Liberal legitimacy, reasonable disagreement and justice

Pluralism and Liberal Neutrality

Volumn , Issue , 2020, Pages 19-36

  Caney, Simon ^a  

^a NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85121481486     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1201/9781315037158-3     Document Type: Chapter

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