Pension fund governance expertise and organizational form

Journal of Pension Economics and Finance

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 233-253

  Clark, Gordon L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85022885587     PISSN: 14747472     EISSN: 14753022     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1474747204001556     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. Alchian, A. (1950) Uncertainty, evolution and economic theory. Journal of Political Economy, 58:211-222.
2. Allen, F. and Gale, D. (2000) Comparing Financial Systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
3. Atiyah, P. S. (1979) The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Bateman, H., Kingston, G., and Piggott, J. (2001) Forced Saving. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Black, B. (1992) Agents watching agents: the promise of institutional voice. UCLA Law Review, 39: 811–893.
6. Blake, D. (2003) Pension Schemes and Pension Funds in the United Kingdom. 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. Bourdieu, P. (1990) In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology. Cambridge: Polity Press.
8. Buckley, F. H. (1999) Free contracting in bankruptcy. In Buckley, F. H. (ed.), The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 301–311.
9. Bunt, K., Winterbotham, M., and Williams, R. (1998) The role of pension scheme trustees. Research Report 81, HM Department of Social Security, London.
10. Campbell, J. and Yiceira, L. (2002) Strategic Asset Allocation: Portfolio Choice for Long-Term Investors. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
11. Cartwright, J. (1991) Unequal Bargaining: A Study of Vitating Factors in the Formation of Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
12. Clark, C. L. (2000) Pension Fund Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
13. Clark, G. L. (2003) European Pensions and Global Finance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14. Clark, G. L. (2005) Pension fund governance: asymmetrical information and regimes of regulation. In Clark, G. L., Orszag, M., and Munnell, A. (eds), Oxford Handbook of Pensions and Retirement Income. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
15. Coase, R. (1937) The nature of the firm. Economica, NS4: 386–405.
16. Coffee, J. (2003) What caused Enron? A capsule social and economic history of the 1990s. Working Paper 214, Columbia Law School, Columbia University, New York.
17. Coleman, J. (1992) Risks and Wrongs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
18. Disney, R. (2005) Hybrid pension systems. In Clark, G. L., Orszag, M., and Munnell, A. (eds), Oxford Handbook of Pensions and Retirement Income. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
19. Ellison, R. (2002) Pensions Law and Practice with Precedents. London: Sweet & Maxwell.
20. Emmerson, C. (2003) Pension reform in the United Kingdom: increasing the role of private provision? In Clark, G. L. and Whiteside, N. (eds), Pension Security in the 21st Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 168–192.
21. Epstein, R. (1999) Contracts small and contracts large: contract law through the lens of laissez-faire. In Buckley, F. H. (ed.), The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 25–61.
22. European Federation for Retirement Provision (2003) European Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision. Brussels.
23. Gigerenzer, G., Todd, M., and the ABC Research Group Staff (1999) Simple Heuristics that Make us Smart. New York: Oxford University Press.
24. Hawley, J. and Williams, A. (1999) The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
25. Hebb, T. (2004) The economic inefficiency of secrecy. Working Paper 04–04, School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxforeojlmd, Oxford.
26. Hebb, T. and Wojcik, D. (2005) The institutional investor value chain: CalPERS’ emerging markets strategy. Environment and Planning A (forthcoming).
27. Horack, S., Martin, A., and Young, P. (2003) The Myners principles and occupational pension schemes. Research Report 195, HM Department for Work and Pensions, London.
28. Houthakker, H. and Williamson, J. (1996) The Economics of Financial Markets. New York: Oxford University Press.
29. Jensen, M. (2000) A Theory of the Firm. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
30. Johnson, C. (1991) Moral Legislation: A Legal-Political Model for Indirect Consequentialist Reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
31. Langbein, J. (1997) The secret life of the trust: the trust as an instrument of commerce. Yale Law Journal, 107: 165–189.
32. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1997) Legal determinants of external finance. Journal of Finance, 52: 1131–1150.
33. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1998) Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106: 113–155.
34. Litterman, B. and the Quantitative Resources Group (2003) Modern Investment Management. New York: Wiley.
35. March, J. (1994) A Primer on Decision Making. New York: Free Press.
36. Masten, S. E. (ed.) (1996) Case Studies in Contracting and Organization. New York: Oxford University Press.
37. Munnell, A. (2003) Restructuring pensions for the 21st century: the United States social security debate? In Clark, G. L. and Whiteside, N. (eds), Pension Security in the 21st Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 193–224.
38. Myners Report (2001) Institutional Investment in the UK: a review. London: HM Treasury.
39. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2002) Guidelines for Pension Fund Governance. Paris.
40. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2004) Principles of corporate governance. Draft revised text, Paris.
41. Rawls, J. (1954) Two concepts of rules. Philosophical Review, 64: 3–32.
42. Runciman, D. and Ryan, M. (eds) (2003) Maitland: State, Trust and Corporation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shiller, R. J. (2002) Bubbles, human judgement, and expert opinion. Financial Analysts Journal, 58(3): 18–26.
43. Shleifer, A. (2000) Market Inefficiency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
44. Simon, H. (1982) Models of Bounded Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
45. Thomas, A., Pettigrew, N., Candy, S., and Hulusi, H. (2000) The changing role of the Occupational Pension Scheme Trustee. Research Report 124, HM Department of Social Security, London.
46. Trebilcock, M. (1993) The Limits of Freedom of Contract. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
47. Trebilcock, M. (1999) External critiques of laissez-faire contract values. In Buckley, F. H. (ed.), The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 78–93.
48. Wagner, R. K. (2002) Smart people doing dumb things: the case of managerial incompetence. In Sternberg, R. J. (ed.), Why Smart People Can Be So Stupid. Yale: Yale University Press, pp. 42–62.
49. Williamson, O. (1975) Markets and Hierarchies. New York: Free Press.
50. Williamson, O. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.
51. Williamson, O. (1996) The Mechanisms of Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.