Understanding philosophy of science

Understanding Philosophy of Science

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 1-290

  Ladyman, James ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 85071133997     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203463680     Document Type: Book

References (110)

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