Soil pollution, community action and political opportunities

The Political Context of Collective Action

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 105-125

  Aarts, Kees ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE   (Netherlands)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85082503372     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203449677-9     Document Type: Chapter

References (37)

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