Engineering Interrelated Electricity Markets

Contributions to Management Science

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-32

  Weidlich, Anke ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85064940692     PISSN: 14311941     EISSN: 2197716X     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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