메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 85-113

The disappearance of analogy in descartes, spinoza, and regis

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 85071218049     PISSN: 00455091     EISSN: 19110820     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2000.10717526     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (15)

References (73)
  • 1
    • 0011341666 scopus 로고
    • Paris: J. Vrin, AT:, vols., cited by volume (-part) and page. For standard English translations of the passages from Descartes, see The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, volumes I-II, J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984–85), and The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, volume III, The Correspondence, J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, and A. Kenny, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991). The latter contains the passages from the record of Descartes’ interview. Translations these three volumes are keyed to the pagination AT. Translations the text and notes of passages from Latin and French primary texts and the French secondary literature are my own., and, eds
    • Adam, C., and Tannery, P., eds. 1964–78. Œuvres de Descartes 11Paris: J. Vrin. AT:, vols., cited by volume (-part) and page. For standard English translations of the passages from Descartes, see The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, volumes I-II, J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984–85), and The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, volume III, The Correspondence, J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, and A. Kenny, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991). The latter contains the passages from the record of Descartes’ interview. Translations in these three volumes are keyed to the pagination in AT. Translations in the text and notes of passages from Latin and French primary texts and the French secondary literature are my own.
    • (1964) Œuvres de Descartes , pp. 11
    • Adam, C.1    Tannery, P.2
  • 2
    • 85071216211 scopus 로고
    • See, for instance, the following exchange the23 Dasie Radner, ‘Is There a Problem of Cartesian Interaction?’ 35–49; Robert Richardson and Louis Loeb, ‘Replies to Dasie Radners Is There a Problem of Cartesian Interaction?’ 221–31; and Radner, ‘Rejoinder to Professors Richardson and Loeb,’ 232–36
    • 1985. Journal of the History of Philosophy See, for instance, the following exchange in the23 Dasie Radner, ‘Is There a Problem of Cartesian Interaction?’ 35–49; Robert Richardson and Louis Loeb, ‘Replies to Dasie Radner's “Is There a Problem of Cartesian Interaction?”’ 221–31; and Radner, ‘Rejoinder to Professors Richardson and Loeb,’ 232–36.
    • (1985) Journal of the History of Philosophy
  • 3
    • 0010576285 scopus 로고
    • 2nd ed., Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, This thesis is anticipated the discussion of Descartes’ ‘inversion métaphysique’ of the scholastic doctrine of analogy Henri Gouhier, La pensée métaphysique de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin 1962), 221–32
    • Marion, Jean-Luc. 1991. Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes. Analogie, création des vérités éternelles et fondement, 2nd ed. 23Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. This thesis is anticipated in the discussion of Descartes’ ‘inversion métaphysique’ of the scholastic doctrine of analogy in Henri Gouhier, La pensée métaphysique de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin 1962), 221–32.
    • (1991) Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes. Analogie, création des vérités éternelles et fondement , pp. 23
    • Marion, J.-L.1
  • 4
    • 85071211227 scopus 로고
    • Heidelberg: Carl Winters, Ip3, G 2:47. Spinoza endorsed the Dissimilarity Principle E Ipl7s, G 2:62f. E Ethics (Ethica), using ‘p’ for proposition, ‘ax’ for axiom, ‘def’ for definition, ‘d’ for demonstration, ‘s’ for scholium, and ‘c’ for corollary. G: Spinoza Opera, ed. G. Gebhardt vols., cited by volume and page. For standard English translations of the passages I cite from the Ethics, see The Collected Works of Spinoza, volume I, E.M. Curley, ed. and trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1985). Translations this text are keyed to the pagination G
    • 1925. E 4Heidelberg: Carl Winters. Ip3, G 2:47. Spinoza endorsed the Dissimilarity Principle in E Ipl7s, G 2:62f. E Ethics (Ethica), using ‘p’ for proposition, ‘ax’ for axiom, ‘def’ for definition, ‘d’ for demonstration, ‘s’ for scholium, and ‘c’ for corollary. G: Spinoza Opera, ed. G. Gebhardt vols., cited by volume and page. For standard English translations of the passages I cite from the Ethics, see The Collected Works of Spinoza, volume I, E.M. Curley, ed. and trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1985). Translations in this text are keyed to the pagination in G.
    • (1925) , pp. 4
  • 5
    • 85071210481 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Paris: J. Cusson 1704), I-2, xxxv, 203f. I cite this text by book-part, chapter, and page. I use ‘Ref.’ as an abbreviation for the ‘Refutation of the opinion of Spinoza,’ an appendix to the Use of Reason
    • Regis, Pierre-Sylvain. Usage de la raison et de la foy (Paris: J. Cusson 1704), I-2, xxxv, 203f. I cite this text by book-part, chapter, and page. I use ‘Ref.’ as an abbreviation for the ‘Refutation of the opinion of Spinoza,’ an appendix to the Use of Reason.
