The Rule of Law in Peace and Capacity Building Operations: Moving beyond a Conventional State-Centred Imagination

Journal of International Peacekeeping

Volumn 13, Issue 3-4, 2009, Pages 267-293

  Hughes, Bryn ^a   Hunt, Charles ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND   (Australia)

Author keywords

capacity building; informal justice mechanisms; peace operations; peacebuilding; post Weberian; rule of law

Indexed keywords

EID: 85044810350     PISSN: 18754104     EISSN: 18754112     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/187541009X12463418050650     Document Type: Article

References (130)

1. 1) See: Marten Zwanenburg, Accountability of Peace Support Operations (International Humanitarian Law Series; Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), pp. 30, 49, whereby it uses the ‘peace support operations’ term meaning to encompass both coercive and non-coercive multifunctional international interventions but with the principle of impartiality, short of war, and the goal of establishing sustainable peace.
2. 2) According to Jessica Howard and Bruce Oswald (eds.), ‘The Rule of Law on Peace Operations’, ‘Challenges of Peace Operations’ Project (Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne, 2002), p. ix, it is seen as “a cornerstone of effective peace operations”.
3. See also: Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks (eds.), Can Might Make Rights: Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 56-60.
4. 3) Otwin Marenin, ‘Restoring Policing Systems in Conflict Torn Nations: Process, Problems, Prospects’, Occasional Paper No. 7 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2005), p. 4;
5. OHCHR, ‘Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Mapping the Justice Sector’, (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2006) at foreword;
6. Bruce Oswald, ‘Addressing the Institutional Law and Order Vacuum: Key Issues and Dilemmas for Peacekeeping Operations’ (New York: United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices, 2005), p. 4.
7. 4) Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 4.
8. 5) Marcus Brand, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law, Transparency and Fighting against Corruption’, ‘Building Capacity for Democracy, Peace and Social Progress’ – The 6th International Conference of New or Restored Democracies (ICNRD-6) (Doha, Qatar: UNDP, 2006), p. 5.
9. 6) Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks (eds.), Can Might Make Rights: Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions, pp. 58-62.
10. 7) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/1, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ (2005), para. 134 (a), p. 29.
11. 8) Sheryl Gay Stolberg, ‘On First Day, Obama Quickly Sets a New Tone’, The New York Times, 21 January 2009.
12. 9) Thomas Carothers, ‘The Problem of Knowledge’, in Thomas Carothers (ed.), Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), pp. 15-30, p. 16.
13. 10) Brand, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law, Transparency and Fighting against Corruption’, p. 2;
14. Thomas Carothers, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge’, Carnegie Paper (No. 34; Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), pp. 5-7.
15. 11) Rachael Kleinfeld-Belton, ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: Implications for Practitioners’, Rule of Law Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Papers, Number 55 (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).
16. 12) “Academics, policy makers, and reformers have struggled to define the term “rule of law” and to date no universal definition has been widely accepted.” Jim Parsons et al., ‘Developing Indicators to Measure the Rule of Law: A Global Approach’, VERA International Indicators Group (Vera Institute of Justice, 2008), p. 3.
17. See also: Rachel Kleinfeld, ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law’, in Thomas Carothers (ed.), Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), pp. 31-74
18. Carothers, ‘The Problem of Knowledge’, p. 19.
19. 13) Brand, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law, Transparency and Fighting against Corruption’, p. 2;
20. Scott N. Carlson, ‘Legal and Judicial Rule of Law Work in Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons-Learned Study’ (New York: UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, 2006), p. 2.
21. 14) Kleinfeld, ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law’, p. 32.
22. 15) See: Till Blume, ‘Security, Justice and the Rule of Law in Peace Operations’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 15, no. 5, 2008, pp. 713-21, pp. 716-17. For examples of how local ownership is recognised but not critically enough and to the extent we suggest herein.
23. 16) Kleinfeld, ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law’, p. 64.
24. 17) ‘Post-Weberian’ herein refers to the condition in which both state and non-state actors comprise plausible sources of law and justice, with the point being to identify where and how the myriad sources operate, and potentially interact. This contrasts the Weberian ideal which presupposes that formal state mechanisms alone deliver law and justice practices. See: Joel S. Migdal and Klaus Schlitche, ‘Rethinking the State’, in K. Schiltche (ed.), The Dynamics of States: The Formation and Crises of State Domination (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishers, 2005), pp. 1-40, p. 36-40.
