Decentralization and the structure of Chinese corporate boards: Do politicians Jeopardize board professionalism and firm performance?

China's Domestic Private Firms: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Management and Performance

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 147-170

  Chen, Dong Hua ^a,b   Fan, Joseph P H ^c   Wong, T J ^d  

^a NANJING UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b SHANGHAI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS   (China)

^c CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^d Chinese University of Hong Kong   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85076071565     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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