Solidarity: Its microfoundations and macrodependence. A framing approach

The Problem of Solidarity: Theories and Models

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 61-112

  Lindenberg, Siegwart ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85071688806     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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