Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect after 9/11

Netherlands International Law Review

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 37-62

  Molier, Gelijn ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 85023037696     PISSN: 0165070X     EISSN: 17416191     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0165070X06000374     Document Type: Article

References (72)

1. See, for example: Danish Institute of International Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects (Copenhagen, DUPI 1999); Advisory Council on International Affairs and Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International law, Humanitarian Intervention, No. 13 (The Hague, AIV 2000) (hereinafter: report Humanitarian Intervention); International Com-mission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottowa, International Development Research Centre 2001) (hereinafter: ICISS report); Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2000).
2. See, for example, the contributions in 97 American Journal of International Law (2003) of W.H. Taft IV and T.F. Buchwald, 'Preemption, Iraq, and International Law’, pp. 557-563; J. Yoo, 'International Law and the War in Iraq’, pp. 563-576; R. Wedgwood, 'The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defence’, R. N. Gardner, 'Neither Bush nor the “Jurisprudes”’, pp. 585-590; R.A. Falk, 'What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?’, pp. 590-598; M. Sapiro, 'Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defence’, pp. 599-607; T.M. Franck, 'What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq’, 607-620; T.J. Farer, 'The Prospect for International Lew and Order in the Wake of Iraq’, pp. 621-628; J.E. Stromseth, 'Law and Force After Iraq: A Transitional Moment’, pp. 628–642. 3. See n. 1.
3. A more secure world: Our shared responsibility (2004) pp. 56–57, paras. 201–203, avail-able at: .
4. A/5912005 21 March 2005, p. 35, para. 135.
5. AIRES/60/1 24 October 2005, p. 30, paras. 138–139. 7. See, for example, Resolution 794, 3 December 1992 (Somalia); Resolution 836, 4 June 1993 (Bosnia-Herzegovina); Resolution 929, 22 June 1994 (Rwanda); Resolution 940, 31 July 1994 (Haiti); Resolution 1264, 15 September 1999 (East-Timor).
6. See, for example, W.D. Verwey, 'Humanitarian Intervention in the 1990s and Beyond: An International Law Perspective’, in J. Nederveen Pieterse, ed., World Orders in the Making: Humanitarian Intervention and Beyond (London, MacMillan Press 1998) p. 181.
7. See, for example, P. Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force (Amsterdam, Het Spinhuis 1993) p. 3. 10. As such can be mentioned the intervention of India in East-Pakistan (Bangladesh, 1971), Vietnam in Cambodia (1978–79), Tanzania in Uganda (1979), France in the Central African Republic (1980). See G. Molier, De (on)rechtmatigheid van humanitaire interventie: Respect voor staatssoevereiniteit versus bescherming van mensenrechten ?[The (Il)legality wof Humanitar-ian Intervention: Respect for State Sovereignty or Protection of Human Rights?] (The Hague, Boom Juridische uitgevers 2003) pp. 217–273.
8. Human Rights in the World, at pp. 96–105.
9. O. Ramsbotham and T. Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualization (Cambridge, Polity Press 1996) p. 139.
10. D.J. Scheffer, 'Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention’, U Toledo L Rev. (1992) p. 259. 14. Weiss defines 'the humanitarian impulse’ as 'the understandable human desire to help those in life-threatening distress resulting from armed conflict’. T.G. Weiss, 'The Humanitar-ian Impulse’, in D.M. Malone, ed.,The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (London, Boulder 2004) p. 37.
11. Weiss, Human Rights in the World, at p. 38, quotes Roberts to underline his point of view: 'In the 1990s humanitarian issues played a historically unprecedented role in international politics.’
12. Human Rights in the World, at p. 37.
13. A/54/PV.4, 20 September 1999, p. 2. 18. Molier, Human Rights in the World n. 10, at pp. 313–316.
14. Human Rights in the World, at pp. 306–310. 20. Human Rights in the World, at pp. 314–315.
15. Available at: . 22. T.G. Weiss, 'The Synset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era’, Security Dialogue (2004) p. 141.
16. Roberts quoted in Weiss, Human Rights in the World, at p. 143.
17. C. Abbott, 'Rights and Responsibilities: Resolving the Dilemma of Humani-tarian Intervention’ (Oxford Research Group, September 2005) p. 11, available at: .