    • Usage de la raison et de la foy
    • Regis, P.-S.1
  • 6
    • 0002003001 scopus 로고
    • Oxford: Oxford University Press, From the editors introduction to, xviii. Cf. the editorial comments Lentretien avec Burman, ed. J.-M. Beyssade (Paris: J. Vrin 1981), 158., ed
    • Cottingham, J., ed. 1976. Descartes’ Conversation with Burman Oxford: Oxford University Press. From the editor's introduction to, xviii. Cf. the editorial comments in L'entretien avec Burman, ed. J.-M. Beyssade (Paris: J. Vrin 1981), 158.
    • (1976) Descartes’ Conversation with Burman
    • Cottingham, J.1
  • 7
    • 79958410458 scopus 로고
    • Ferdinand Alquié has urged that the views of Descartes recorded by Burman and Clauberg are ‘imprecise and not exempt from contradictions’, !F. Alquié, [Paris: J. Vrin ], 3:765f). For a discussion of the problems that Alquié cites which adds others besides, see Roger Ariew, ‘The Infinite Descartes’ Conversation with Burman,’ Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie69 (1987) 140–63
    • 1973. (Œuvres philosophiques de Descartes Ferdinand Alquié has urged that the views of Descartes recorded by Burman and Clauberg are ‘imprecise and not exempt from contradictions’, !F. Alquié, [Paris: J. Vrin ], 3:765f). For a discussion of the problems that Alquié cites which adds others besides, see Roger Ariew, ‘The Infinite in Descartes’ Conversation with Burman,’ Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie69 (1987) 140–63.
    • (1973) (Œuvres philosophiques de Descartes
  • 8
    • 85071211782 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Also at issue is Descartes’ claim the ‘Fifth Replies’ that ‘divine [creation] is closer to natural production than to artificial [production]’ (AT 7:373
    • Also at issue is Descartes’ claim in the ‘Fifth Replies’ that ‘divine [creation] is closer to natural production than to artificial [production]’ (AT 7:373).
  • 9
    • 84884768371 scopus 로고
    • 31 Dec. AT 3:274; cf. the remarks the ‘Third Meditation’ at AT 7:40
    • 1640. To Mersenne 31 Dec. AT 3:274; cf. the remarks in the ‘Third Meditation’ at AT 7:40.
    • (1640) To Mersenne
  • 10
    • 85071217958 scopus 로고
    • See for instance Descartes claim that God alone is a universal cause that serves also as a total cause insofar as everything depends on His will, 6 Oct. AT 4:314
    • 1645. (To Elisabeth See for instance Descartes' claim that God alone is a universal cause that serves also as a total cause insofar as everything depends on His will, 6 Oct. AT 4:314).
    • (1645) (To Elisabeth
  • 13
    • 85071202584 scopus 로고
    • ‘Substantia itaque increata est per se ipsa substantialiter atque essentialiter subsistens, atque ita ex vi suæ habet completam rationem substantiæ; substantia vero creata… [si] vero sit completa substantia, quamvis subsistat actu, non tamen vi suæ essentiæ formaliter ac præcise, sed per aliquem modum et actum suæ essentiæ, et ideo substantialis natura creata, ut infra dictam, non est essentialiter actus subsistens, sed aptitudine’ XXXII, i, 7, Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, C. Berton, ed. [Paris: Vivès ], 26:314). I cite Suárezs text by disputation, section, and paragraph
    • 1866. Metaphysical Disputations ‘Substantia itaque increata est per se ipsa substantialiter atque essentialiter subsistens, atque ita ex vi suæ habet completam rationem substantiæ; substantia vero creata… [si] vero sit completa substantia, quamvis subsistat actu, non tamen vi suæ essentiæ formaliter ac præcise, sed per aliquem modum et actum suæ essentiæ, et ideo substantialis natura creata, ut infra dictam, non est essentialiter actus subsistens, sed aptitudine’ XXXII, i, 7, in Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, C. Berton, ed. [Paris: Vivès ], 26:314). I cite Suárez's text by disputation, section, and paragraph.
    • (1866) Metaphysical Disputations
  • 14
    • 0012757115 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Descartes’ reference to his discovery of the notion of material falsity Suárezs, at AT 7:235
    • Disputations See Descartes’ reference to his discovery of the notion of material falsity in Suárez's, at AT 7:235.
    • Disputations
  • 15
    • 85071218852 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • La théorie cartésienne de la substance: Equivocité ou analogie
    • Cf. Jean-Marie Beyssade f, 66.,. In
    • 1996. “ ‘La théorie cartésienne de la substance: Equivocité ou analogie,’ ”. In Revue Internationale de Philosophie 195 59 Cf. Jean-Marie Beyssade f, 66.
    • (1996) Revue Internationale de Philosophie 195 , pp. 59
  • 16
    • 85071214845 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • However, Descartes did claim that the positive cause of Gods existence ‘can be referred by analogy to efficient causes and that talk of God causing perfections himself is ‘derived by analogy [analogia] with the notion of efficient causation? (AT 7:240, 242). But cf. the reading of these passages Marion, Sur la théologie, 428–44, which emphasizes their deviation from the views of Aquinas. I consider below Marions interpretation of Descartes’ views on analogy
    • [per analogiam ad efficientem],’ However, Descartes did claim that the positive cause of God's existence ‘can be referred by analogy to efficient causes and that talk of God causing perfections in himself is ‘derived by analogy [analogia] with the notion of efficient causation? (AT 7:240, 242). But cf. the reading of these passages in Marion, Sur la théologie, 428–44, which emphasizes their deviation from the views of Aquinas. I consider below Marion's interpretation of Descartes’ views on analogy.
