International organisations and immunity from jurisdiction: To restrict or to bypass

International and Comparative Law Quarterly

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 1-15

  Gaillard, Emmanuel ^a   Pingel Lenuzza, Isabelle ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS EST CRÉTEIL   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85018191992     PISSN: 00205893     EISSN: 14716895     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/iclq/51.1.1     Document Type: Article

References (80)

1. This situation was discussed, as early as in 1965, in a Memorandum of the Government of the United Kingdom on the privileges and immunities of international organisations and persons connected with them, which led to a report on the same subject by the Council of Europe (for the text of the Memorandum of the Government of the United Kingdom and the Council of Europe's explanatory report, see Council of Europe, Privileges and Immunities of International Organisations (1970), hereinafter ‘Council of Europe Report’).
2. As noted in the report of the various privileges and immunities granted to organisations, ‘those which are most open to criticism are immunities from jurisdiction’ (Council of Europe Report, at 71).
3. For a clear statement of this principle, see, eg, the decision by the US Supreme Court in The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon, 7 US 116, 137 (1 Cranch).
4. On this issue, see generally, Isabelle Pingel-Lenuzza, Les immunités des états en droit international 17 et seq (1998).
5. See, eg, 22 June 1995, Swiss Fed Trib, F SA v G., unpublished, partially reproduced in 1996 Revue suisse de droit international et de droit européen [Rev Suisse dr int et dr eur] 657
6. see also the 21 Nov 1990 decision of the Supreme Court of Austria, summarised in 120 Journal du Droit International [JDI] 388 (1993).
7. See, eg, the decision by the Supreme Court of The Netherlands, 20 Dec 1985, AS v Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 94 ILR 321.
8. On this point, see Jean Duffar, Contribution à l'étude des privilèges et immunités des organisations internationales 68 et seq (1982).
9. See CA Paris, 13 Jan 1993, CEDAO v. BCCI, 120 JDI 353 (1993), and note by Ahmed Mahiou.
10. Christian Dominicé, L'arbitrage et les immunités des organisations internationales, in Etudes de droit international en l'honneur de Pierre Lalive 483, 487 (Christian Dominicé et al eds, 1993) (our translation).
11. By the same author, see L'immunité de juridiction et d'exécu-tion des organisations internationales, Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, vol 187, Year 1984, Part IV, at 145.
12. For a similar approach, see Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, L'immunité de juridiction et d'exécution des Etats et des organisations internationales, 1 Droit International 109, 161–2 (1981)
13. Panayotis Glavinis, Les litiges relatifs aux contrats passés entre organisations internationales et personnes privées 122 (1990).
14. See, eg, IBRD Charter Art. VII, para 3, the European Investment Bank Charter, Art 29, or Art 4(1) of the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) of 1 Dec 1986, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol 1522, at 161.
15. For an overview of exceptions to immunity, see Duffar, above n 6, at 63 et seq; see also the International Law Commission's Fourth Report on relations between States and international organisations, UN Doc A/CN.4/424 (24 Apr 1989), Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1989, Vol II (Part One), 153, at 160 et seq.
16. On this issue, see Philippe Kahn's commentary following CA Paris, 18 June 1968, Dame Klarsfeld v Office franco-allemand pour la jeunesse, 96 JDI 671, 673 (1969).
17. Following this approach, see Swiss Fed Trib, 30 Oct 1996, partially reproduced in 1997 Rev suisse dr int et dr eur 668.
18. See also Jean-Flavien Lalive, L'immunité de juridiction des Etats et des organisations internationales, Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, vol 84, Year 1953, Part III, at 303; Glavinis, above n 8, at 125.
