What is the Physical?

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages

  Montero, Barbara ^a  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

Consciousness; Nature of mind; Physical duplicates; Physical nature; Physicalism

Indexed keywords

EID: 85066355580     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0010     Document Type: Chapter

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