    • per analogiam ad efficientem],’
  • 17
    • 85071218296 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • ‘[A]liquo modo conveniat ratione substantiæ cum aliquibus entibus creatis, non tarnen univoce, sed analogice’, XXXII, i, 7, Opera, 26:314
    • (Met. Disp. ‘[A]liquo modo conveniat in ratione substantiæ cum aliquibus entibus creatis, non tarnen univoce, sed analogice’, XXXII, i, 7, in Opera, 26:314).
    • (Met. Disp.
  • 18
    • 85071218296 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • XXVIII, ii, 9 and 11, Opera, 26:10 and 11. Cf. the claim that while uncreated substance is substantial ‘per se ipsa,’ created substance has a substantiality that is ‘imperfect’ since it ‘inherently includes a negation’ (Met. Disp., XXXI, i, 7, Opera, 26:314
    • Met. Disp. XXVIII, ii, 9 and 11, in Opera, 26:10 and 11. Cf. the claim that while uncreated substance is substantial ‘per se ipsa,’ created substance has a substantiality that is ‘imperfect’ since it ‘inherently includes a negation’ (Met. Disp., XXXI, i, 7, in Opera, 26:314).
    • Met. Disp.
  • 19
    • 85071201424 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • I do wonder, however, whether the ‘common concept’ of being that Marion finds Suárez is the end distinct from a Thomistic concept that applies primarily to God and only derivatively to creatures
    • I do wonder, however, whether the ‘common concept’ of being that Marion finds in Suárez is in the end distinct from a Thomistic concept that applies primarily to God and only derivatively to creatures.
  • 20
    • 85038702440 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Roger Ariew has pointed out to me that Descartes read Eustachius scholastic text, the (1609), which explicitly endorses univocal predication. There is thus some reason to think that Descartes was aware of the Scotist alternative to Thomistic analogy. My point against Marion is simply that it is highly doubtful that Descartes would have been able to discern this alternative Suárez, if indeed the alternative is there to be discerned
    • Summa philosophica quadripartita Roger Ariew has pointed out to me that Descartes read Eustachius' scholastic text, the (1609), which explicitly endorses univocal predication. There is thus some reason to think that Descartes was aware of the Scotist alternative to Thomistic analogy. My point against Marion is simply that it is highly doubtful that Descartes would have been able to discern this alternative in Suárez, if indeed the alternative is there to be discerned.
    • Summa philosophica quadripartita
  • 21
    • 85071209506 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • I do not follow Marions claim that the dependence of creatures on God is for Descartes merely ‘extrinsic’ to the essence of created substance (‘A propos,’ 117f; cf., 110–13). The Principles seems to me to make clear that this dependence is part of the very notion of created substance, and thus that this notion is distinct from the strict or proper notion of substance
    • Sur la théologie I do not follow Marion's claim that the dependence of creatures on God is for Descartes merely ‘extrinsic’ to the essence of created substance (‘A propos,’ 117f; cf., 110–13). The Principles seems to me to make clear that this dependence is part of the very notion of created substance, and thus that this notion is distinct from the strict or proper notion of substance.
    • Sur la théologie
  • 22
    • 85071216620 scopus 로고
    • But there is one letter which Descartes did speak of the human will as ‘infinite’ (Dec. AT 2:628). This claim may simply be careless, and is any case not to be found his discussion the ‘Fourth Meditation.’
    • 1639. To Mersenne, 25 But there is one letter in which Descartes did speak of the human will as ‘infinite’ (Dec. AT 2:628). This claim may simply be careless, and is in any case not to be found in his discussion in the ‘Fourth Meditation.’
    • (1639) To Mersenne, 25
  • 23
    • 85071209051 scopus 로고
    • Cf. the claim the first of the 1630 letters to Mersenne that we esteem Gods greatness all the more since we cannot grasp it (AT 1:145) and the emphasis a letter to More, which contains his last word on the subject, on the fact that a finite mind cannot set limits to an infinite power (AT 5:272). As is clear from Marions useful chart 270f, the appeal to the incomprehensibility of Gods power is found nearly every discussion which Descartes broached the created truths doctrine
    • 1649. Sur la théologie Cf. the claim in the first of the 1630 letters to Mersenne that we esteem God's greatness all the more since we cannot grasp it (AT 1:145) and the emphasis in a letter to More, which contains his last word on the subject, on the fact that a finite mind cannot set limits to an infinite power (AT 5:272). As is clear from Marion's useful chart in, 270f, the appeal to the incomprehensibility of God's power is found in nearly every discussion in which Descartes broached the created truths doctrine.
    • (1649) Sur la théologie
  • 24
    • 85071205509 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Spinoza appealed explicitly to the result Ip16 that there derive from the divine essence ‘infinitely many things infinitely many modes (that is, everything that can fall under infinite intellect)’ (G 2:60), but E Ip25s he used this proposition to demonstrate that ‘God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of [their] essence’ (G 2:67f
    • E Spinoza appealed explicitly to the result in Ip16 that there derive from the divine essence ‘infinitely many things in infinitely many modes (that is, everything that can fall under infinite intellect)’ (G 2:60), but in E Ip25s he used this proposition to demonstrate that ‘God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of [their] essence’ (G 2:67f).
