Explanation, understanding, and control

Synthese

Volumn 191, Issue 17, 2014, Pages 4169-4200

  Smith, Ryan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Causation; Explanation; Mental representation; Rationality; Understanding; Unification

Indexed keywords

EID: 85027927122     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-014-0521-3     Document Type: Article

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