Reciprocation and learning in the Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma game

Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport

Volumn , Issue , 2019, Pages 299-314

  Goren, Harel ^a   Bornstein, Gary ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85079309886     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (22)

1. Abbink, K., & Sadrieh, A. (1995). Ratlmage: Research assistance toolbox fo r computeraided human behavior experiments. University of Bonn, Discussion paper No. B-325.
2. Allison, G. (1971). Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis. Boston: Little, Brown.
3. Bornstein, G. (1992). The free rider problem in intergroup conflicts over step-level and continuous public goods. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 597-606.
4. Bornstein, G., Winter, E., & Goren, H. (1996). Experimental study of repeated team games. European Journal of Political Economy, 12, 629-639.
5. Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. I. (1985). Culture and the evolutionary process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
6. Brams, S. (1975) Game theory and politics: International relations games. New York: The Free Press.
7. Colman, A. (1982). Game theory and experimental games: The study of strategic interaction. Oxford, England: Pergamon Press.
8. Guttman, I. M. (1986). Matching behavior and collective action: Some experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7, 171-198.
9. Harley, C. B. (1981). Leaming the evolutionary stable strategy. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 89, 611-633.
10. Maynard Smith, I. (1984). Game theory and evolution of behavior. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7, 95-125.
11. Messick, D., Allison, S., & Samuelson, C. (1988). Framing and communication effects on group members' responses to environmental and social uncertainty. In S. Maital (Ed.). Applied behavioral economics, (Vol. 2, pp. 677-700). New York: New York University Press.
12. Neter, J., Wasserman, W., & Kutner, M. H. (1990). Applied linear statistical models: Regression, analysis of variance, and experimental design (3rd ed.). Boston: IRWIN.
13. Neyman, A (1995). Cooperation in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma when the number of stages is not commonly known. Discussion Paper No. 65., The Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
14. Palfrey, T. R., & Rosenthal, H. (1983). A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice, 41, 7-53.
15. Radlow, R. (1965). An experimental study of cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 9, 221-227.
16. Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A M. (1965). Prisoner's dilemma: A study in conflict and cooperation. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
17. Roth, A, & Erev, I. (1995). Leaming in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term. Games and Economic Behavior, 8, 164-212.
18. Selten, R. (1991). Evolution, learning, and economic behavior. Games and Economic Behavior, 3, 3-24.
19. Snidal, D. (1986). The game theory of international politics. In K. Oye (Ed.), Cooperation under anarchy, (pp. 25-57). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
20. Suleiman, R., & Rapoport, A (1988). Environmental and social uncertainty in single-trial resource dilemmas. Acta Psychologica, 68, 99-112.
21. Thorndike, E. L. (1898). Animal intelligence: An experimental study of the associative processes in animals. Psychological Monographs, 2.
22. van de Kragt, A J. C., Orbell, J. M., & Dawes, R. M. (1983). The minimal contributing set as a solution to public goods problems. American Political Science Review, 77, 112-122.