Managing Plenary Time: The U.S. Congress in Comparative Context

The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages

  Cox, Gary W ^a   McCubbins, Mathew D ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Congressional policymaking; House of Representatives; Legislative agenda; Managing plenary time; Plenary bottleneck; Plenary time; Senate; Theoretical possibilities

Indexed keywords

EID: 85066519971     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199559947.003.0020     Document Type: Chapter

References (44)

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