19. See, eg, in France, Cass 1e civ, 6 July 1954, Procureur général près la Cour de cassation v Sté immobilière Alfred Dehodencq, 83 JDI 136 (1956), and note by Jean-Baptiste Sialelli
20. Cass 1e civ, 14 Nov 1995, Hintermann v Union de l'Europe occidentale, 124 JDI 141 (1997), and note by Christian Byk
21. In the second case, the Cour de Cassation granted immunity to the Western European Union, refusing to hear the claim for payment of indemnities brought by its former Secretary-General. It justified this position by referring to the need to refrain from ‘gravely perturbing the law of international relations by reducing to nearly nothing the jurisdictional privileges and immunities of the international organisations of which France is a member’ (Rapport de la Cour de cassation 418–19 (1995) (our translation)).
22. In the United States, see Mendaro v World Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (DC Cir 1983).
23. For this type of presentation, see, eg, Glavinis, above n 8, at 120 et seq. See also Philippe Cahier, Commentaire de l'article 105, in La charte des Nations Unies-Commentaire article par article 1397, 1401–1402 (Jean-Pierre Cot, Alain Pellet (eds), 1991).
24. Dominicé, above n 8, at 487 (our translation). Similarly, see Richard J. Oparil, Immunity of International Organizations in United States Courts: Absolute or Restrictive?, 24 Vand J Transnat'l L 689, 710 (1991).
25. See Swiss Fed Trib, 21 Dec 1992, Groupement Fougerolle & Consorts v CERN, 2 Bulletin de l'Association Suisse d'Arbitrage [Bull ASA] 259 (1993)
26. See also Geneva Surveillance Authority for Debt Recovery and Bankruptcy Matters, 9 Apr 1997, 1999 Rev suisse dr int et dr eur 656.
27. European Court of Human Rights, Beer and Regan v Germany, Judgment of 18 Feb 1999, Case No 28934/95, unpublished but accessible on the Council of Europe's Website, [hereinafter the Decision]
28. see also the decision of the same date rendered on the same terms in Waite and Kennedy v Germany, Judgment of 18 Feb 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999-I, at 393.
29. For a critique, not unexpected, of this case law and that of the European Commission on this issue, see Jean-François Flauss, Contentieux de la fonction publique européenne et Convention européenne des droits de l'homme, in Le droit des organisations internationales-Recueil d'études à la mémoire de Jacques Schwob 157, 162 et seq (1997).
30. On the basis of the case law of the Federal Labour Court, holding that the immunity granted to the ESA was not contrary to the fundamental principles of German constitutional law, see the Waite and Kennedy case decided in 1999 and referred to in Beer and Regan, above n 18, at para 15. The claimants did not appeal the decision of the Darmstadt court. On the fact that there were no local remedies to exhaust in that case prior to referral to the Commission, see the Decision on Admissibility, 24 Feb 1997, No 28934/95.
31. More generally, and on the question of what constitutes exhaustion of local remedies under the European Convention on Human Rights, see Frédéric Sudre, Droit international et européen des droits de l'homme 381, 385–6 (1999).
32. The case was brought before the Commission after an amicable settlement had been reached between the employees and the companies that had hired them. The question was raised by commentators, but not examined by the Court, whether the settlement had put an end to their status as victims (see the commentary by Paul Tavernier, 127 JDI 102, 103 (2000)).
33. Decision, above n 18, para 48 and European Court of Human Rights, Golder v United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 Feb 1975, Series A No 18, paras 34–5 (1975).
34. Decision, above n 18, at para 53. For a commentary on the Court's grounds for taking this position, see Isabelle Pingel-Lenuzza, Autonomie juridictionnelle et employeur privilégié: Concilier les contraires, 2000 Revue Générale de Droit International Public [RGDIP] 446, 457–8.
35. On the condition of independence of the court before which the case is brought under Art 6, para 1 of the Convention, see for example Sudre, above n 19, at 234 et seq.
36. The reservation, stated in the Decision, pursuant to which ‘[i]t would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention, however, if the Contracting States were thereby absolved from their responsibility under the Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by such attribution’ (Decision, above n 18, at para 57), does not affect this analysis, although it could in certain cases allow the private party's interests to prevail over those of the organisation.
