Replaceability and infanticide

Journal of Value Inquiry

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 153-166

  Uniacke, S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85032070275     PISSN: 00225363     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004254929762     Document Type: Article

References (53)

1. R.M. Hare, "Possible People," in R.M. Hare, Essays in Bioethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 68-69.
2. Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 121.
3. Ibid., p. 126.
4. Rosalind Hursthouse, Beginning Lives (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 152-153.
5. Suzanne Uniacke and H.J. McCloskey, "Peter Singer and Non-Voluntary 'Euthanasia:' tripping down the slippery slope," Journal of Applied Philosophy, 9 (1992), p. 218, n. 22.
6. Unless this point is conceded the abortion of fetuses that will not be replaced will be severely restricted. See Hursthouse, op. cit., pp. 151-153. The required replacement of positive value might sometimes be more restrictive than exponents suggest. See Uniacke and McCloskey, op. cit., p. 218, n. 19.
7. Unless this point is conceded the abortion of fetuses that will not be replaced will be severely restricted. See Hursthouse, op. cit., pp. 151-153. The required replacement of positive value might sometimes be more restrictive than exponents suggest. See Uniacke and McCloskey, op. cit., p. 218, n. 19.
8. Singer, op. cit., pp. 128-131.
9. Ibid., pp. 103, 121, 125, and 186.
10. R.M. Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count?," in Hare, op. cit., p. 91.
11. See also Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse, Should the Baby Live? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 161. This is an application of the view that we are obliged to produce the most valuable outcome. Thus, it is right that we accord less moral significance to maintaining an existing being that will have a worthwhile life than to creating a possible one, if we can reasonably predict that the possible life will have less unsatisfied preferences or will satisfy more preferences than the existing being.
12. See Stephen Buckle, "Arguing from potential," in Peter Singer, et al. (eds.) Embryo Experimentation: Ethical, Legal and Social Issues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 102.
13. Hare, for instance, maintains that an infant has desires which are frustrated by its death. See his "When Does Potentiality Count?," op. cit., p. 91.
14. Singer, Practical Ethics, p. 126.
15. R.M. Hare, "Survival of the Weakest," in Samuel Gorovitz (ed.), Moral Problems in Medicine (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976); Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count?," op. cit., p. 91; Singer, Practical Ethics, op. cit., ch. 7; Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), ch. 12.
16. R.M. Hare, "Survival of the Weakest," in Samuel Gorovitz (ed.), Moral Problems in Medicine (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976); Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count?," op. cit., p. 91; Singer, Practical Ethics, op. cit., ch. 7; Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), ch. 12.
17. R.M. Hare, "Survival of the Weakest," in Samuel Gorovitz (ed.), Moral Problems in Medicine (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976); Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count?," op. cit., p. 91; Singer, Practical Ethics, op. cit., ch. 7; Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), ch. 12.
18. R.M. Hare, "Survival of the Weakest," in Samuel Gorovitz (ed.), Moral Problems in Medicine (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976); Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count?," op. cit., p. 91; Singer, Practical Ethics, op. cit., ch. 7; Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), ch. 12.
19. "It would, of course, be difficult to say at what age children begin to see themselves as distinct entities existing over time. Even when we talk to two and three year old children it is usually very difficult to elicit any coherent conception of death, or the possibility that someone - let alone the child herself - might cease to exist," Singer, Practical Ethics, op. cit., p. 171.
20. Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count?," op. cit., p. 87.
21. This was written for Paul Wittgenstein, a successful concert pianist, who continued his career after losing his right arm in the First World War. See Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein (London: Vintage Books, 1990), p. 13.
22. Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse, "More on Euthanasia: A Response to Pauer-Studer," The Monist, 76 (1993), pp. 159-60. See also Singer, Practical Ethics, pp. 122-125.
23. Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse, "More on Euthanasia: A Response to Pauer-Studer," The Monist, 76 (1993), pp. 159-60. See also Singer, Practical Ethics, pp. 122-125.
24. Singer, Practical Ethics, op. cit., pp. 189-190; Singer and Kuhse, "More on Euthanasia: A Response to Pauer-Studer," op. cit., p. 61. See also the related discussions of Glover, op. cit., pp. 64-65; Hare, "Survival of the Weakest," and Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count?".
