Myanmar's international relations strategy: The search for security

Contemporary Southeast Asia

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 530-553

  James, Helen ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85050845526     PISSN: 0129797X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1355/CS26-3G     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. For an incisive discussion of the distinction between the two approaches as applied to the Asia-Pacific region, see Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack, Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics-Politics Nexus (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1997).
2. Confrontation between supporters of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, General Secretary of the opposition National League for Democracy, and supporters of the government led to a number of people losing their lives. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and 35 of her supporters were taken into custody. The incident caused international outrage and unanimous calls for the release of both her and her supporters, eight of whom have been released; on 9 November 2003, following recuperation at home from surgery, restrictions were reportedly lifted on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, although she declined to accept her freedom until all her supporters were also released. The incident was widely interpreted in the international press as a premeditated attack on Daw Suu Kyi's cavalcade with the intention of disrupting her political activities in northern Myanmar.
3. A term usefully explored by Likhit Dhiravegin, Demi-Democracy: The Evolution of the Thai Political System (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1992).
4. James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
5. On 27 November 2003, Myanmar denied U.S. Treasury allegations that two private banks in Myanmar are engaged in "money laundering", despite the country's new anti-money laundering legislation introduced in 2002. It is possible that this is an alternate means of transacting some of Myanmar's international trade and goes to demonstrate that such U.S. sanctions undermine legitimate business activity. See Myanmar Information Sheet, 27 November 2003.
6. For an incisive discussion of China's motivations in joining the ASEAN Regional Forum, see Thammy Evans, "The PRCs Relationship with the ASEAN Regional Forum: Realpolitik, Regime Theory or a Continuation of the Sinic Zone of Influence System?" Modern Asian Studies 37, no. 3 (2003): 737-63. The author favours realistic "sinic self-interest" in the PRCs relations with regional states.
7. Andrew Selth, Transforming the Tatmadaw: the Burmese Armed Forces Since 1 988 (Canberra: Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies, The Australian National University, 1996).
8. Civil unrest leading to the suppression of the democracy movement and the military government's failure to transfer power following the May 1990 elections in which the opposition NLD won a majority of votes led to Myanmar being treated as a "pariah" state by some Western nations.
9. On this point I wish to gratefully acknowledge the helpful discussions with my colleague, Dr Gerald Chan, Senior Fellow, Centre of International Studies, Cambridge University.
10. Two Indian energy majors, ONGC Videsh and GAIL India, hold joint equity stakes with Korea's Daewoo International and Korean Gas Company in the substantial gas reserves off Myanmar's Rakhine coast.
11. Myanmar's forces have frequently carried out operations against insurgent forces operating from India's northeast.
12. The Hindustan Times (3 November 2003) noted India's official stance that Myanmar has a "special place" in its "Look East" policy; the aim of the India-Myanmar Joint Trade Committee is to double bilateral trade turnover to US$1 billion in the next three years with particular attention to joint projects in areas of information technology, telecommunications, hydrocarbons, engineering goods and pharmaceuticals.
13. Satu P. Limaye, Director of Research, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Hawai'i, views the re-emergence of India in Asia in the mid-1990s as "derived from the twin shocks of Soviet collapse and near financial default in the early 1990s. The importance of being Asian became stark. Enhanced ties with Asia were seen as a step to possible inclusion in the broader Asia Pacific community, including regional economic and political organizations. This web of inclusion was deemed vital if India was to avoid over-dependence upon any one power; compensate for the loss of political, economic, and military support from the ex-Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries; and escape isolation and marginalization in a new world order. Temporarily interrupted by the 1998 nuclear test, India has since then enhanced its regional economic and political role". See "India-East Relations: India's Latest Asian Incarnation", Comparative Connections, Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, Hawaii, October 2000.
14. Agence France Presse, 3 November 2003, noted that while Myanmar maintains strong trading links with China and India, Western sanctions have minimal effect.