  • 25
    • 85071200964 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • This is my gloss on Spinozas argument, which provides no justification for the conclusion that ‘if the essence of one could be destroyed, and become false, the essence of the other would be destroyed’ (G 2:63). I base this gloss both on the official definition of essence as ‘that which being given the thing is necessarily posited, and which being taken away the thing is necessarily taken away’ (IIdef2, G 2:84), and on the discussion E Ip8s2 of the ‘human nature general’ that several individuals share (G 2:50f). E IIp40s1, however, Spinoza used the example of the word ‘man’ as an example of something that stands for a confused universal (G 2:121
    • E This is my gloss on Spinoza's argument, which provides no justification for the conclusion that ‘if the essence of one could be destroyed, and become false, the essence of the other would be destroyed’ (G 2:63). I base this gloss both on the official definition of essence as ‘that which being given the thing is necessarily posited, and which being taken away the thing is necessarily taken away’ (IIdef2, G 2:84), and on the discussion in E Ip8s2 of the ‘human nature in general’ that several individuals share (G 2:50f). In E IIp40s1, however, Spinoza used the example of the word ‘man’ as an example of something that stands for a confused universal (G 2:121).
  • 26
    • 0037798215 scopus 로고
    • Paris: A. Colin, On this passage, see Alexandre Koyré, ‘Le chien constellation céleste et le chien animal aboyant,’ !A. Koyré, and especially Martial Gueroult, Spinoza I, Dieu (Ethique, I) (Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1968), 272–95
    • 1961. Etudes d'histoire de la pensée philosophique 85–94. Paris: A. Colin. On this passage, see Alexandre Koyré, ‘Le chien constellation céleste et le chien animal aboyant,’ in, !A. Koyré, and especially Martial Gueroult, Spinoza I, Dieu (Ethique, I) (Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1968), 272–95.
    • (1961) Etudes d'histoire de la pensée philosophique , pp. 85-94
  • 27
    • 85071203852 scopus 로고
    • Cf. Spinozas remarks a letter to Oldenburg written around 1661, G 4:14. For English translations of the passages from Spinozas correspondence that I cite, see Spinoza: The Letters, S. Shirley, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett
    • 1995. Letter 4 Cf. Spinoza's remarks in a letter to Oldenburg written around 1661, in, G 4:14. For English translations of the passages from Spinoza's correspondence that I cite, see Spinoza: The Letters, S. Shirley, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett
    • (1995) Letter 4
  • 28
    • 85071211391 scopus 로고
    • Spinozas friend G.H. Schuller transmitted Tschirnhaus’ objection a letter to Spinoza
    • 1675. Spinoza's friend G.H. Schuller transmitted Tschirnhaus’ objection in a letter to Spinoza.
    • (1675)
  • 29
    • 0037523733 scopus 로고
    • Indianapolis: Hackett, Such a view goes back at least to the article on Spinoza the second edition of Pierre Bayes Historical and Critical Dictionary, which was published 1702
    • Bennett, Jonathan. 1984. A Study of Spinoza's Ethics 32Indianapolis: Hackett. Such a view goes back at least to the article on Spinoza in the second edition of Pierre Baye's Historical and Critical Dictionary, which was published in 1702.
    • (1984) A Study of Spinoza's Ethics , pp. 32
    • Bennett, J.1
  • 30
    • 85071207148 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Spinoza himself noted the scholium that ‘I will show later, without the aid of this Proposition, that neither intellect nor will pertain to Gods nature’ (G 2:62). The demonstration, which occurs Ip31, appeals to the fact that both intellect and will are modes, and thus distinct from the divine substance and its attributes (G 2:71f
    • E Spinoza himself noted in the scholium that ‘I will show later, without the aid of this Proposition, that neither intellect nor will pertain to God's nature’ (G 2:62). The demonstration, which occurs in Ip31, appeals to the fact that both intellect and will are modes, and thus distinct from the divine substance and its attributes (G 2:71f).
  • 31
    • 85071212238 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • e siècle 147 (1985, It is interesting, however, that Descartes later compared the essences and eternal truths created by God to Fates that were established by Jupiter but that subsequently bound him (see AT 7:380
    • e siècle 147 (1985, It is interesting, however, that Descartes later compared the essences and eternal truths created by God to Fates that were established by Jupiter but that subsequently bound him (see AT 7:380).
  • 32
    • 0003994331 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Curleys introductory comments 1: xiii
    • Collected Works of Spinoza See Curley's introductory comments in, 1: xiii.
    • Collected Works of Spinoza
  • 33
    • 65949117062 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Cf. Koyré, ‘Le Chien.’
    • Spinoza: Dieu 291–95. Cf. Koyré, ‘Le Chien.’