18. A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities (Barcelona 2004), available at: .
19. R.O. Keohane, 'Introduction’, In J.L. Holzgrefe and R.O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Moral Dilemmas (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2003) p. 11. See also T.J. Farer, in Holfzrefe and Keohane, Human Rights in the World, at pp. 84, 86.
20. G. Evans (March), available at: .
21. Farer, Human Rights in the World n. 26, at p. 86.
22. See, for example: Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General. Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 (Geneva, 25 January 2005), available at: ; J. Flint, Darfur Destroyed Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan (New York, Human Rights Watch 2004), available at: ; Empty Promises? Continuing Abuses in Darfur, Sudan: A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper (11 August 2004), available at: . 30. ICISS report, Human Rights in the World n. 1, at p. 16.
23. Human Rights in the World, at p. 55.
24. Human Rights in the World, at p. 55. These criteria will be discussed later in this section. 33. Human Rights in the World, at pp. 9, 17.
25. Human Rights in the World, at p. 17.
26. See Molier, Human Rights in the World n. 10, at pp. 390–391.
27. ICISS report, Human Rights in the World n. 1, at pp. 19–27.
28. Human Rights in the World, at p. 67. 38. F.R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (New York, Transnational Publishers 1997).
29. Human Rights in the World, at p. 98: 'The state has the international rights of territorial integrity and political independence if, and only if, it is a legitimate state from the standpoint of domestic justice - when it protects and guarantees the rights of its subjects.’
30. Human Rights in the World, at p. 174.
31. Human Rights in the World, at p. 173. 42. Human Rights in the World, at p. 173.
32. ICISS report, Human Rights in the World n. 1, at pp. 32–37. Apart from these five criteria the Commission also distinguishes so-called 'operational principles’ but these are not so much formulated in terms of conditions of legitimacy, as well as in terms of practical guidelines in order to increase the possibility of a successful intervention. For these 'operational principles’ see ICISS report, p. 67.
33. See Molier, Human Rights in the World n. 10, at pp. 380–388.
34. HLP report, Human Rights in the World n. 4, at pp. 56–57, paras. 201–203.
35. Human Rights in the World, at p. 57, para. 202. 47. Human Rights in the World, at p. 57, para. 204.
36. Human Rights in the World, at p. 57, para. 207. The first one is labeled 'seriousness of threat'. Hereby is meant that the threatened harm to state or human security must be sufficiently clear and serious to justify the use of military force.
37. SG report, Human Rights in the World n. 5, at p. 33, paras. 122–126.
38. Human Rights in the World, at p. 35, para. 135.
39. Human Rights in the World, at p. 33, para. 126.
40. Human Rights in the World, at p. 33, para. 126. 53. A/RES/60/1, p. 30, paras. 138–139.
41. A good example is House of Commons International Development Committee, Darfur, Sudan: The responsibility to protect, Fifth Report of Session 2004–05, published on 30 March 2005, available at: .
42. For a more extended version of this section see Molier, Human Rights in the World n. 10, at pp. 343–363.
43. W.D. Verwey, 'Humanitarian Intervention under International Law’, NILR (1985) pp. 414 - 417; J. Raby, 'The State of Necessity and the Use of Force to Protect Nationals’, 26 Can. YIL (1988) pp. 253 - 272; A. de Hoogh, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes: A Theoretical Inquiry into the Implementation and Enforcement of the International Responsibility of States (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1996) pp. 323 - 324; S. Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001) p. 214.
44. J. Crawford, The International Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2002) p. 178.
45. Human Rights in the World, at p. 183, para. 14.
46. The former Art. 33 read as follow: '1. A state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act of that State not in conformity with an international obligation of the State unless: the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the State against a grave and imminent peril; and the act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards which the obligation existed.’ 60. Crawford, Human Rights in the World n. 57, at p. 183, para. 15: The extent to which a given interest is “essential” depends on all the circumstances, and cannot be prejudged. It extends to particu-lar interests of the State and its people, as well as of the international community as a whole[emphasis added].’
