Games, information, and politics: Applying game theoretic models to political science

Games, Information, and Politics: Applying Game Theoretic Models to Political Science

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-182

  Gates, Scott ^a   Humes, Brian D ^b  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA LINCOLN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85058923623     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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