25. Singer, Practical Ethics, op. cit., pp. 189-190; Singer and Kuhse, "More on Euthanasia: A Response to Pauer-Studer," op. cit., p. 61. See also the related discussions of Glover, op. cit., pp. 64-65; Hare, "Survival of the Weakest," and Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count?".
26. Singer, Practical Ethics, op. cit., pp. 189-190; Singer and Kuhse, "More on Euthanasia: A Response to Pauer-Studer," op. cit., p. 61. See also the related discussions of Glover, op. cit., pp. 64-65; Hare, "Survival of the Weakest," and Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count?".
27. Singer, Practical Ethics, op. cit., pp. 189-190; Singer and Kuhse, "More on Euthanasia: A Response to Pauer-Studer," op. cit., p. 61. See also the related discussions of Glover, op. cit., pp. 64-65; Hare, "Survival of the Weakest," and Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count?".
28. Singer, Practical Ethics, op. cit., pp. 189-190; Singer and Kuhse, "More on Euthanasia: A Response to Pauer-Studer," op. cit., p. 61. See also the related discussions of Glover, op. cit., pp. 64-65; Hare, "Survival of the Weakest," and Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count?".
29. Derek Parfit, "Rights, Interests and Possible People," in: Samuel Gorovitz (ed.), op. cit., pp. 373-374, and Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 367. See also Glover, op. cit., pp. 67-68.
30. Derek Parfit, "Rights, Interests and Possible People," in: Samuel Gorovitz (ed.), op. cit., pp. 373-374, and Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 367. See also Glover, op. cit., pp. 67-68.
31. Derek Parfit, "Rights, Interests and Possible People," in: Samuel Gorovitz (ed.), op. cit., pp. 373-374, and Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 367. See also Glover, op. cit., pp. 67-68.
32. Singer, Practical Ethics, p. 123.
33. Ibid., p. 125, p. 129, p. 189.
34. Ibid., p. 124-125; Singer and Kuhse, "More on Euthanasia: a Response to Pauer-Studer," op. cit., p. 161.
35. Ibid., p. 124-125; Singer and Kuhse, "More on Euthanasia: a Response to Pauer-Studer," op. cit., p. 161.
36. Singer, Practical Ethics, op. cit., p. 123; Singer and Kuhse, "More on Euthanasia: A Response to Pauer-Studer," op. cit., p. 160.
37. Singer, Practical Ethics, op. cit., p. 123; Singer and Kuhse, "More on Euthanasia: A Response to Pauer-Studer," op. cit., p. 160.
38. See Singer, Practical Ethics, pp. 125-131, and Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count?," op. cit., p. 89-90; also Glover, op. cit., ch. 11. Some are understandably anxious to avoid the implications of the view that contraception and killing are morally equivalent, see Glover, op. cit., ch. 4.
39. See Singer, Practical Ethics, pp. 125-131, and Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count?," op. cit., p. 89-90; also Glover, op. cit., ch. 11. Some are understandably anxious to avoid the implications of the view that contraception and killing are morally equivalent, see Glover, op. cit., ch. 4.
40. See Singer, Practical Ethics, pp. 125-131, and Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count?," op. cit., p. 89-90; also Glover, op. cit., ch. 11. Some are understandably anxious to avoid the implications of the view that contraception and killing are morally equivalent, see Glover, op. cit., ch. 4.
41. See Singer, Practical Ethics, pp. 125-131, and Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count?," op. cit., p. 89-90; also Glover, op. cit., ch. 11. Some are understandably anxious to avoid the implications of the view that contraception and killing are morally equivalent, see Glover, op. cit., ch. 4.
42. Singer, Practical Ethics, op. cit., p. 188: "I cannot see how one could defend the view that fetuses may be 'replaced' before birth, but newborn infants may not be."
43. Uniacke and McCloskey, op. cit., p. 216.
44. Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count?" op. cit., pp. 89-91.
45. Nevertheless, Singer and Kuhse suggest that when a defective infant is allowed to live and so not replaced by a normal infant, the possible normal infant is harmed by never being conceived. See Uniacke and McCloskey, op. cit., pp. 218-219, n. 23.
46. See Singer, Practical Ethics, ch. 4. Such elision is not necessarily utilitarian.
47. See Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), and Singer, Practical Ethics, ch.4.
48. See Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), and Singer, Practical Ethics, ch.4.
49. Singer defends one-dimensionality, arguing that other cases of total dependence do not establish a right to kill, op. cit., pp. 140-141.
50. Hursthouse, op. cit., p. 157, argues that the value of a fetus as a developing being is not morally on a par with that of a non-developing being such as a non-human animal with similar actual characteristics.
51. Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count?," op. cit., pp. 91-93.
52. Ibid., p. 96.
53. Singer, Practical Ethics, op. cit., pp. 130-131.