15. Helen James, "The Fall of Ayutthaya: A Re-assessment", Journal ofBurma Studies, 5 (2000): 75-108.
16. S. Chutintaranond and K. U-Sha, eds., From Fact to Fiction: History of Thailand-Myanmar Relations in Cultural Context (Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 2001).
17. The countries attending were: Australia, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, China, Japan, India, Singapore, Indonesia, plus Thailand and Myanmar. Special envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General, the Malaysian diplomat, Tun Razali Ismail, also participated.
18. See Bangkok Post, 21 September 2003, p. 3.
19. Bangkok Post, 21 September 2003.
20. This trade is exclusive of Thailand's purchase of natural gas from Myanmar which, in 2002-03 was said to be AUD$875. See (Australian) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Burma Country Brief, at .
21. The latest round of U.S. sanctions now closes this market to Myanmar exporters.
22. Although the majority of the Muslim population of both countries are peaceful, law-abiding citizens, both countries have a small minority of Islamic militants whom it is feared could easily be infiltrated by AI-Qaeda agents. It is known that some Myanmar Muslims sought training in Pakistan with AI-Qaeda before 11 September 2001. When the recent Muslim-Buddhist community disturbances broke out in Upper Myanmar, the government took firm action to ensure there was no widespread civil unrest. See Agence France Presse, 2 November 2003. Ordinary Muslims in Myanmar who are amongst the poorest, fear that the terrorist threat could be used to further suppress their community. In recognition of the sensitivity of this issue and how critical it is to national security, at the time of the cabinet reshuffle in early September 2003, the civilian Religious Affairs minister was replaced with a military man. Myanmar has keen memories of widespread communal violence between Buddhists and non-Buddhists during the U Nu era of parliamentary democracy when the late Prime Minister was planning to make Buddhism the state religion. Myanmar is a secular state which has an official policy of religious toleration.
23. In an important indicator of the new rapprochement between Thailand and Myanmar, the Thai Prime Minister would not allow even the incident of a Thai fishing trawler fired on by Myanmar authorities off Ranong, the day before the visit by the Thai Defence Minister, to impact on the cordial relations at the top. The incident was put down to imperfect communications at local level.
24. Asian Development Bank (ADB), Country Assistance Plan, (2000-2002), (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2002).
25. Andrew Selth, Transforming the Tatmadaw, op. cit.
26. The late General Ne Win was a close personal friend of ex-President Soeharto and went to visit him as late as 1999.
27. A. Clark, "Myanmar's Present Development and Future Options", Asian Survey 39, no. 5 (1999): 772-91. The 104 principles drafted previously as the basis for a new national constitution, and now continued under the recently re-convened National Convention, ensure that the military in Myanmar will continue to have a controlling role in government.
28. BIMST-EC stands for Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic Cooperation.
29. See Agence France Presse, 2 November 2003. In 1991-92, some 20,000 Myanmar Muslims from Rakhine state (known as Rohingyas) fled repression. Some later returned under a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) initiative. The Myanmar government initially agreed to accept only 7,500 whose identities as Myanmar nationals had been verified. The UNHCR requested Bangladesh to integrate around 14,000 with local Bangladeshi, but Bangladesh did not agree to the request. Some further repatriations have taken place since 1997, but the process stalled over the refugees' unwillingness to return and the lengthy verification process on the Myanmar side.
30. See . In September 2002, Japan also provided emergency humanitarian aid for the flood victims in Monywa, at the request of the Myanmar government.
31. New Light of Myanmar, 27 November 2003.
32. The Australian, 18 November 2003.
33. Myanmar Times, 8-14 December 2003.
34. Myanmar Information Committee, 22 November 2003.
35. New Light of Myanmar, 27 November 2003.
36. See Bangkok Post, 1 November 2003. Hungary is among 10 new countries to join the EU. The other nine are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus.
37. In a recent article, Mark Beeson has highlighted the "widespread unease about America's rather heavy-handed interventions in regional affairs" and has expressed the view that although most Asian nations still look to the system of bilateral American alliances in the region to maintain the balance of power between China, Japan, Korea and ASEAN, if the "war on terror" goes badly, and if East Asia is generally seen to be damaged by events over which it has little control, then it is not inconceivable that a new, more inclusive calculus of the region's strategic interests may emerge. See Mark Beeson, "ASEAN Plus Three and the Rise of Reactionary Regionalism", Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 2 (2003): 256.