Homes of Origin: Return and Property Rights in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina

Refuge

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 8-16

  Madsen, Lene ^a  

^a Office of the High Representative

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EID: 85134337453     PISSN: 02295113     EISSN: 19207336     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.25071/1920-7336.21199     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. Chapter 1, article 1, annex 7 (“Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons”) of the General Framework Agreement for Peace.
2. The Office of the High Representative interpreted the homes of origin provision of annex 7 of the Dayton Accords to mean the right to return to the housing unit in which one lived before the war. Unhcr, “1998 Presentation by unhcr, ” Property and Housing Issues Affecting Repatriates and Displaced Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina (compilation of material assembled by ohr for Property Law Training Workshops), 27 (4).
3. Of the approximately 2.2 million displaced people at the end of the war, 1.2 million were refugees, while approximately 1 million were displaced within the borders of Bosnia. International Crisis Group (icg), Going Nowhere Fast: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Bosnia, International Crisis Group (icg) Bosnia Project, April 30, 1997, p. 8.
4. Pre-war Yugoslavia had several types of property, including what is referred to as socially owned property, a form of property entitlement that is stronger than a rental arrangement, but weaker than private property rights.
5. Article 1, protocol 1 of the ehcr states, “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.”
6. Marcus Cox, Strategic Approaches to International Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Geneva: casin, 1998), 38, 39.
7. ohr, Refugee Return through Property Laws: Briefing Paper (Sarajevo: ohr, August 1999), 1.
8. crpc/unhcr, Return, Relocation, and Property Rights: A Dis-cussion Paper, (Sarajevo: crpc/unhcr, December 1997), p. 8.
9. Under annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Accords, the Office of the High Representative (ohr) is the lead agency in Bosnia that deals with civilian aspects of peace implementation. The ohr was given the task at Dayton to mobilize and coordinate the activities of agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement. The Peace Implementation Council has the power to expand or develop the powers of the High Representative.
10. The international community has developed an elaborate struc-ture and process to encourage those who are still displaced to return to their home of origin, and has focused with particular intensity on minority returnees. Through the Return and Reconstruction Task Force (rrtf), which is led by the ohr but supported also by the unhcr and other agencies, the international community has sought to promote return by addressing issues of “space, security and sustainability.” In contending with “space,” the rrtf has focused on encouraging implementation of the property laws by pressuring and encouraging local offi-cials, to ensure that minorities are once again given access to their property. The rrtf has also played a fundamental role in identifying “axes of return” throughout Bosnia, directing do-nor funding to areas where minority return is underway or likely to commence.
11. Oganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
12. The Bonn Powers are enumerated in chapter 11, paragraph 2 of the Bonn pic Declaration, which states in part, “The Council welcomes the High Representative’s intention to use his final authority … to facilitate the resolution of difficulties by mak-ing binding decisions as he judges necessary.”
13. ohr, Refugee Return through Property Laws, 1.
14. David L. Bosco, “Reintegrating Bosnia: A Progress Report, ” The Washington Quarterly (Spring 1998), 76.
15. ohr, Refugee Return through Property Laws, 4.
16. icg, in its report Rebuilding a Multi-Ethnic Sarajevo: The Need for Minority Returns, icg Bosnia Project, February 3, 1998, indi-cates that about 5000 homes in Sarajevo Canton are occupied by people who have access to alternative housing” p.7.
17. This occurs where temporary occupants are beneficiaries of a reconstruction project, but continue to occupy other housing. This may be because they have a job in the area of the home they occupy, or may simply be because they prefer to have two accommodations.
18. icg, Going Nowhere Fast, 11.
19. Bosco, Reintegrating Bosnia, 70; see also Jane M. O. Sharpe, “Dayton Report Card,” International Security 22 (3): 4.
20. Chaloka Beyani, “A Political and Legal Analysis of the Problem of Return of Forcibly Transferred Populations,” Refugee Survey Quarterly, 6 (3): 4.
21. Cox, Strategic Approaches, 28, 29.
22. icg, Minority Return or Mass Relocation? 43.
23. icg, Changing Course? The Implications of the Divide in Bosnian-Croat Politics, icg Bosnia Project, August 13, 1998.
24. David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton (Lon-don: Pluto Press, 1999), 75.
25. An example is documented by icg in their report, A Tale of Two Cities: Return of Displaced Persons to Jajce and Travnik, icg Bosnia Project, June 3, 1998. The hdz administration in Jajce has been generally obstructive of Bosniak returns to the town. The sda administration in Travnik has obstructed returns to Travnik, but relatively supportive of returns by Muslims from Travnik to other parts of the country.
26. European Stability Initiative (esi), Reshaping International Pri-orities in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosnian Power Structures (Brussels: esi, 14 October 1999), 15.
27. Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy, 107.
28. Susan Woodward, “Bosnia after Dayton: Year Two,” Current History 96 (608): 103.
29. unhcr, Refworld, www.unhcr.ch/world/euro/bosnia.htm (Oc-tober 9, 1999).
30. Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy, 104.
31. crpc/unhcr, Return, Relocation and Property Rights, 19. This study involved a survey of 862 displaced persons in BiH, and 683 refugees in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The survey was complemented by a series of focus groups held with refugees and displaced persons.
32. Cox, Strategic Approaches, 29.
33. Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy, 105.
34. Cox, Strategic Approaches, 42.
35. Unhcr, unhcr Note on Returns from Germany to Internal Dis-placement in Bosnia and Herzegovina (unhcr: Sarajevo, July 1998), paragraph 3.4.
36. Unhcr, Repatriation and Return Operation 1998 (unhcr: Sarajevo, 1998), 3, 4.
37. Relocation has been used unscrupulously by some European governments as well as by municipal governments. Numerous Laender in Germany (which, according to unhcr, establish their own criteria for termination of temporary protection and refugee deportation), for example, have supported relocation in violation of underlying property rights. For example, relocation projects in Sanski Most and Bosanski Krupa in Canton 1 have involved the reconstruction of houses owned by displaced Serbs, for the continued residence of the Muslim dps. Municipal governments have in some cases extended themselves to attract this kind of “assistance,” preferring to keep the dps (who are of the same ethnicity and hence more apt to vote for them) than to promote return of minorities (who are less likely to vote for them). Municipalities have also been involved in supporting relocation projects by offering empty municipal land for the purpose—this is not itself a problem, but where that land was used for cultural, social, or religious purposes before the war, such relocation would be in violation of a High Representative Decision of May 26, 1999, intended to ensure that land previ-ously used by minorities is not reallocated.
38. crpc/unhcr, Return, Relocation, and Property Rights, 1.
39. Elsewhere I have seen references to establishing a compensa-tion mechanism, as is foreseen in annex 7 of Dayton and in the mandate of the crpc. I have not listed it here because it seems an unlikely strategy in a context where there are few internal resources to invest in such an enterprise, and where international agencies clearly do not intend to provide resources ei-ther. Any scheme based on vouchers or coupons seems unwieldy and impracticable.
40. crpc/unhcr, Return, Relocation, and Property Rights, 25.