25. 18) Others before us have suggested the need to marry formal state with informal non-state mechanisms. See, for example, W. Clifford, L. Morauta, and B. Stuart, ‘Law and Order in Papua New Guinea’, (Port Moresby: Institute of National Affairs and Institute of Applied social and Economic Research 1984). who made the argument that because Papua New Guinea’s formal justice system was often entirely irrelevant to much of the population, it should be viewed within the broader context of the many informal social control mechanisms in order to enhance its performance.
26. 19) Sinclair Dinnen, Abby Mcleod, and Gordon Peake, ‘Police-Building in Weak States: Australian Approaches in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands’, Civil Wars, vol. 8, no. 2, 2006, pp. 87-108.
27. 20) We intend to embed robustly what many such as Stromseth et al. acknowledge (yet fail to explore in depth) in statements such as the following: “community-based accountability proceedings that both enjoy local legitimacy and respect human rights can have an important immediate impact and also contribute to the longer-term goal of strengthening the rule of law.” Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks (eds.), Can Might Make Rights: Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions, p. 308.
28. 21) Randy Peerenboom, ‘The Future of Rule of Law: Challenges and Prospects for the Field’, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law vol. 1, no. 01, 2009, pp. 5-14, p. 6, makes an important point that we should guard against striving for a consensus definition, preferring instead to accept multiple perspectives. While agreeing with the essence of his point, we would argue that the absence of explicit understandings contains its own problems, including the risk of making RoL meaningless, and that we should therefore move toward a consensus which allows for multiple perspectives to be housed under the same roof. We see no reason to presume that a consensus definition would necessarily strangle the capacity for diverse perspectives.
29. 22) We are also mindful that some contest whether the causal relationship between RoL and development may actually be the converse from what RoL advocates maintain (See: Stephen Golub, ‘A House without a Foundation’, in Thomas Carothers (ed.), Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), pp. 105-36, p. 110.
30. 23) See Michael Kelly in Howard and Oswald (eds.), ‘The Rule of Law on Peace Operations’, p. 279, who argues that ‘We have to avoid the paradigm paralysis of attempting to impose what we are familiar with, and what has worked elsewhere.’
31. 24) Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks (eds.), Can Might Make Rights: Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions, p. 56.
32. 25) See: Paul Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’, Public Law, Autumn 1997, pp. 467-87;
33. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, pp. 91-113.
34. 26) See: Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’;
35. Matthew Stephenson, ‘Rule of Law as a Goal of Development Policy’, Law and Justice Institutions (The World Bank);
36. Thomas Carothers, ‘The Rule of Law Revival’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 2, 1998, pp. 95-106, pp. 96-97;
37. 27) Rama Mani, ‘Contextualizing Police Reform: Security, the Rule of Law and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 6, no. 4, 1999, pp. 9-26, pp. 17-18.
38. 28) Stephenson, ‘Rule of Law as a Goal of Development Policy’.
39. 29) See: Blume, ‘Security, Justice and the Rule of Law in Peace Operations’, p. 718, who suggests that “Rule of Law should be seen as a set of institutions, not as single instruments and indicators.”
40. 30) Kirsti Samuels, ‘Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries: Operational Initiatives and Lessons Learnt’, Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, Paper No. 37 (The World Bank, 2006), p. 1.
41. 31) Kirsti Samuels, ‘Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries: Operational Initiatives and Lessons Learnt’, Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, Paper No. 37, p. 2.
42. 32) Brand, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law, Transparency and Fighting against Corruption’, p. 6;
43. Samuels, ‘Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries: Operational Initiatives and Lessons Learnt’, p. 2.
44. 33) Kleinfeld-Belton, ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: Implications for Practitioners’, p. 27.
45. Also see Samuels, ‘Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries: Operational Initiatives and Lessons Learnt’, p. 7.
46. 34) Howard and Oswald, ‘The Rule of Law on Peace Operations’.
47. 35) Rainer Grote, ‘Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and Etat De Droit’, in Christian Starck (ed.), Constitutionalism, Universalism and Democracy – a Comparative Analysis (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), p. 271.
48. 36) Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch, ‘Enhancing United Nations Capacity for Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law’, The Project on Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Settings (Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2007) p. ix;
