Semantic approaches in the philosophy of science

South African Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 100-148

  Ruttkamp, Emma B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA   (South Africa)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85023791773     PISSN: 02580136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/02580136.1999.10878181     Document Type: Article

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