Mental Causation

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages

  Kim, Jaegwon ^a  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Causal interaction; Mental causation; Mind body problem; Ren Descartes; Substance dualism; Voluntary actions

Indexed keywords

EID: 85066526404     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0002     Document Type: Chapter

References (73)

1. Alexander, S. (1920), Space, Time, and Deity, II (London: Macmillan).
2. Allen, C. (1995), 'It Isn't What You Think: A New Idea about Intentional Causation', Noûs, 29: 115-26.
3. Baker, L. (1993), 'Metaphysics and Mental Causation', in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 75-95.
4. Baker, L. (1995), Explaining Attitudes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
5. Bennett, K. (2003), 'Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It', Noûs, 37: 471-97.
6. Bickle, J. (1998), Psychoneural Reduction (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
7. Block, N. (1990), 'Can the Mind Change the World?', in G. Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 137-70.
8. Block, N. (2003), 'Do Causal Powers Drain Away?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67: 133-50.
9. Bontly, T. D. (2002), 'The Supervenience Argument Generalizes', Philosophical Studies, 109: 75-96.
10. Broad, C. D. (1925), The Mind and Its Place in Nature (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).
11. Campbell, D. (1974), '"Downward" Causation in Hierarchically Organized Biological Systems', in F. J. Ayala and T. Dobzhansky (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Biology (Berkley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press), 179-86.
12. Chalmers, D. J. (1996), The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
13. Churchland, P. M. (1981), 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes', Journal of Philosophy, 78: 67-90.
14. Crane, T. (1998), 'The Efficacy of Content: A Functionalist Theory', in J. Bransen and S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 199-225.
15. Davidson, D. (1970), 'Mental Events', in L. Foster and J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press), 79-101; repr. in Davidson, D. Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 207-25.
16. Davidson, D. (1993), 'Thinking Causes', in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 3-17.
17. Dennett, D. C. (1988), 'Quining Qualia', in A. J. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science (Oxford, Oxford University Press), 42-77.
18. Descartes, R. (1641/1984), Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, ii, trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1-398.
19. Descartes, R. (1931), The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931).
20. Dowe, P. (2000), Physical Causation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
21. Dretske, F. (1988), Explaining Behaviour (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
22. Dretske, F. (1998), 'Minds, Machines, and Money: What Really Explains Behaviour', in J. Bransen and S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 157-73.
23. Fain, H. (1963), 'Some Problems of Causal Explanation', Mind, 72: 519-32.
24. Fair, D. (1979), 'Causation and the Flow of Energy', Erkenntnis, 14: 219-50.
25. Fodor, J. (1974), 'Special Sciences, or the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis', Synthese, 28: 97-115.
26. Fodor, J. (1987), Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
27. Fodor, J. (1989), 'Making Mind Matter More' Philosophical Topics, 17: 59-79.
28. Foster, J. (1968), 'Psychophysical Causal Relations', American Philosophical Quarterly, 5: 64-70.
29. Foster, J. (1989), 'A Defence of Dualism', in J. R. Smythies and J. Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism (Charlottesville, Va: University Press of Virginia).
30. Garber, D. (2001), 'Understanding Interaction: What Descartes Should Have Told Elisabeth', in D. Garber (ed.), Descartes Embodied: Reading Cartesian Philosophy through Cartesian Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 168-88.
31. Garrett, B. J. (1998), 'Pluralism, Causation, and Overdetermination', Synthese, 116: 355-78.
32. Gillett, C., and Rives, B. (2001), Does the Argument from Realization Generalize? Responses to Kim', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 39: 79-98.
33. Hall, N. (2004), 'Two concepts of causation', in J. Collins, N. Hall, and L. A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), 225-76.
34. Humphreys, P. (1997a), 'How Properties Emerge', Philosophy of Science, 64: 1-17.