49. Sean Mcfate, ‘Securing the Future: A Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries’, Special Report (209; Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2008), p. 3;
50. Brand, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law, Transparency and Fighting against Corruption’, p. 18.
51. 37) Samuels, ‘Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries: Operational Initiatives and Lessons Learnt’, p. 2.
52. 38) Kleinfeld, ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law’.
53. 39) Stephenson, ‘Rule of Law as a Goal of Development Policy’.
54. 40) See for example UNDP, UN OHCHR, OCHA, etc.
55. 41) Kofi Annan, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies’, Report of the Secretary-General (New York: United Nations, 2004), p. 4, para 6.
56. 42) Parsons et al., ‘Developing Indicators to Measure the Rule of Law: A Global Approach’, p. 3.
57. 43) See: Differing conceptions for EUJUST LEX Iraq, EULEX Kosovo: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g, accessed 31 March 2009.
58. 44) For example, current SSR processes in DRC and Guinea-Bissau are discussed as activities in the realm of RoL no different to the police, judiciary and customs focus in their Kosovo programs, despite the significant distinctions between what each entails.
59. 45) See: Rule of Law activities – http://www.osce.org/activities/13049.html;
60. Policing activities – http://www.osce.org/activities/13046.html, accessed 31 March 2009.
61. 46) OSCE, Strategic Police Matters Unit: Background (December 2006) http://www.osce.org/publications/spmu/2004/11/13565_64_en.pdf, accessed 31 March 2009.
62. 47) http://www.osce.org/activities/13049.html, accessed 31 March 2009.
63. 48) The OSCE, as with the World Bank and multinational corporations, stress the free market aspect of the sanctity of private property and enforcement of contracts. See: Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks (eds.), Can Might Make Rights: Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions, p. 58.
64. 49) ‘Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE’, Copenhagen 1990, paragraph (2), p.1, http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2006/06/19392_en.pdf, accessed 31 March 2009. (NB: The OSCE was then called the CSCE.)
65. 50) For example, describing its on-going RoL activities, the OSCE proclaims that: “The concept of rule of law forms a cornerstone of the OSCE’s human rights activities. It not only describes formal legal frameworks, but also aims at justice based on the full acceptance of human dignity.” http://www.osce.org/activities/13049.html, accessed 31 March 2009.
66. 51) AU Political Affairs Department, http://www.africa-union.org/Structure_of_the_Commission/ depPOLITICAL%20AFFAIRS%20DIRECTORATE.htm, accessed 31 March 2009.
67. 52) See, for example, ‘AU Constitutive Act’, the Preamble, http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/Constitutive_Act_en.htm, accessed 31 March 2009.
68. 53) See Articles 3 &4 for example. ‘Inter-American Democratic Charter’, Organization of American States (OAS), http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm, accessed 31 March 2009.
69. 54) Human Rights An OAS Priority, Secretary General Says, October 11, 2005 http://www.oas.org/oaspage/press_releases/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-232/05, accessed 31 March 2009.
70. 55) ‘Inter-American Democratic Charter’, Organization of American States (OAS), http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm, accessed 31 March 2009.
71. 56) CIS Human Rights Treaties 1991-2007 http://cis.minsk.by/sm.aspx?uid=9696, accessed 31 March 2009;
72. Convention on the Transfer of the Convicted Persons for Further Serving of Their Sentence (Moscow, 6 March 1998);
73. Agreement on the Protection of the Criminal Procedure Participants (Minsk, 28 November 2006).
74. 57) Rodolfo C. Severino, Secretary-General of ASEAN, ‘The ASEAN Way and the Rule of Law’, Address at International Law Conference on ASEAN Legal Systems and Regional Integration (Asia-Europe Institute/Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 3 September 2001), http://www.aseansec.org/2849.htm, accessed 31 March 2009;
75. See also: ‘ASEAN Vision 2020’ (1997), http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm, accessed 31 March 2009.
76. 58) Brand, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law, Transparency and Fighting against Corruption’, p. 6.
77. 59) WJP website, http://www.abanet.org/wjp/rolindex.html, accessed 31 March 2009.
78. 60) See: D.H. Bayley, ‘Community Policing: Evaluation Programs’, (May 2005), http://72.14.235.132/search?q=cache:Ut0JBo4-eOkJ:s21.anu.edu.au/conference/addread/COMMUNITY% 2520POLICING%2520-%2520EVALUATION%2520%2520PROGRAM.pdf+(David+ H+Bayley)+(Community+Policing)+(UN)&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=6&gl=au, accessed 31 March 2009.
79. 61) Golub, ‘A House without a Foundation’, p. 105.
80. 62) Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks (eds.), Can Might Make Rights: Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions, p. 78.
81. 63) The Australian Federal Police, ‘Inquiry into the Main Economic and Security Challenges Facing Papua New Guinea and the Island States of the Southwest Pacific’ (Parliament of Australia Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Australian Federal Police Submission, 2008).
