Understanding Scientific Practices: The Role of Robustness Notions

Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science

Volumn 292, Issue , 2012, Pages 289-315

  Boon, Mieke ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Methodological Criterion; Scientific Practice; Scientific Result; Semantic Concept; Theoretical Knowledge

Indexed keywords

EID: 85102002295     PISSN: 00680346     EISSN: 22147942     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-2759-5_12     Document Type: Chapter

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