Two puzzles from the postscript

Legal Theory

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 359-380

  Soper, Philip ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85022852144     PISSN: 13523252     EISSN: 14698048     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1352325200001063     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. The best-known example in legal theory is that of Gustav Radbruch, whose apparent conversion from positivism after World War II became the occasion for speculation about its implications in the classic exchange between Hart and Fuller. See H.LA Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Lauf-a Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).
2. N. MacCormick, Herbert LA. Hart: In Memoriam, 6 RATIO JURIS 337 (1993).
3. All page references in the text are to H.LA. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) (with Postscript).
4. See Joseph Raz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 47 (1979).
5. “Soft positivism” is the term Hart uses to describe this position. For a book-length defense of this view, see WJ. Waluchow, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994).
6. See Philip Soper, A THEORY OF LAW 31,39 (1984).
7. See, e.g., N. MacCormick, A Moralistic Case for A-Moralistic Law, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 1,28-29 (1985).
8. Neil MacCormick, H.LA HART 162 (1981).
9. See Joseph Raz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 153 (1979).
10. See P. Soper, Law's Normative Claims, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW 215, 218-20 (R. Geortre 1996).
11. See Joseph Raz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 147-48 (1975).
12. See P. Soper, Searching for Positivism, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1739, 1741-44 (1996) (reviewing W.J. Waluchow, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS note 5); id, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS note 6, at 101-109.
13. See P. Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dwbrkin Dispute, 75 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1977); D. Lyons, Principles, Positivism, and Legal Theory, 87 YALE L. J. 415 (1977) (reviewing Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY); J. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism.
14. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982).
15. See, e.g., M. Moore, Law as a Functional Kind, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 188 (R. Georee ed 1992).
16. See Lon Fuller, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (2d ed. 1964).
17. Thus, Fuller himself could imagine justifying occasional retroactive laws, even though they too violated one of his eight constraints. See id. at 39, 44, 51-62.
18. In his famous Speluncean Explorers piece, Fuller imagines one judge “discovering” for the first time a dustyjudicial precedent that would completely reverse what judges had thought he law was, at least in some respects, arguably requiring a different result in the case before & h. See L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 628 (1949).
19. See J.L. Mackic, INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1977).
20. See. Coleman, INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG note 13, at 141,145-48 (on the distinction between a semantic and epistemic Rule of Recognition).
21. At times, Hart suggests that his soft positivism only extends to this idea of “formal” rather than substantive incorporation. See, e.g., Hart, INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG note note 3, at 258-59 (suggesting that his practice theory of rules explains howjudges may be agreed on “the relevance” of incorporated moral tests for law, even though they disagree as to what the tests require in particular cases). For the reasons suggested in the text, I have ignored the possibility that Hart thinks of soft positivism as involving only “formal” incorporation of moral standards, with all subsequent attempts to apply such standards constituting judicial legislation.
22. See Don Herzog, HAPPY SLAVES (1989).
23. See text at HAPPY SLAVES note 6.
24. Cf. THE CONCEPT OF UW, ch. 5, at 86-87, with id, ch. 8 at 172-80 and ch 9 at 202-203.
25. See H.L.A. Hart, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 156-57 (1982).
26. See P. Soper, supranolc 10, at 218, 241 n.10.
27. H.L.A. Hart, supranolc note 28, at 160; see also id. at 264-67.
28. See P. Soper, supranolc note note 10.
29. See. Noonan, 7 NAT. L. F. 177 (1962) (book review).
30. The term comes from Leslie Green, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE, ch. 3 (1988).
31. See Raz, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE note 9.
32. See Soper, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE note note 10.
33. See Dworkin, LAWS EMPIRE, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE note note note 14, at 191.
34. See H.L.A. Hart, LAWS EMPIRE note 28.