The politics of market liberalization: A comparative study of the south korean and philippine telecommunications service industries

Contemporary Southeast Asia

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 337-370

  Kim, Dong Yeob ^a  

^a ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY   (Philippines)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85025428212     PISSN: 0129797X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1355/CS24-2G     Document Type: Article

References (38)

1. The East Asian newly industrialized countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore have been extensively studied under this framework.
2. Karl Fields, “Strong States and Business Organizations in Korea and Taiwan”, in Business and the State in Developing Countries, edited by Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider (Ithaca, New York, and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 122–51.
3. Huntington has argued that economic development was one of the important factors to stimulate the third wave of democratization (1974 ~). Economic development appears to have promoted changes in social structure and values that, in turn, encouraged democratization. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
4. Strategic coalition here contains two different aspects. One is that the business sector is the state’s machinery for the gathering of industrial data and to implement its economic policy; the other is the negative aspect of patron–client relationships that revolve around state-created rents.
5. The cases of South Korea and Taiwan during the late 1980s are explicit examples.
6. Stephan Haggard, “Taiwan: From Import Substitution to Export-Led Growth”, in Stephan Haggard, Developing Nations and the Politics of Global Integration (Washington, D. C: The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 76–99.
7. Here, “economic deadlock” means a situation where further economic development is deterred because of conventional state economic policy, which had functioned positively in the earlier period.
8. R. Samarajiva, and P. Shields, “Value Issues in Telecommunications Resource Allocation in the Third World”, in Telecommunications, Values, and the Public Interest, edited by S. B. Lundstedt (New Jersey: Norwood, 1990), pp. 227–53. Cited in Nobuya Inagaki and Romi Mahajan, “Emerging Issues in the International Telecommunications and Information Environment: Research Topics,” in TIPI International White Paper (Telecommunications and Information Policy Institute, University of Texas, Austin TX, USA, 2000).
9. The comparative method here is regarded as one of discovering empirical relationships among variables, not as a method of measurement. See details about the comparative method in Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method”, American Political Science Review 65 (1971): 683.
10. The data used in Figure 2 are growth national income (GNI) for Korea and growth domestic product (GDP) for the Philippines. No significant differences exist in these two figures.
11. This argument has been advanced by Dong-Se Cha, Kwang-Suk Kim, and Dwight H. Perkins, eds., The Korean Economy 1945–1995: Performance and Vision for the 21st Century (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1997).
12. See Pedro V. Salgado, O.P., The Philippine Economy, History and Analysis (Quezon City: R.P. Garcia Publishing Co. Inc., 1985).
13. See Temario C. Rivera, Landlords & Capitalists. Class, Family, and State in Philippine Manufacturing (Quezon City: Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines Press, 1994).
14. See Hagen Koo and Eun-Mee Kim, “The Developmental State and Capital Accumulation in South Korea”, in State and Development in the Asia-Pacific Rim, edited by Richard P. Appelbaum and Jeffrey Henderson (Newbury Park, London and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1992); and Soon-Won Kwon, “Economic Justice and Social Welfare: New Principles of Economic Policy”, in Democratization and Globalization in Korea: Assessments and Prospects, edited by Chung-In Moon and Jong-Ryn Mo (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999).
15. The following literature provided the background for this analysis: Edberto M. Villegas, The Political Economy of Philippine Labor Laws (Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1988); Felipe B. Miranda, ed., Democratization: Philippine Perspectives (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1997); John J. Carroll, S.J. The Filipino Manufacturing Entrepreneur, Agent and Product of Change (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965); Joseph Y. Lim, Philippine Macroeconomic Development, 1970–1993 (Quezon City: Philippine Center For Policy Studies, 1996); Pedro V. Salgado, O.P., op. cit.; Temario C. Rivera, op. cit.; Grace Gorospe-Jamon, “The El Shaddai Prayer Movement: Political Socialization in a Religious Context”, Philippine Political Science Journal 20, no. 43 (1999); Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Roger L. Mendosa, “Elections and the Crisis of Legitimacy in the Philippines: A Comparative View of the Marcos and Aquino Regimes”, Philippine Journal of Public Administration 32, nos. 3&4 (July–October 1998); and Temario C. Rivera, “Middle Class Politics: The Philippine Experience”, Journal of Social Science 45 (Tokyo: September 2000).
16. It was established in 1981 by separating the telecommunications business from the government’s direct control.
17. It was established in 1982 in order to provide data communication services, such as information database services and value-added network services.
18. It was established in 1984 and began to provide car-phone and paging services. Cellular phone service started only in 1988.
19. Shin Cho, Sun-Kyu Choi, and Yong-Kyu Kim, Telecommunication Market Structure Under Globalization Era, Research Report 95-03 (KwaCheon City: Korea Information Society Development Institute, 1995), p. 19 (Korean version).
20. Shin Cho, Sun-Kyu Choi, and Yong-Kyu Kim, Telecommunication Market Structure Under Globalization Era, Research Report 95-03 (KwaCheon City: Korea Information Society Development Institute, 1995), p. 20.
21. The largest shareholder could not possess more than 10 per cent of company stocks; for the telecommunications facility manufacturers, not more than 3 per cent; and no stock could be held by foreigners.
22. The largest shareholder could not possess more than one-third of the company stocks; for the telecommunications facility manufacturers not more than 10 per cent; for foreigners not more than one-third of the company’s stocks, but could not be the largest shareholder. State institutions could invest up to 10 per cent but they could not be the largest shareholder.
23. Wireless telecommunications services were then classified as special services.
24. The existing pre-announcement system made by the government for any new licensing in network telecommunications service was abolished at this time.
25. APEC Secretariat, The Impact of Liberalization: Communicating with APEC Communities (Studies in APEC Liberalization, November 1998), p. 5.
26. Ma. Joy V. Abrenica, “Reforming the Telecommunications Industry: Prospects and Challenges”, Economic Policy Agenda, Series No. 3 (Foundation for Economic Freedom, Inc., 1999), p. 5.
27. APEC Secretariat, op. cit., p. 8.
28. Donyaprueth Krairit, “Liberalizing Development: Effects of Telecommunication Liberalization in Thailand and the Philippines” (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June, 2001), p. 68.
29. Donyaprueth Krairit, “Liberalizing Development: Effects of Telecommunication Liberalization in Thailand and the Philippines” (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June, 2001),, pp. 67–68.
30. See International Telecommunication Union, Yearbook of Statistics, Telecommunication Services Chronological Time Series 1990–1999 (Geneva: ITU, 2001).
31. See Kyung-Min Koo, “Liberalization of Korean IT Industry and the Politics of Policy Change” (Paper presented to the Association of Korean Politics, 1999).
32. KT procured its facilities, specifically electronic exchanges, from domestic suppliers at a higher price of over US$100 per line compared with foreign suppliers. Stated by Rep. Jeong-Hun Jeong at the Transportation and Communication Committee meeting, 145th National Assembly Session, 2 March 1989, from the Committee Minutes (Korean version).
33. See Sheila S. Coronel, “Monopoly”, at http://www.pldt.com/monopoly1.htm.
34. Cutler & Company, WTO Impact Study, Incremental Change or Step Function Gain? Positioning the Philippines’ Communications Sector in the Emerging WTO Environment (Final Report for the DOTC, Philippines, November 1999), p. 68.
35. See Coronel, op. cit.
36. Paul D. Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philippines (Ithaca, New York, and London: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 52.
37. The ITU 1998 Report on Universal Access suggested that a household must earn at least an annual income of US$1,340 to afford the service provided by the carrier that deployed the most efficient technology.
38. Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p. 19.