37. In other words, ‘it should be borne in mind that … [p]rivileges and immunities constitute a right not a courtesy’ (Fourth Report on relations between States and international organisations, above n 9, at 161).
38. It is also accepted, as the General Assembly of the United Nations has stated, that ‘no privileges and immunities which are not really necessary should be asked for’, GA Resolution of 13 Feb 1946, A/Res/22A (I), s D.
39. See UN Charter Art 105; see also General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 13 Feb 1946, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol 1, at 15.
40. For a commentary on these provisions and a position, quite isolated at the time, in favour of restricting the immunity of international organisations, see Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Les privilèges et immunités des organismes internationaux d'après les jurisprudences nationales depuis 1945, 3 Annuaire Français de Droit International [AFDI] 262 (1957).
41. On the ‘tendency to standardize’ the regime of immunity of organisations since the Second World War, see André Lewin, Principes communs aux organisations internationales-Statut juridique, Juris-Classeur Droit international, Fasc 112–13, para 31 (1989).
42. Council of Europe Report, above n 1, at 15. As a result, for example, the United Nations, which has political functions and liable to come under pressure, would have extended immunity, whereas ‘in the case of a small organisation with purely administrative functions … there might be no good reason for excluding the jurisdiction of the local courts’
43. (Council of Europe Report, above n 1, at 27). The Fourth Report on relations between States and international organisations also takes this view (above n 9, at 160 et seq).
44. Eight reports were submitted between 1977 and 1991 on the Relations between States and international organisations, before the International Law Commission concluded that it would be ‘wise to put aside for the moment the consideration of a topic which does not seem to respond to a pressing need of States or of international organisations’ (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1992, Vol II (Part One), at 53).
45. Cf, on this point, the position of Horatia Muir-Watt, note following the French Cour de Cassation's Decision of 14 Nov 1995, above n 13, at 340.
46. Mendaro, above n 13, in which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit emphasized that ‘one of the most important protections granted to international organisations is immunity from suits by employees of the organisation in actions arising out of the employment relationship’, Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 615.
47. See, eg, Corte di Cassazione, 8 Apr 1975, Di Banella Schirone, 77 ILR 572.
48. For an overview of the position of the Italian Courts, see Antonio Cassese, L'immunité de juridiction civile des organisations internationales dans la jurisprudence italienne, 30 AFDI 556 (1984).
49. See AS v Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, above n 5, at 321.
50. Compare the earlier, but more classic position of the French Cour de Cassation in Hintermann, above n 13.
51. According to the applicable texts, the Court of Justice of the European Communities has jurisdiction over disputes concerning officials and other servants (temporary staff, auxiliary staff, and special advisers). The courts of the member States have jurisdiction over disputes concerning local staff (under contract for specific tasks or services). On this question generally, see, eg, Guy Isaac, Droit communautaire général 91–2 (1998).
52. For the application of this distinction in disputes between staff members and international organisations, see for example Italian Corte di Cassazione, 8 Apr 1975, above n 36
53. and Corte di Cassazione, 8 June 1994, Nacci v Bari Institute of the International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies, 114 ILR 539.
54. See also AS v Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, above n 5.
55. Against such a distinction, on the basis that the immunity of international organisations is absolute, see, eg, Swiss Fed Trib, 22 June 1995, F. SA v G., above n 4.
56. Similarly, see the 28 Feb 1994 memorandum of the International Public Law Section of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 1995 Rev suisse dr int et dr eur 596.
57. See, eg, Cahier, above n 14, at 1041–1042, criticising an Italian decision for refusing to grant immunity to the FAO on the basis that an international organisation should not have immunity superior to that of States.
58. See Fourth Report on relations between States and international organisations, above n 9, at 157–8.
59. See Ahmed Mahiou, note following TGI Paris, 4 Dec 1991, CEDAO v BCCI, 119 JDI 693, 704 (1992).
60. Cited in Fourth Report on relations between States and international organisations, above n 9, at 161.
61. The Report of the Council of Europe suggests the same conclusion, defining a series of possible exceptions to the regime of immunity from jurisdiction of international organisations that is similar to that applicable to States (Council of Europe Report, above n 1, at 24).