35. Humphreys, P. (1997b), 'Emergence, not Supervenience', Philosophy of Science, 64: S337-45.
36. Huxley, T. H. (1874), 'On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and Its History', Fortnightly Review, 16: 555-80; repr. in Huxley, Collected Essays, i (London: Macmillan, 1904), 199-250.
37. Jacob, P. (1997), What Minds Can Do (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
38. Kim, J. (1973), 'Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event', Journal of Philosophy, 70: 217-36.
39. Kim, J. (1992), 'Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52: 1-26.
40. Kim, J. (1993), 'Can Supervenience and Non-strict Laws Save Anomalous Monism?', in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 19-26.
41. Kim, J. (1998), Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
42. Kim, J. (1999), 'Making Sense of Emergence', Philosophical Studies, 95: 3-36.
43. Kim, J. (2001), 'Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism', in K. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 30-43.
44. Kim, J. (2003), 'Blocking Causal Drainage and Other Maintenance Chores with Mental Causation', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67: 128-53.
45. Kim, J. (2005), Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
46. Kim, J. (2006), 'Emergence: Core Ideas and Issues', Synthese, 151: 547-59.
47. Lepore, E., and Loewer, B. (1987), 'Mind Matters', Journal of Philosophy, 84: 630-42.
48. Loewer, B. (2002), 'Comments on Jaegwon Kim's Mind and the Physical World', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 655-62.
49. McLaughlin, B. (1989), 'Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical', Philosophical Perspectives, 3: 109-35.
50. McLaughlin, B. (1993), 'On Davidson's Reply to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism', in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 27-40.
51. Mellor, D. H. (1995), The Facts of Causation (London: Routledge).
52. Menzies, P. (2003), 'The Causal Efficacy of Mental States', in S. Walter and H.-D. Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation (Exeter: Imprint Academic), 195-223.
53. Mills, E. (1996), 'Interactionism and Overdetermination', American Philosophical Quarterly, 33: 105-17.
54. Noordhof, P. (1999), 'Micro-based Properties and the Supervenience Argument', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99: 109-14.
55. O'Connor, T., and Wong, H. J. (2005), 'The Metaphysics of Emergence', Noûs, 39: 658-78.
56. Papineau, D. (2001), 'The Rise of Physicalism', in C. Gillett and B. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and Its Discontents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 3-36.
57. Polger, T. (2004), Natural Minds (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
58. Putnam, H. (1967), 'Psychological Predicates', repr. as 'The nature of mental states', in Putnam, Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers, ii (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 429-40.
59. Quine, W. V. (1973), The Roots of Reference (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court).
60. Raymont, P. (2003), 'Kim on Closure, Exclusion and Non-reductive Physicalism', in S. Walter and H.-D. Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation (Exeter: Imprint Academic), 225-42.
61. Sabates, M. (2001), 'Varieties of Exclusion', Theoria, 16: 13-42.
62. Searle, J. R. (1980), 'Minds, Brains, and Programs', Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 417-24.
63. Segal, G., and Sober, E. (1991), 'The Causal Efficacy of Content', Philosophical Studies, 63: 1-30.
64. Shapiro, L. A. (2004), The Mind Incarnate (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
65. Sosa, E. (1993), 'Davidson's Thinking Causes', in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 3-17.
66. Sperry, R. W. (1969), 'A Modified Concept of Consciousness', Psychological Review, 76: 532-6.
67. Stich, S. (1983), From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
68. Stoutland, F. (1980), 'Oblique Causation and Reasons for Action', Synthese, 43: 351-67.
69. Van Gulick, R. (1992), 'Three Bad Arguments for Intentional Property Epiphenomenalism', Erkenntnis, 36: 311-32.
70. Watson, R. A. (1987), The Breakdown of Cartesian Metaphysics (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities).
71. Woodward, J. (2003), Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
72. Yablo, S. (1992), 'Mental Causation', Philosophical Review, 101: 245-80.
73. Yablo, S. (1997), 'Wide Causation', Philosophical Perspectives, 11: 251-81.