Some questions and comments on what is called “the mental element of the offence”

Israel Law Review

Volumn 30, Issue 1-2, 1996, Pages 82-105

  Burkhardt, Björn ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

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EID: 85022681662     PISSN: 00212237     EISSN: 20479336     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0021223700014965     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. Cf. also Duff 1990, 87
2. Ashworth 1991, 161 ff
3. Cf. S/S-Cramer 1991, § 15 Rn 67.
4. Cf. examples mentioned by Duff 1990, 88 ff; besides, the English Draft uses a different language and refers to acting intentionally with respect to a circumstance.
5. Jakobs 1991, 8/15.
6. cf. also Ashworth 1991, 149, 151: pointing out (the leading case)
7. Hyam v. DPP ([1975] A.C. 55), which suggested that a person could be held to intend a result which he had foreseen as probable [or highly probable] to occur [also p. 153, n. 90].
8. Jakobs, A.C 8/27
9. Duff, A.C. 98.
10. Washington Code (p. 236 note 12 MPC and Commentaries 1985): “A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge when (i) he is aware of a fact, facts or circumstances described by a statute defining an offence, or (ii) he has information which would lead a reasonable man in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a statute defining an offence.”
11. The term “intentional state” is used in the sense John R. Searle (Jntentionality, Cambridge 1983) uses it.
12. RG JW 1938, 2734
13. JW 1935, 2734
14. BGH NJW 1953, 152.
15. furthermore Jescheck 1992, 61, 64.
16. Searle., at 149.
17. Duff Searle. 143, 149
18. [1982] A.C. 341.
19. [1982] 1 W.L.R. 762.
20. BGH NStZ 1983, 407.
21. Jakobs 1991, 8/5a, 21
22. For further examples see Frisch 1983, 219.
23. Crim LR 1992, 820 f.
24. RGSt 75, 127 f
25. RG HRR 128 Nr. 791
26. differently however BGH NJW 1953, 152.
27. Sistare 1989, 131.
28. Compare also Law Com. No. 177 Vol. 2 para 8.60 p. 202.
29. Cf. Law Com. No. 177 Vol 2 p. 202.
30. Some renowned English authors, e.g., Glanville Williams, also take this position. It was given further support by famous American philosophers
31. e.g. John R. Searle (1983, 61, 135–140).