47. Human Rights in the World, at p. 278, para. 9.
48. Human Rights in the World, at p. 278, para. 10.
49. Human Rights in the World, at p. 187.
50. Human Rights in the World, at p. 188, para. 4.
51. Human Rights in the World, at p. 188, para. 5. 66. R. Bernhardt, 'Article 103’, in B. Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1994) p. 1118: 'The extent to which the Char-ter contains ius cogens cannot be discussed here. However the outstanding example of such a norm in the Charter is the prohibition of the use of force.’ Chesterman, Human Rights in the World n. 56, at p. 60; P. Malanczuk, ed., Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edn. (London, Routledge 1997) p. 311; B. Simma, ' NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’, 10 EJIL (1999) p. 5; A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001) pp. 110, 141; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th edn. (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1990) p. 513.
52. ILC Yearbook (1980) Vol. 2, Part Two, pp. 43–44, para. 23.
53. Human Rights in the World, at p. 44, para. 23.
54. Human Rights in the World, at p. 45, para. 2653.
55. Human Rights in the World, at p. 45, para. 26.
56. Statement of the United Kingdom: 'Every means short of force has been tried to avert this sitation. In these circumstances, and as an exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity, military intervention is legally justifiable. The force now proposed is directed exclusively to averting a humanitarian catastrophe, and is the minimum judged neces-sary for that purpose.’ See S/PV.3988, 24 March 1999, p. 12. Statement of Belgium: '[I]f we have failed to convince you that what has been taking place is armed humanitarian intervention justified by international law, the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium will also plead, in the alternative, that there is a state of necessity.’ See International Court of Justice, Public Sitting, 10 May 1999, Verbatim Record, CR 99/15, p. 7, available at: .
57. Crawford, Human Rights in the World n. 57, at p. 185, para. 21.
58. Human Rights in the World, at p. 185, para. 21: 'It is true that in a few cases, the plea of necessity has been invoked to excuse military action abroad, in particular in the context of claims to humanitarian intervention. The question whether measures of forcible humanitarian intervention, not sanctioned pursuant to Chapters VII or VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, may be lawful under modern international law is not covered by article 25.’
59. Human Rights in the World n. 73.
60. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-first session 3 May-23 July 1999, A/54/10, p. 180, para. 385.
61. Report Humanitarian Intervention, Human Rights in the World n. 1, at p. 35.
62. Human Rights in the World, at p. 35. 78. Human Rights in the World, at p. 28.
63. Human Rights in the World, at p. 20.
64. Kamerstukken II 2001–2002, 27742, No. 5, p. 13. 81. Compare Art. 53 para. 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: '[A] peremp-tory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same char-acter. ’
65. See Molier, Human Rights in the World n. 10, at pp. 282–324.
66. Crawford, Human Rights in the World n. 57, at p. 188, para. 5. 84.Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1986) pp. 100–101, para. 190.
67. ILC Yearbook (1976) Vol. 2, Part II, p. 121, para. 67.
68. Human Rights in the World, at p. 121, para. 68. 87.Human Rights in the World n. 71.
69. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Order of 5 February 1997, ICJ Reports (1997) p. 3, para. 40.
70. Compare the report of the International Development Committee of the House of Com-mons, Human Rights in the World n. 54, at p. 57, para. 97: 'The responsibility to protect is an emerging legal norm, but as yet it has no firm legal basis. As a result, a shared responsibility to protect risks degenerating into a game of passing the buck and avoiding responsibilities.’
71. See HLP report, Human Rights in the World n. 4, at pp. 53 – 58 and SG report, Human Rights in the World n. 5, at pp. 24–26, 33.
72. A/RES/60/1, pp. 21–22.