    • Spinoza: Dieu , pp. 291-295
  • 35
    • 85071211659 scopus 로고
    • 3rd ed., Paris: Delagrave, For more on Regis’ life, see Francisque Bouillier, (1868), 1:517–27. Cf. the official éloge for Regis by the secretary of the Académie des sciences, Fontenelle, Fontenelle, Œuvres completes, G.-B. Depping, ed. (GenèveSlatkine Reprints,89–95
    • 1989. Histoire de la philosophie cartésienne, 3rd ed. 1Paris: Delagrave. For more on Regis’ life, see Francisque Bouillier, (1868), 1:517–27. Cf. the official éloge for Regis by the secretary of the Académie des sciences, Fontenelle, in Fontenelle, Œuvres completes, G.-B. Depping, ed. (GenèveSlatkine Reprints,89–95.
    • (1989) Histoire de la philosophie cartésienne , pp. 1
  • 36
    • 84932634185 scopus 로고
    • Paris:, From the unpaginated preface to Huets anonymously published (Regis was Huets main Cartesian opponent the debate that ensued following the publication of his Censura philosophiœ cartesianœ (Paris: J. Anisson 1689). For more on this debate, see chapter of my forthcoming book, Radical French Cartesianism: Desgabets, Regis, and Constructions of Descartes (1663–1720).,. In
    • 1692. “ 6 ”. In Nouveaux mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du cartésianisme Paris: n.p. From the unpaginated preface to Huet's anonymously published (Regis was Huet's main Cartesian opponent in the debate that ensued following the publication of his Censura philosophiœ cartesianœ (Paris: J. Anisson 1689). For more on this debate, see chapter of my forthcoming book, Radical French Cartesianism: Desgabets, Regis, and Constructions of Descartes (1663–1720).
    • (1692) Nouveaux mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du cartésianisme
  • 37
    • 85071208175 scopus 로고
    • Paris: J. Vrin, the mid-1690s Regis was involved particular a dispute with the malebranchiste members of the, LHospital, Sauveur, Varignon, and Catelan, over the proper explanation of why the sun and moon appear larger on the horizon than at the meridian. On this dispute, see the materials Œuvres complètes de Malebranche, A. Robinet, ed.238–55, 263–78, 347–55. Regis also engaged an exchange with Malebranche on the doctrine the latter that ‘we see all things God’; cf. Regis’ System of Philosophy, Metaphysics, II-1, xiv, the retitled second edition, Cours entier de philosophie, R. Watson, ed. (1691; New York: Johnson Reprints 1970), 1:184–88; and the second chapter of Malebranches Réponse à Regis, Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, 17–1:280–310. Citations from the System are by book-part and chapter
    • 1958–78. Académie des sciences 17–1. Paris: J. Vrin. In the mid-1690s Regis was involved in particular in a dispute with the malebranchiste members of the, L'Hospital, Sauveur, Varignon, and Catelan, over the proper explanation of why the sun and moon appear larger on the horizon than at the meridian. On this dispute, see the materials in Œuvres complètes de Malebranche, A. Robinet, ed.238–55, 263–78, 347–55. Regis also engaged in an exchange with Malebranche on the doctrine in the latter that ‘we see all things in God’; cf. Regis’ System of Philosophy, Metaphysics, II-1, xiv, in the retitled second edition, Cours entier de philosophie, R. Watson, ed. (1691; New York: Johnson Reprints 1970), 1:184–88; and the second chapter of Malebranche's Réponse à Regis, in Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, 17–1:280–310. Citations from the System are by book-part and chapter.
    • (1958) Académie des sciences , pp. 17-11
  • 38
    • 85071200067 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Citations from the are by book-part, chapter, and page
    • Use Citations from the are by book-part, chapter, and page.
    • Use
  • 39
    • 85071202544 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Cf. the discussion Met., 1–1, vii, Cours, 1:86f
    • System Cf. the discussion in, Met., 1–1, vii, in Cours, 1:86f.
    • System
  • 40
    • 85071204311 scopus 로고
    • Regis was educated at a Jesuit college Cahors prior to going to the Sorbonne to study theology the
    • 1650s. Regis was educated at a Jesuit college in Cahors prior to going to the Sorbonne to study theology in the
    • (1650)
  • 41
    • 85071218296 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • XVII, ii, 21, Opera, 25:591f
    • Met. Disp. XVII, ii, 21, in Opera, 25:591f.
    • Met. Disp.
  • 42
    • 85071209580 scopus 로고
    • New Haven: Yale University Press, On the distinction between first and secondary causes, see, XVII, ii, 20, Opera, 25:591. Suárez also limited his discussion to principal as opposed to instrumental causes; for this distinction see Met. Disp., XVII, ii, 7–19, Opera, 25:585–91. His restriction to principal secondary causes is explicit Met. Disp., XVII, ii, 21, Opera, 25:591f. For a full English translation of the sections from disputations 17 and 18 that I cite this paper, see Francisco Suarez, S.J.: On Efficient Causality (Metaphysical Disputations 17,18, and 19), A.J. Freddoso, ed
    • 1994. Met. Disp. New Haven: Yale University Press. On the distinction between first and secondary causes, see, XVII, ii, 20, in Opera, 25:591. Suárez also limited his discussion to principal as opposed to instrumental causes; for this distinction see Met. Disp., XVII, ii, 7–19, in Opera, 25:585–91. His restriction to principal secondary causes is explicit in Met. Disp., XVII, ii, 21, in Opera, 25:591f. For a full English translation of the sections from disputations 17 and 18 that I cite in this paper, see Francisco Suarez, S.J.: On Efficient Causality (Metaphysical Disputations 17,18, and 19), A.J. Freddoso, ed.
