Externalities of the arms trade

It's Legal but it Ain't Right: Harmful Social Consequences of Legal Industries

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 43-73

  Bondi, Loretta ^a  

^a JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85017122871     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (76)

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2. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, http://first.sipri.org:7020/milex_retrieve.
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4. William W. Keller, Arms in Arm: The Political Economy of the Global Arms Trade (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 91.
5. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 339-67.
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8. Tamar Gabelnick, William D. Hartung, and Jennifer Washburn, “Arming Repression: U.S. Arms Sales to Turkey during the Clinton Administration,” in A Joint Report of the World Policy Institute and the Federation of American Scientists (October 1999), 6.
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29. Bernard Udis and Keith E. Maskus, “Offsets as Industrial Policy: Lessons from Aerospace,” Defence Economics 2 (1991): 151.
30. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2000, 354-55.
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38. “Principles of Official Policy in the Field of the Military-Technical Cooperation of the Russian Federation and Foreign States,” http://projects.sipri.se./expcon/natexpon/Russia/rusframes.htm.
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42. Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, “Over a Barrel: Light Weapons and Human Rights in the Commonwealth,” Paper presented at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Durban, South Africa, November 12-15, 1999.
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44. Lumpe and Donarski, Arms Trade Revealed, 14-15.
45. Human Rights Watch, Arsenals on the Cheap: NATO Expansion and the Arms Cascade: A Human Rights Watch Short Report (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 1999).
46. Loretta Bondi, “Arms Embargoes Implementation and Enforcement,” Paper presented at the Conference on Smart Sanctions, The Next Step: Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions, Bonn, Germany, November 21-23, 1999.
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48. Human Rights Watch, Angola Unravels, 110-11.
49. Alain Lallemand, “The ‘Blood Diamonds,'" Le Soir (Brussels), August 30, 2000.
50. Claudia Rocio Vasquez, “Defense Minister: Yes, There Was a Report Made to the CIA,” El Tiempo (Bogotá), August 27, 2000.
51. Human Rights Watch, Angola Unravels, 113.
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53. http://www.basicint.org/eucode.htm.
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56. Michael Renner, Small Arms, Big Impact, World Watch Paper (October, 1997), 19.
57. P. Wallensteen and M. Sollenberg, “Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996,” Journal of Peace and Research 34 (3).
58. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2000 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2000).
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61. Peter Abel, “Manufacturing Trends: Globalising the Source,” in Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms, ed. Lora Lumpe (London: Zed Books, 2000), 81-100.
62. Human Rights Watch, Rearming with Impunity: International Support to the Perpetrators of Rwanda’s Genocide: A Human Rights Watch Short Report (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 1995).
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65. Loretta Bondi, Expanding the Net: A Model Convention on Arms Brokering (Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, 2001).
66. Loretta Bondi, James Bourke, Jeremy Carver, Rae Lindsay, and Richard Winfield, A Model Convention on the Registration of Arms Brokers and the Suppression of Unlicensed Arms Brokering (Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, 2001).
67. Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers, available at http://www.controlarms.org.
68. GRIP Draft Convention on the Marking, Registration, and Tracing of Small Arms and Light Weapons, available at http://www.grip.org/bdg/pdf/g4040.pdf.
69. Loretta Bondi, “Disillusioned NGOs Blame the United States for a Weak Agreement,” SAIS Review 22 (winter-spring 2002).
70. Cooperative Security Program, Shoulder to Shoulder: Views from Government and Civil Society on Cooperative Security 1 (3) (July-August 2003).
71. “NRA’s Extremism Goes Global,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, November 14, 1996, p. 22A.
72. Kathi Austin, “The Second Amendment, Going Global,” Washington Post, March 26, 2000.
73. Adam Buckmann, “Infomercial with a Bang: NRA Buys Airtime on Ch. 9 to Recruit New Members,” New York Post, February 8, 2000.
74. http://basicint.org.
75. http://www.armslaw.org.
76. Human Rights Watch, World Report, 409.