Incomplete contracts and signalling

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 1992, Pages 432-443

  Spier, Kathryn E ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85076787280     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: 17562171     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2555872     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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