    • (1994) Met. Disp.
  • 43
    • 0012757115 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Suárez would have had reason to be concerned with this disappearance even if Marion is correct thinking that his own remarks the undermine the distinction between analogy and univocity (see note 19
    • Disputations Suárez would have had reason to be concerned with this disappearance even if Marion is correct in thinking that his own remarks in the undermine the distinction between analogy and univocity (see note 19).
    • Disputations
  • 44
    • 85071218296 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • For instance, Suárez held that univocal and equivocal causes contain not the genus or difference of their effects, as Regis would have it, but rather the substantial or accidental forms these causes produce XVII, ii, 21, Opera, 25:592
    • Met. Disp. For instance, Suárez held that univocal and equivocal causes contain not the genus or difference of their effects, as Regis would have it, but rather the substantial or accidental forms these causes produce XVII, ii, 21, in Opera, 25:592).
    • Met. Disp.
  • 45
    • 85071218296 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • XVIII, vii, 1, Opera, 25:631. The particular section which this condition is considered is Met. Disp., XVIII, ix, Opera, 25:668–80
    • Met. Disp. XVIII, vii, 1, in Opera, 25:631. The particular section in which this condition is considered is Met. Disp., XVIII, ix, in Opera, 25:668–80.
    • Met. Disp.
  • 46
    • 85071218296 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • XVIII, ix, 9, Opera, 25:670f
    • Met. Disp. XVIII, ix, 9, in Opera, 25:670f.
    • Met. Disp.
  • 47
    • 85071209582 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The phrase ‘mediately or immediately’ is explained by Regis view that the existence of substance follows immediately from the divine will while the existence of modes follows immediately from other modes but only mediately from the divine will; see, 130–32
    • Use, I-2, xxxi The phrase ‘mediately or immediately’ is explained by Regis' view that the existence of substance follows immediately from the divine will while the existence of modes follows immediately from other modes but only mediately from the divine will; see, 130–32.
    • Use, I-2, xxxi
  • 48
    • 85071201749 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • that ‘pertain to God considered in Himself,’ and ‘respective attributes’ (attributs respectives), such as goodness, power, justice, and mercy, that ‘are related to creatures’ (Use, 1–1, xxix, 92f; but cf. the somewhat different account of this distinction in System, Met., I-1, vii, in Cours, 1:88). Since the respective attributes relate God to creatures
    • they presuppose something common between the two. However, the implication Regis is that nothing Gods absolute attributes is found the nature of creatures
    • Regis distinguished between ‘absolute attributes’ (attributs absolus)x such as eternity, immutability, simplicity, and infinite, that ‘pertain to God considered in Himself,’ and ‘respective attributes’ (attributs respectives), such as goodness, power, justice, and mercy, that ‘are related to creatures’ (Use, 1–1, xxix, 92f; but cf. the somewhat different account of this distinction in System, Met., I-1, vii, in Cours, 1:88). Since the respective attributes relate God to creatures, they presuppose something common between the two. However, the implication in Regis is that nothing in God's absolute attributes is found in the nature of creatures.
    • Regis distinguished between ‘absolute attributes’ (attributs absolus)x such as eternity, immutability, simplicity, and infinite
  • 49
    • 33751163901 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • E.g., Malebranche, 6:118f. For a discussion of this point, see my ‘Malebranche on Ideas and the Vision God,’ The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche, S. Nadler, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, press
    • Œuvres complètes E.g., in Malebranche, 6:118f. For a discussion of this point, see my ‘Malebranche on Ideas and the Vision in God,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche, S. Nadler, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in press).
    • Œuvres complètes
  • 51
    • 85071201976 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Met., II-l, xiv, Cours, 1:187
    • System Met., II-l, xiv, in Cours, 1:187
    • System
  • 52
    • 33751163901 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See, for instance, his response to the objection of his former student, Jean Jacques Dortous de Mairan, that his view that God contains a necessary and infinite ‘intelligible extension’ Himself seems to support to the Spinozistic conclusion that all beings are modifications of God. For this correspondence, see Malebranche, 19:852–65, 870–79, 882–89, 890–912. There is an English translation of the correspondence Malebranches First and Last Critics, R.A. Watson and M. Grene, trans. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press
    • 1995. Œuvres complètes See, for instance, his response to the objection of his former student, Jean Jacques Dortous de Mairan, that his view that God contains a necessary and infinite ‘intelligible extension’ in Himself seems to support to the Spinozistic conclusion that all beings are modifications of God. For this correspondence, see Malebranche, 19:852–65, 870–79, 882–89, 890–912. There is an English translation of the correspondence in Malebranche's First and Last Critics, R.A. Watson and M. Grene, trans. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press
    • (1995) Œuvres complètes
  • 53
    • 33751163901 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • However, Malebranche did insist to Mairan that he differs from Spinoza insofar as he holds that God is not determined to create the material world; see Malebranche, 19:910
    • Œuvres complètes However, Malebranche did insist to Mairan that he differs from Spinoza insofar as he holds that God is not determined to create the material world; see Malebranche, 19:910.
