Congressional control or judicial independence: The determinants of U.S. Supreme Court labor-relations decisions, 1949-1988

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 1992, Pages 463-492

  Spiller, Pablo T ^a   Gely, Rafael ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85076754529     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: 17562171     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2555900     Document Type: Article

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