82. 64) Gordon Peake and Kaysie Studdard-Brown, ‘Policebuilding: The International Deployment Group in the Solomon Islands’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, no. 4, December 2005, pp. 520-32.
83. 65) Frank Upham, ‘Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy’, Carnegie Paper (No. 30; Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 1.
84. 66) Michael G. Morgan and Abby Mcleod, ‘Have We Failed Our Neighbour?’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 60, no. 3, 2006, pp. 412-28, p. 426.
85. 67) Samuels, ‘Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries: Operational Initiatives and Lessons Learnt’, p. 1.
86. 68) Brand, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law, Transparency and Fighting against Corruption’, p. 22.
87. 69) In a 2008 survey in eastern DRC, for example, the Government military was widely seen as dangerous, with only a third seeing them as ‘protectors’ (ICTJ–Living w/Fear 2008: 26). On the other hand, when asked how justice should be achieved, 15% mentioned traditional/customary means with a further 34% mentioning other non-state mechanisms (ICTJ 2008: 45). Findings from northern Uganda show a similar need to take seriously non-state sources. Specifically, when asked who they thought could “bring justice,” 40% replied the government, whereas 44% cited various non-state sources as being best suited for the task (ICTJ Uganda 2005: 31). Yet these beliefs, and plausibly the existing institutions and capacities that underpin them, tend to be invisible to dominant models.
88. 70) Howard and Oswald, ‘The Rule of Law on Peace Operations’, at 279, OECD, ‘OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform’ (2007), p. 195.
89. 71) In a 2004 report on RoL (see footnote 42), the Secretary General stated that: “unfortunately, the international community has not always provided rule of law assistance that is appropriate to the country context. Too often, the emphasis has been on foreign experts, foreign models and foreign-conceived solutions to the detriment of durable improvements and sustainable capacity. Both national and international experts have a vital role to play, to be sure. But we have learned that effective and sustainable approaches begin with a thorough analysis of national needs and capacities, mobilizing to the extent possible expertise resident in the country.” See also: Howard and Oswald, ‘The Rule of Law on Peace Operations’, pp. 276-77.
90. 72) Writing for The World Bank, Samuels acknowledges that the preference for formal over informal or traditional mechanisms are among the major lessons not yet learned. Samuels, ‘Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries: Operational Initiatives and Lessons Learnt’, pp. 16-23.
91. 73) Brand, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law, Transparency and Fighting against Corruption’, p. 6.
92. 74) Eirin Mobekk, ‘Identifying Lessons in United Nations International Policing Missions’, Policy Paper 9 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2005), p. 11.
93. 75) Agnes Hurwitz and Kaysie Studdard, ‘Rule of Law Programs in Peace Operations’, The Security-Development Nexus Program (New York: International Peace Academy, 2005), p. 5.
94. 76) Peake and Studdard-Brown, ‘Policebuilding: The International Deployment Group in the Solomon Islands’, p. 527.
95. 77) Howard and Oswald, ‘The Rule of Law on Peace Operations’, pp. 276-77, said: “Many of the communities that we have worked with have interesting and viable concepts of communal justice that can be utilised and drawn upon in this respect.”
96. See also: Marenin, ‘Restoring Policing Systems in Conflict Torn Nations: Process, Problems, Prospects’, pp. 48-55, who notes the need to identify and build the capacity of locals.
97. Further, Frank Upham, ‘Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy’, in Thomas Carothers (ed.), Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), pp. 75-104, points out how Hernando de Soto’s investigations of Peru should be interpreted to highlight how well informal systems can function – in specific contrast to Peru’s formal RoL providers.
98. 78) See: Mobekk, ‘Identifying Lessons in United Nations International Policing Missions’, p. 11.
99. 79) Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks (eds.), Can Might Make Rights: Building the Rule of Law after Military Interventions, p. 310.
100. 80) Stephen Arthur Lamony, ‘Approaching National Reconciliation in Uganda. Perspectives on Applicable Justice Systems’, Working Paper (Uganda Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 2007), pp. 15-18.
101. 81) Bruce Baker, ‘Multi-Choice Policing in Uganda’, Policing and Society, vol. 15, no. 1, 2005, pp. 19-41, p. 21.
102. 82) Bruce Baker, Multi-Choice Policing in Africa (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstituter, 2008).
103. 83) The Australian Federal Police, ‘Inquiry into the Main Economic and Security Challenges Facing Papua New Guinea and the Island States of the Southwest Pacific’.
104. 85) OECD, ‘OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform’, p. 195.
