HOW CAN WE USE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DISCOVERY AND JUSTIFICATION? ON THE WEAKNESSES OF THE STRONG PROGRAMME IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE

Archimedes

Volumn 14, Issue , 2006, Pages 133-158

  Sturm, Thomas ^a   Gigerenzer, Gerd ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Causal Explanation; Irrational Belief; Knowledge Claim; Propositional Content; True Belief

Indexed keywords

EID: 85102109544     PISSN: 13850180     EISSN: 22150064     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/1-4020-4251-5_9     Document Type: Chapter

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