Board size and corporate performance: Evidence from European countries

International Journal of Phytoremediation

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 291-304

  Conyon, Martin J ^a   Peck, Simon I ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Boards of directors; Corporate governance; Corporate performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 85066222626     PISSN: 15226514     EISSN: 15497879     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/135184798337317     Document Type: Article

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