    • Œuvres complètes
  • 54
    • 85071204780 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Met., 1–1, vii, Cours, 1:85. this text Regis also asserted as an axiom that ‘all that exists is a substance or a mode’ (Met., 1–1, ii, Cours, 1:73
    • System Met., 1–1, vii, in Cours, 1:85. In this text Regis also asserted as an axiom that ‘all that exists is a substance or a mode’ (Met., 1–1, ii, in Cours, 1:73).
    • System
  • 55
    • 85071203471 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Met., I-1, vii, Cours, 1:86
    • System Met., I-1, vii, in Cours, 1:86
    • System
  • 56
    • 85071203330 scopus 로고
    • Cf. his remark that God ‘is a mind, or a thing that thinks’ and that ‘our souls nature resembles His sufficiently for us to believe that it is an emanation of his supreme intelligence, a breath of divine spirit 1 February AT 4:608
    • 1647. To Chanut Cf. his remark that God ‘is a mind, or a thing that thinks’ and that ‘our soul's nature resembles His sufficiently for us to believe that it is an emanation of his supreme intelligence, a “breath of divine spirit'” 1 February AT 4:608).
    • (1647) To Chanut
  • 57
    • 85071205771 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Met., I-1, ix, Cours, 1:92
    • System Met., I-1, ix, in Cours, 1:92
    • System
  • 58
    • 85071210922 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Met., I-1, vii, Cours, 1:88
    • System Met., I-1, vii, in Cours, 1:88
    • System
  • 59
    • 84879965266 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Descartes’ remarks in.60, AT 8–1:28f
    • Principles 1 See Descartes’ remarks in.60, AT 8–1:28f.
    • Principles , pp. 1
  • 60
    • 85035881735 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • For a discussion of this argument, see my ‘Spinoza on the Vacuum,’ 81 (1999,–205
    • Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 174 For a discussion of this argument, see my ‘Spinoza on the Vacuum,’ 81 (1999,–205
    • Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie , pp. 174
  • 61
    • 84959205650 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Regis did introduce as an axiom the that ‘the essences of things are indivisible’ (System, Met., I-1, ii, Cours, 1:74), but later this text he failed to mention the indivisible essence of extension when discussing the divisibility of quantité (System, Phy., I-1, i, Cours, 1:279–83
    • System of Philosophy Regis did introduce as an axiom in the that ‘the essences of things are indivisible’ (System, Met., I-1, ii, in Cours, 1:74), but later in this text he failed to mention the indivisible essence of extension when discussing the divisibility of quantité (System, Phy., I-1, i, in Cours, 1:279–83).
    • System of Philosophy
  • 62
    • 85071201135 scopus 로고
    • On Descartes’ position, see Roger Woolhouse, ‘Descartes and the Nature of Body 2.14–19),’ British Journal of the History of Philosophy2 and Dennis Des Chene, Physiologia: Natural Philosophy Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996), 371–74
    • 1994. Principles of Philosophy 19–33. On Descartes’ position, see Roger Woolhouse, ‘Descartes and the Nature of Body 2.14–19),’ British Journal of the History of Philosophy2 and Dennis Des Chene, Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996), 371–74.
    • (1994) Principles of Philosophy , pp. 19-33
  • 63
    • 85071217968 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The itself distinguishes the eviternité, or created eternity, of substances from the uncreated éternité of God; see Use, 1–2, xxv, 171. Cf. the discussion of the distinction among modal temporality, substantial perpétuité and divine éternité System, Met., 1–1, xiv-xv, Cours, 1:105–109, which explicitly brackets the case of ‘body considered itself’ (Cours, 1:107
    • Use of Reason The itself distinguishes the eviternité, or created eternity, of substances from the uncreated éternité of God; see Use, 1–2, xxv, 171. Cf. the discussion of the distinction among modal temporality, substantial perpétuité and divine éternité in System, Met., 1–1, xiv-xv, in Cours, 1:105–109, which explicitly brackets the case of ‘body considered in itself’ (Cours, 1:107).
    • Use of Reason
  • 64
    • 85071201089 scopus 로고
    • The basic elements of this framework are evident Desgabets’ unpublished manuscript, the ‘Traité de lindéfectibilité des creatures,’ which he had started by 1654 (as indicated the chronological biography [Amsterdam: Quadratures ], 1: xvi). Desgabets died 1678, one year after the publication of the Opera Posthuma containing the Ethics. There is to my knowledge no evidence that Desgabets read this work, or indeed even knew of its existence., ed
    • Beaude, J., ed. 1983–85. Dom Robert Desgabets: Œuvres philosophiques inédites The basic elements of this framework are evident in Desgabets’ unpublished manuscript, the ‘Traité de l'indéfectibilité des creatures,’ which he had started by 1654 (as indicated in the chronological biography in, [Amsterdam: Quadratures ], 1: xvi). Desgabets died in 1678, one year after the publication of the Opera Posthuma containing the Ethics. There is to my knowledge no evidence that Desgabets read this work, or indeed even knew of its existence.
