How Do You Know You are Not a Zombie?

Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge

Volumn , Issue , 2017, Pages 1-13

  Dretske, Fred ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85139322458     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9781315245997-8     Document Type: Chapter

References (26)

1. Armstrong, D. (1961), Perception and the Physical World, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
2. Armstrong, D. (1962), Bodily Sensations, London; Routledge and Kegan Paul.
3. Bermúdez, J.L. (1998), The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Bradford Books.
4. Bernecker, S. (1996), ‘Externalism and the Attitudinal Component of Self-Knowledge’, Noûs, 30, 262-75.
5. Burge, T. (1988), ‘Individualism and Self-Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy, 85, 649-93.
6. Burge, T. (1996), ‘Our Entidement to Self-Knowledge’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XCVI, 91-116.
7. Chalmers, D. (1996), The Conscious Mind, New York: Oxford University Press.
8. Dretske, F. (1981), Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Bradford Books.
9. Dretske, F. (1995), Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Bradford Books.
10. Dretske, F. (1999), ‘The Mind’s Awareness of Itself’, Philosophical Studies, 95, 103-24.
11. Also in (1997), Frank Esken and Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds), Bewusstsein und Representation, Verlag Ferdinand Schoeningh, Paderborn Germany. Reprinted in Dretske (2000).
12. Dretske, F. (2000), Knowledge, Perception, andBelief: Selected Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. Dretske, F. (forthcoming 2003), ‘Externalism and Self-Knowledge’, in S. Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
14. Gibson, J.J. (1979), The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Publishers.
15. Heil, J. (1988), ‘Privileged Access’, Mind, 47, 238-51.
16. Lycan, W. (1996), Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Bradford Books.
17. Lycan, W. (1997), ‘Consciousness as Internal Monitoring’, in N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Giizeldere (eds), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Bradford Books.
18. Pitcher, G. (1971), A Theory of Perception, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
19. Reid, Thomas (1785), Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, edited and abridged by A.D. Woozley, Charlottesville: Ibis Publishing.
20. Siewert, C. (1998), The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
21. Shoemaker, S. (1986), ‘Introspection and the Self’, P. French, T. Uehling and H. Wettstein (eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press), 110-120. Reprinted in Shoemaker (1996) (page references are to this).
22. Shoemaker, S. (1994), ‘Self-Knowledge and “Inner Sense”"', Philosophy andPhenomenological Research, 54, 249-314. Reprinted in Shoemaker (1996: 201-23).
23. Shoemaker, S. (1996), The First Person Perspective and Other Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
24. Stubenberg, L. (1998), Consciousness and Qualia, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
25. Tye, M. (1995), Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Bradford Books.
26. Wittgenstein, L. (1921/1961), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, London: Roudedge and Kegan Paul.