62. See, eg, David Ruzié, note following Conseil d'Etat, 25 July 1986, M. Girod de l'Ain et autres, 1986 Revue Française de Droit Administratif 956, 960.
63. See also Blaise Knapp, Les privilèges et immunités des organisations internationales et de leurs agents devant les tribunaux internationaux, 1965 RGDIP 615, 622.
64. In France, see, eg, Cass Soc, 24 May 1978, Bellaton v Agence spatiale européenne, 1978 Bull Civ V, No 392.
65. On this question generally, see Alain Pellet, Les voies de recours ouvertes aux fonctionnaires internationaux (1982)
66. Société Française pour le Droit International, Le contentieux de la fonction publique internationale (1996).
67. For a rare example of recourse to arbitration for the resolution of disputes concerning the staff of an organisation, see David Ruzié, Le recours à l'arbitrage dans le contentieux de la fonction publique internationale: L'exemple du personnel local de l'U.N.R.W.A., 113 JDI 109 (1986).
68. For a detailed analysis of the functioning of these tribunals, see, eg, Nassib Ziadé, Some Practical Issues Arising in International Administrative Tribunals, The World Bank Administrative Tribunal 1980–2000 (20th Anniversary Conference, 16 May 2000), to be published in the Proceedings of the 20th Anniversary of the Administrative Tribunal 1980–2000
69. Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, International Administrative Tribunals in the United Nations System, in Manuel sur les organisations internationales 206 et seq (R-J Dupuy (ed), 1998).
70. Commentators have sometimes criticized this method of appointment, which is the prerogative of intergovernmental organs and often leads to the appointment of senior civil servants. ‘Without casting doubt on their independence with regard to the organisations …, it is questionable whether these senior civil servants are not liable to be more preoccupied by the desire to protect the funds of the organisations than to impose severe financial sanctions for manifest irregularities. The intervention, for the selection of judges, of an independent external authority (such as the International Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights) … would doubtless offer better guarantees of independence’ (David Ruzié, Rapport général, in Société Française pour le Droit International, Le contentieux de la fonction publique internationale, above n 48, at 18–19 (our translation)).
71. On this question, see, in particular, Hubert Thierry, Les voies de recours contre les jugements du tribunal administratif des Nations Unies et du tribunal administratif de l'O.I.T., in Société Française pour le Droit International, Le contentieux de la fonction publique internationale, above n 48, at 121 et seq
72. Ruzié, above n 52, at 46 et seq.
73. TGI Paris, 20 Oct 1997, Boulois v UNESCO, 1997 Rev arb 575, and note by Charles Jarrosson.
74. CA Paris, 19 June 1998, UNESCO v Boulois, 1999 Rev arb 343 (our translation), and note by Charles Jarrosson.
75. It should also be noted that, regretably, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights is far more conservative than this holding of the Paris Court of Appeals. On this case law, see above, Part I (A). See also Fouchard Gaillard Goldman On International Commercial Arbitration 645 (E Gaillard and J Savage (eds), 1999).
76. Swiss Fed Trib, 21 Dec 1992, Groupement Fougerolle & Consorts v CERN, above n 16 (our translation).
77. See, eg, Cass 1e civ, 18 Nov 1986, Yougoslavie v SEEE, 114 JDI 120 (1987), and note by Bruno Oppetit
78. On this question, see also the commentary by Berthold Goldman following CA Paris, 12 July 1984, République Arabe d'Egypte v SPP, 112 JDI 129, 145 (1985), noting that by accepting to submit to arbitration, the State must have accepted in good faith to submit to all ancillary national procedures.
79. Compare the commentary by Philippe Kahn following TGI Paris, 8 July 1970, SEEE v Yougoslavie, 98 JDI 131, 136 (1971).
80. In favour of this approach, see Wilfred Jenks, International Immunities 40–1 (1961)