Doubt: Affective states and the regulation of inquiry

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 28, Issue , 1998, Pages 203-225

  Hookway, Christopher ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85063703159     PISSN: 00455091     EISSN: 19110820     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00455091.1998.10717500     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. 1993. European Journal of Philosophy, 1: 156–74. “Mimicking Foundationalism: On Sentiments and Self-control,”
2. 1996. Considered Judgment Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. For an interesting exception to this, see Catherine Elgin's Chapter 5.
3. 1979. The Claim of Reason Oxford: Oxford University Press. See, for example, Stanley Cavell, and Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), passim.
4. 1994. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2: 465–85. If this is correct, then it suggests that there are rational limits to how reflective we should be in assessing our beliefs and inquiries; rational reflection is often fundamentally shallow. Mapping the limits of responsible or rational reflection was the main concern of my “Cognitive Virtues and Epistemic Evaluations,”: 211–27. I discuss the topic further in Part 2 of Scepticism (London: Routledge, 1990) and in “Naturalised Epistemology and Epistemic Evaluation,” Inquiry 37 (1994)
5. Fisch, M., eds. 1984. Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. References to Peirce's work employ two sources: they take the following standard forms. (Volumes 2 and 3), (–86) is referred to in the text as “W” followed by volume and page. References to Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and A. Burks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931–58) identify volume and numbered paragraph.
6. Characterizing the kind of role in shaping actions which beliefs possess and doubts lack is not easy If my doubt that the car is ready for collection leads me to take the bus or train when I head for town, then that state can shape actions other than inquiries into the proposition doubted. I shall not pursue this issue here.
7. 1877. Collected Papers The final sentence was added to this passage in 1903 5.376).
8. 1997. Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge and Autonomy Oxford: Oxford University Press. The epistemic importance of the idea of self-trust has recently been emphasized by Keith Lehrer in
9. I shall not discuss in detail exactly why the sort of self-trust described here is rational. At least two strategies suggest themselves, both familiar from pragmatist writings. First: it could be defended as a regulative presumption. If it is not warranted, then responsible rationality would be impossible, so it is rational to proceed on the hope that it is warranted. Second: appeal could be made to the fact that it is “natural” and, indeed, unavoidable much of the time. If my behaviour shows that I endorse it, then, in the absence of a positive reason for doubting it, I am warranted in relying upon it.
10. Brunning, Jacqueline, and Forster, Paul, eds. 1997. The Rule of Reason: The Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce 211–27. Toronto: Toronto University Press. I have done so elsewhere: see “Mimicking Foundationalism” and “Sentiment and Self-control,” in 201–22. Also relevant is “Cognitive Virtues and Epistemic Evaluations,” International journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (1994)
11. Considered Judgment 146–47. This example is discussed by Catherine Elgin in Chapter 5; see esp.
12. Nagel. 1970. The Possibility of Altruism Oxford: Oxford University Press.
13. This then gives rise to the philosophical task of arriving at an explanation of our cognitive habits and goals that vindicates this presumption of their adequacy If we fail in this task, then scepticism may be unavoidable. Much of Peirce's work can be read as an attempt to carry out this task.