How, whether, why: Causal judgments as counterfactual contrasts

Proceedings of the 37th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci 2015

Volumn , Issue , 2015, Pages 782-787

  Gerstenberg, Tobias ^a   Goodman, Noah D ^b   Lagnado, David A ^c   Tenenbaum, Joshua B ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

causality; counterfactuals; intuitive physics; mental simulation

Indexed keywords

BILLIARD BALLS; CAUSALITY; COUNTERFACTUALS; GENERATIVE MODEL; INTUITIVE PHYSIC; MENTAL SIMULATION; NEWTONIAN MODEL; SIMULATION MODEL;

COGNITIVE SYSTEMS;

EID: 85139505159     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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