Dispositions toward counterfactuals in ethics

The Good, the Right, Life and Death: Essays in Honor of Fred Feldman

Volumn , Issue , 2017, Pages 173-187

  Conee, Earl ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

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Indexed keywords

EID: 85087261241     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9781315239323-10     Document Type: Chapter

References (9)

1. Bradley, Ben (2004), ‘When is Death Bad for the One Who Dies?’Noûs, Vol. 38(1), pp. 1-28.
2. Draper, Kai (1999), ‘Disappointment, Sadness, and Death,’The Philosophical Review, Vol. 108(3), pp. 387-414.
3. Feldman, Fred (1991), ‘Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death,’The Philosophical Review, Vol. 100(2), pp. 205-227.
4. Feldman, Fred (1992), Confrontations with the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of Death, Oxford, New York.
5. Firth, Roderick (1952), ‘Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer,’Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 12(1), pp. 317-345.
6. Goodman, Jeffrey (unpublished), Toward an Adequate Theory of Possible and Impossible Worlds (University of Rochester doctoral dissertation).
7. Hursthouse, Rosalind (1996), ‘Normative Virtue Ethics,’ in Roger Crisp (ed.), I low Should One Live? Essays in the Philosophy of Virtue, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
8. Lewis, David (1979), ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow,’Noûs, Vol. 13(4), pp. 455-476.
9. Shope, Robert K. (1978), ‘The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy,’The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 75, pp. 397-413.