Writing history and registering memory in legal decisions and legal practices: An introduction

History, Memory, and the Law

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-24

  Sarat, Austin ^a   Kearns, Thomas R ^a  

^a AMHERST COLLEGE   (United States)

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EID: 85059249792     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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