Eclipse attacks on Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer network

Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Security Symposium

Volumn , Issue , 2015, Pages 129-144

  Heilman, Ethan ^a   Kendler, Alison ^a   Zohar, Aviv ^b   Goldberg, Sharon ^a  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BITCOIN; INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS; MONTE CARLO METHODS; NETWORK ARCHITECTURE;

IP ADDRESSS; PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS; RAISE THE BARS;

PEER TO PEER NETWORKS;

EID: 85070733097     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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