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1
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33750702396
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Just Cause for War
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Fall available at www.cceia.org/resources/ournal/19_3/articles/5270.html
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Jeff McMahan, “Just Cause for War”, Ethics & International Affairs 19, no. 3 (Fall 2005), pp. 1–21; available at www.cceia.org/resources/ournal/19_3/articles/5270.html.
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(2005)
Ethics & International Affairs
, vol.19
, Issue.3
, pp. 1-21
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McMahan, J.1
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2
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33845412548
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Proportionality in the Morality of War
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Closely related to these is the reasonable hope of success condition, but as McMahan notes, it can be subsumed under the proportionality condition. On this, see also
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Closely related to these is the reasonable hope of success condition, but as McMahan notes, it can be subsumed under the proportionality condition. On this, see also Thomas Hurka, “Proportionality in the Morality of War,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2005), p. 37.
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(2005)
Philosophy and Public Affairs
, vol.33
, pp. 37
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Hurka, T.1
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4
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0004264902
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), pp. 27–36.
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(1903)
Principia Ethica
, pp. 27-36
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Moore, G.E.1
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5
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84923223030
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The Additive Fallacy
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see also October
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see also Shelly Kagan, “The Additive Fallacy,” Ethics 99 (October 1988), pp. 5–31
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(1988)
Ethics
, vol.99
, pp. 5-31
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Kagan, S.1
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6
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0041719886
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Given this condition, the lesser humanitarian wrongs that provide conditional just causes will be situated between two thresholds. They will be below the threshold for being an independent just cause but above the threshold that determines when a humanitarian wrong can be another state's legitimate business. See, e.g. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.
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Given this condition, the lesser humanitarian wrongs that provide conditional just causes will be situated between two thresholds. They will be below the threshold for being an independent just cause but above the threshold that determines when a humanitarian wrong can be another state's legitimate business. See, e.g., A. C. Ewing, The Morality of Punishment (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.,1929).
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(1929)
The Morality of Punishment
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Ewing, A.C.1
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7
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0004083066
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2nd ed New York: Basic Books
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Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1992), pp. 34–37
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(1992)
Just and Unjust Wars
, pp. 34-37
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Walzer, M.1
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8
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0040941308
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2nd ed see also Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall
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see also Paul Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1998), p. 25.
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(1998)
The Ethics of War and Peace
, pp. 25
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Christopher, P.1
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9
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8644284846
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The Ethics of Killing in War
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Jeff McMahan, “The Ethics of Killing in War,” Ethics 114 (2004), pp. 723–725.
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(2004)
Ethics
, vol.114
, pp. 723-725
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McMahan, J.1
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10
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0000976166
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Thomas Nagel, “War and Massacre,”
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See, e.g. Winter
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See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, “War and Massacre,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (Winter 1972), pp. 139–140
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(1972)
Philosophy and Public Affairs
, vol.1
, pp. 139-140
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16
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0018244142
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Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life
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Winter
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Joel Feinberg, “Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (Winter 1978), pp. 122–123.
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(1978)
Philosophy and Public Affairs
, vol.7
, pp. 122-123
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Feinberg, J.1
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17
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1842364593
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Feinberg emphasizes this distinction before expressing his skepticism about whether any rights are inalienable
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Feinberg, “Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life,” pp. 114–18; Feinberg emphasizes this distinction before expressing his skepticism about whether any rights are inalienable.
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Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life
, pp. 114-118
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Feinberg1
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19
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84993714192
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The Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: An Israeli Perspective
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This is not the only reason they give. They also argue that a state's soldiers deserve priority just as citizens of the state, and that the responsibility for any civilians' deaths during antiterrorist operations belongs primarily to the terrorists who brought the combat into the civilians' vicinity (pp. 17–18). But they do not explain how large a role these different reasons play in justifying their final ordering
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Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin, “The Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: An Israeli Perspective,” Journal of Military Ethics 4 (2005), p. 17. This is not the only reason they give. They also argue that a state's soldiers deserve priority just as citizens of the state, and that the responsibility for any civilians' deaths during antiterrorist operations belongs primarily to the terrorists who brought the combat into the civilians' vicinity (pp. 17–18). But they do not explain how large a role these different reasons play in justifying their final ordering.
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(2005)
Journal of Military Ethics
, vol.4
, pp. 17
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Kasher, A.1
Yadlin, A.2
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20
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85022692186
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The Ethics of Killing in War: The Uehiro Lectures 2006
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Lecture 1 forthcoming
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Jeff McMahan, “The Ethics of Killing in War: The Uehiro Lectures 2006,” Lecture 1, “Unjust Warfare,”p. 6 (forthcoming).
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Unjust Warfare
, pp. 6
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McMahan, J.1
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21
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85022618447
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Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
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3rd ed in Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds. Art. 51 (5) (b) and 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949 Oxford: Oxford University Press
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1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Art. 51 (5) (b), in Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds., Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 449.
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(2000)
Documents on the Laws of War
, pp. 449
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