Collective Action for Sustainable Forestry: Institutional Dynamics in Community Management of Forest in Orissa

Social Change

Volumn 40, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 479-502

  Rout, Satyapriya ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HYDERABAD   (India)

Author keywords

collective action; common property; Community forestry; institutions; property rights

Indexed keywords

EID: 85045167261     PISSN: 00490857     EISSN: 09763538     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/004908571004000405     Document Type: Article

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