Complex Technology, Complex Calculations: Uses and Abuses of Precautionary Reasoning in Law

International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology

Volumn 3, Issue , 2009, Pages 175-190

  Beyleveld, Deryck ^a   Brownsword, Roger ^b  

^a DURHAM UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Burden of proof; Floodgates; Gewirth; Pascal; Precaution; Precautionary principle; Precautionary reasoning; Proportionality; Slippery slope

Indexed keywords

EID: 85098204040     PISSN: 18750044     EISSN: 18750036     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-2229-5_12     Document Type: Chapter

References (29)

1. James H. Moor, “Why We Need Better Ethics for Emerging Technologies” in Jeroen van den Hoven and John Weckert (eds), Information Technology and Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 26, at 27.
2. Compare Mathias Klang, Disruptive Technology (Göteborg: Göteborg University, 2006).
3. Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genetically Modified Crops: The Ethical and Social Issues (London, May 1999) at 162. For a more specific elaboration, see Pfizer [2002] ECR II-3305, at para 143: “a preventive measure cannot properly be based on a purely hypothetical approach to risk, founded on mere conjecture which has not been scientifically verified.” So, mere conjecture and hypothesis will not suffice. But, a precautionary measure may apply where the risk “has not yet been fully demonstrated” (para 146). The underlying science must be consistent with principles of “excellence, transparency and independence” (para 172).
4. For helpful recent overviews of the EC jurisprudence, see Veerle Heyvaert, “Guidance Without Constraint: Assessing the Impact of the Precautionary Principle on the European Community’s Chemicals Policy” (2006) 6 The Yearbook of European Environmental Law 27, esp. 29–37, and “Facing the Consequences of the Precautionary Principle in European Community Law” (2006) 31 European Law Review 185.
5. For a recent assault on the principle, see, e.g., Gary E. Marchant and Douglas J. Sylvester, “Transnational Models for Regulation of Nanotechnology” (2006) 34 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 714.
6. See Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans A., J. Krailsheimer (London, Penguin 1966) p. 151.
7. The standard is set by the “ significant harm” test in s. 31(2) Children Act, 1989.
8. See Shaun D. Pattinson, Medical Law and Ethics (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2006) pp.15–17.
9. Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462, 480 (per Viscount Sankey).
10. European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (WT/DS291/23 (United States), WT/DS292/17 (Canada), and WT/DS293/17 (Argentina), August 8, 2003), decided by the WTO in Autumn 2006.
11. Nicolaas de Sadeleer has written an excellent treatise on the role and function of, amongst other principles, “the precautionary principle” in law in his Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). The approach taken by de Sadeleer differs from our own in focussing on more or less explicit references to the precautionary principle in, for the most part, though not exclusively, environmental law from an historical perspective, rather than trying to develop a purely a priori analysis of features that would render a precautionary approach rational, which can then be used to identify uses of precautionary reasoning and their rationality in any area of law whether or not this is explicitly recognised. De Sadeleer’s approach leads him to an important thesis about the function that a shift to a precautionary approach has in maintaining rationality in a system of “post-modern” law. Such an ideological focus is not necessarily incompatible with our own, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider his analysis in the light of our own.
12. Compare, e.g., Ronald Sandler and W.D. Kay, “The National Nanotechnology Initiative and the Social Good” (2006) 34 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 675, at 679.
13. As in the famous Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration (June 1992) which requires parties to “take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.” In this context, the Declaration continues: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures.”
14. See EU Communication on the Precautionary Principle (IP/OO.96) (February 2000).
15. For an excellent discussion, see Richard B. Stewart, “Environmental Regulatory Decision Making Under Uncertainty” in Timothy Swanson (ed), An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Environmental Policy: Issues in Institutional Design (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 2002) 71.
16. Compare Council for Science and Technology, Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies: A Review of Government’s Progress on its Policy Commitments (London, March 2007) para 52 et seq (for the view that, while precaution does not entail a moratorium on the development of nanotechnology, the basic research should not be neglected). For similar emphasis on the importance of conducting the basic research, see the French National Consultative Ethics Committee for Health and Life Sciences, Opinion No 96 (“Ethical Issues Raised by Nanosciences, Nanotechnologies and Health”, 2007) p. 10.
17. Samual Butler, Erewhon (London: Penguin Books, 1985: first published 1872).
18. Cass Sunstein, Laws of Fear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
19. Adam Burgess, Cellular Phones, Public Fears, and a Culture of Precaution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 281. But, the elusive quest continues: see, e.g., Geoffrey Lean, “Wi-Fi: the Backlash” The Independent on Sunday, July 15, 2007, p. 14 (Haringey council resolving to adopt a precautionary approach to wi-fi technology in schools).
20. See Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans A., J. Krailsheimer (London, Penguin 1966) p. 151.
21. See Groundwork of the Metaphyisics of Morals (1785) translated with a commentary by H. J. Paton under the title The Moral Law (London Hutchinson 1948).
22. See Reason and Morality, (Chicago: Chicago University Press 1978).
23. For more on this precautionary argument see Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001) pp. 119–134.
24. It is no secret that we consider Gewirth’s argument to be sound. For a defence of Gewirth’s argument see, in particular, Deryck Beyleveld, The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An Analysis and Defense of Alan Gewirth’s Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency. (Chicago: Chicago University Press 1991). For an analysis of the relationship between Gewirth’s and Kant’s arguments, see Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001) pp. 86–110.
25. Patricia Smith Churchland, “Moral Decision-Making and the Brain” in Judy Illes (ed), Neuroethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) p. 3.
26. House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee, Government Proposals for the Regulation of Hybrid and Chimera Embryos (Fifth Report of Session 2006–2007) (HC 272-I, 5 April, 2007); the Academy of Medical Sciences, Inter-Species Embryos (London, July, 2007); and, most recently, House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, HL Paper 169-I, HC Paper 630-I (London: The Stationery Office, August 1, 2007).
27. David Winickoff, Sheila Jasanoff, Lawrence Busch, Robin Grove-White, and Brian Wynne, “Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law” (2005) 30 Yale Journal of International Law 81.
28. Compare Sara Poli, “Restrictions on the Cultivation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Issues of EC Law” on Han Somsen (ed), The Regulatory Challenge of Biotechnology (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007) p. 156.
29. Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001) pp. 255–258.