U.S. security policy in Asia: Implications for China–U.S. relations

Contemporary Southeast Asia

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 479-497

  Xinbo, Wu ^a  

^a FUDAN UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85040415848     PISSN: 0129797X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1355/CS22-3C     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. See, for example, James A. Baker III, “America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community”, Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5 (1991).
2. Cheng Ruisheng, “On China’s New Policies towards Asia Pacific Security”, International Studies, no. 3 (1999).
3. For instance, the United States used forces abroad approximately forty times in the 1990s.
4. Informational Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense, Beijing (July 1998).
5. For instance, in the post-Cold war era, China has been trying to develop partnerships of various types with countries such as Russia, France, ASEAN, the United States, Japan, and so forth, with the aim of improving its security environment and promoting co-operation with those countries.
6. U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen talked about this on several occasions. Additionally, in a report released in late 1998 entitled, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, the Pentagon also clearly stated Washington’s position on this issue. The report said, “The United States welcomes the public statements of ROK President Kim Dae–Jung affirming the value of the bilateral alliance and the U.S. military presence even after reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. strongly agrees that our alliance and military presence will continue to support stability both on the Korean Peninsula and throughout the region after North Korea is no longer a threat” (p. 62).
7. Editorial, “Bully in the South China Sea”, Wall Street Journal, 17 March 2000.
8. Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert Manning, “The Shocks of a World of Cheap Oil”, Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1 (2000): 25.
9. On China’s security concern over Japan, see, among others, Wu Xinbo, “The Security Dimension of Sino–Japanese Relations: Warily Watching One Another.” Asian Survey 49, no. 2 (March/April 2000).
10. Some in China argue that Japan is already a major military power in terms of its military capability. However, owing to the constraints of the Peace Constitution, Japan cannot use its military strength to pursue its foreign policy objectives. In this sense, Japan is not yet a major military power. It is more accurate to say that Japan is a latent military power.
11. The latest example is the U.S. opposition to Israel’s sale of airborne radar to China. See Jane Perlez, “Israel Drops Plan to Sell Air Radar to China Military”, New York Times, 13 July 2000, pp. 1 & 12.
12. Although President Clinton has decided not to authorize the deployment of NMD at present, given the strong pressure from the Congress and the defence industry, his successor, whether a Democratic or Republican, will have to endorse a limited or unlimited NMD.