105. 86) Joerg Friedrichs, ‘Transformative Consequences of Private Force: The Provision of Security from State to Market and Society’, ISA's 50th Annual Convention – “Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future” (New York Marriott Marquis, New York, USA, 2009), p. 3. It is important to note that Friedrich’s main argument – that the state should in effect maintain exclusive control over the delivery of force – is basically the opposite of ours. Concerning the community ‘self-help’ sources, Friedrichs uses the example of the deputization of local sheikhs after the recent US-led invasion of in Iraq as a warning of the unintended consequences which, to him, predictably occur when the state does not maintain a monopoly on the use of force. However his selective examples are limited to objectionable sources (e.g. Sharia law or merciless gangs). We repudiate his over-generalisation that community providers will predictably result in negative outcomes, in recognition of the many that might assist in positive outcomes.
106. 87) Donald Black, The Behaviour of Law (New York: Academic Press, 1976).
107. 88) Upham, ‘Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy’, p. 1.
108. 89) Charles T. Call, ‘Challenges in Police Refrom: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability’, From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict (New York: International Peace Academy, 2003) p. 4.
109. 90) See Howard and Oswald, ‘The Rule of Law on Peace Operations’, p. 279. They argue that: “From the earliest moment, international civil actors must seek to incorporate local participation and create consultative mechanisms.”
110. 91) Lamony, ‘Approaching National Reconciliation in Uganda. Perspectives on Applicable Justice Systems’.
111. 92) Marenin, ‘Restoring Policing Systems in Conflict Torn Nations: Process, Problems, Prospects’, p. 4.
112. 93) The Australian Federal Police, ‘Inquiry into the Main Economic and Security Challenges Facing Papua New Guinea and the Island States of the Southwest Pacific’, p. 5.
113. 95) Peerenboom, ‘The Future of Rule of Law: Challenges and Prospects for the Field’, p. 6.
114. 96) In a 2005 think-piece for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Best Practices Section, Oswald refers to local criminal justice structures of police, judiciary and corrections as the contextually important “law and order authorities.” See: Oswald, ‘Addressing the Institutional Law and Order Vacuum: Key Issues and Dilemmas for Peacekeeping Operations’, p. 4.
115. 97) See: Peerenboom, ‘The Future of Rule of Law: Challenges and Prospects for the Field’, pp. 6-7. For the need for a ‘process’ oriented understanding.
116. 98) In this vein, see how Vera-Altus has adapted the World Justice Project’s useful but state-centric RoL Index. (WJP website http://www.abanet.org/wjp/rolindex.html. accessed 31 March 2009)
117. 99) Parsons et al., ‘Developing Indicators to Measure the Rule of Law: A Global Approach’, p. ii.
118. 100) Parsons et al., ‘Developing Indicators to Measure the Rule of Law: A Global Approach’, p. 8.
119. See also: David Mednicoff, ‘Middle East Dilemmas’, in Thomas Carothers (ed.), Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (WashingtonDC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), pp. 251-74, p. 254, whereby he uses Arab nation examples to argue that “the most promising approaches…tie ideals to practices.”
120. 101) Marenin, ‘Restoring Policing Systems in Conflict Torn Nations: Process, Problems, Prospects’, p. 53.
121. 102) Parsons et al., ‘Developing Indicators to Measure the Rule of Law: A Global Approach’, p. 11.
122. 103) Parsons et al., ‘Developing Indicators to Measure the Rule of Law: A Global Approach’, p. 12, as they apply it to access to justice.
123. 104) As mentioned above, equal access concerning the ‘security’ function is the one exception wherein our principles do not refer solely to the behaviour of RoL providers since security conceptions should also refer to the behaviour of the public at large in terms of crime rates. We can, however, continue to enquire as to whether security providers deploy relatively equally so that access to security can be experienced equally as opposed to neglecting certain areas. The experience of law and order, in other words, can be uncoupled from the provision of security. The lesson to take from this distinction is that one eye should be on the levels of crime committed by the public while the other should consider the behaviour, resources and coverage of security providers.
124. 105) For a useful discussion on the accountability of intervening parties in a peace support operation context, see: Zwanenburg, Accountability of Peace Support Operations, pp. 287-314.
125. 106) Parsons et al., ‘Developing Indicators to Measure the Rule of Law: A Global Approach’, p. 10.
126. 107) Smith, Holt, and Durch, ‘Enhancing United Nations Capacity for Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law’, p. xi.
127. 108) It might be better termed: ‘relevant or successful’ practices to underscore the need to leverage fully local realities as opposed to a one-size fits all supposition.
128. 109) Wade Channell, ‘Lessons Not Learned About Legal Reform’, in Thomas Carothers (ed.), Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), pp. 137-60.
129. 110) Peerenboom, ‘The Future of Rule of Law: Challenges and Prospects for the Field’, p. 10.
130. 111) Lamony, ‘Approaching National Reconciliation in Uganda. Perspectives on Applicable Justice Systems’, p. 21.