    • (1983) Dom Robert Desgabets: Œuvres philosophiques inédites
    • Beaude, J.1
  • 65
    • 85071211097 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The implication concerning particular bodies is apparent from the remarks on ‘the duration of our Body’ IIp30, d (D 2:114f), which draws on E Ip28, d (G 2:69), while the implication concerning corporeal substance is apparent from the argument for the eternality of substance E Ip19 (D 2:64) and the official definition of eternity E Idef8 (G 2:46), which I have quoted. The claim that Spinoza took substance to have a non-durational existence is controversial, but I think that it is supported by Spinozas own claim his famous ‘Letter on the Infinite’ that divisible duration is grounded an absolutely indivisible eternity (Ep. 12, G 4:54f). For a discussion of this view, see again my ‘Spinoza on the Vacuum.’
    • E The implication concerning particular bodies is apparent from the remarks on ‘the duration of our Body’ in IIp30, d (D 2:114f), which draws on E Ip28, d (G 2:69), while the implication concerning corporeal substance is apparent from the argument for the eternality of substance in E Ip19 (D 2:64) and the official definition of eternity in E Idef8 (G 2:46), which I have quoted. The claim that Spinoza took substance to have a non-durational existence is controversial, but I think that it is supported by Spinoza's own claim in his famous ‘Letter on the Infinite’ that divisible duration is grounded in an absolutely indivisible eternity (Ep. 12, G 4:54f). For a discussion of this view, see again my ‘Spinoza on the Vacuum.’
  • 66
    • 61249612827 scopus 로고
    • Albany: State University of New York Press, See the discussion Thomas Lennon, ‘The Problem of Individuation among the Cartesians,’ esp. 19–30 (but cf. my reservations note 73). I provide a systematic treatment of the metaphysical system of Desgabets and Regis the second part of the forthcoming Radical French Cartesianism., and, eds
    • Barber, K. F., and Gracia, J. E., eds. 1994. Individuation and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant 13–39. Albany: State University of New York Press. See the discussion in Thomas Lennon, ‘The Problem of Individuation among the Cartesians,’ in, esp. 19–30 (but cf. my reservations in note 73). I provide a systematic treatment of the metaphysical system of Desgabets and Regis in the second part of the forthcoming Radical French Cartesianism.
    • (1994) Individuation and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant , pp. 13-39
    • Barber, K.F.1    Gracia, J.E.2
  • 67
    • 85071211424 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Met., III, i, Cours, 1:266f
    • System Met., III, i, in Cours, 1:266f.
    • System
  • 68
    • 85071202765 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • This point is especially clear his response to Spinozas claim Ip5 (G 2:48) that distinct substances cannot share the same attribute; see Use, ‘Ref.,’ 492. The point is not expressed so clearly the section of the Système on the immortality of the soul, which stresses that reason can say very little about the state of the mind apart from the body (System, Met., III, Cours, 1:265–72). However, there is the insistence this text that the self is a thinking substance (System, Met., I-1, xi, Cours, 1:96
    • Ethics This point is especially clear in his response to Spinoza's claim in Ip5 (G 2:48) that distinct substances cannot share the same attribute; see Use, ‘Ref.,’ 492. The point is not expressed so clearly in the section of the Système on the immortality of the soul, which stresses that reason can say very little about the state of the mind apart from the body (System, Met., III, in Cours, 1:265–72). However, there is the insistence in this text that the self is a thinking substance (System, Met., I-1, xi, in Cours, 1:96).
    • Ethics
  • 69
    • 85071215459 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • I think that a development of this point would provide a response to Lennons claim that the passage from the cited at note 71 indicates that ‘the substantial soul turns out to be, as it must be [for Regis], a universal soul’ (‘The Problem of Individuation,’ 28
    • System I think that a development of this point would provide a response to Lennon's claim that the passage from the cited at note 71 indicates that ‘the substantial soul turns out to be, as it must be [for Regis], a universal soul’ (‘The Problem of Individuation,’ 28).
    • System
  • 70
    • 85071205997 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See the discussion toward the end of §11 of the remarks from the ‘Sixth Replies.’
    • See the discussion toward the end of §11 of the remarks from the ‘Sixth Replies.’
  • 71
    • 85071216604 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Geneviève Rodis-Lewis Polémiques sur la création des possibles et sur limpossible dans lécole cartésienne,’ 2 (1981,–23. Cf. Lennon, ‘The Cartesian Dialectic of Creation,’ The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, D. Garber and M. Ayers, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998), 1:350–56
    • Studia Cartesiana, 105 See Geneviève Rodis-Lewis 'Polémiques sur la création des possibles et sur l'impossible dans l'école cartésienne,’ 2 (1981,–23. Cf. Lennon, ‘The Cartesian Dialectic of Creation,’ in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, D. Garber and M. Ayers, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998), 1:350–56.
    • Studia Cartesiana , pp. 105


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.