The 1999 eritrea–yemen maritime delimitation award and the development of international law

International and Comparative Law Quarterly

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 299-344

  Antunes, Nuno Sérgio Marques ^a  

^a DURHAM UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 85015626576     PISSN: 00205893     EISSN: 14716895     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/iclq/50.2.299     Document Type: Article

References (127)

1. See the Preamble and Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement. The materials for this case (including the two Awards and the Arbitration Agreement) are available on the website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (http://www.pca-cpa.org). On this case, see Jean-François Dobelle, “Le Compromis d'Arbitrage Signé par l'Erythrée et le Yemen à Paris le 3 Octobre 1996”, (1996) 42 A.F.D.I. 477
2. N.S.M. Antunes, “The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration: First Stage-The Law of Title to Territory Re-Averred”, (1999) 48 I.C.L.Q 362
3. Giovanni Distefano, “La Sentence Arbitrale du 9 Octobre 1998 dans l'Affaire du Différend Insulaire entre le Yemen et l'Erithrée”, (1999) 103 R.G.D.I.P. 851
4. Barbara Kwiatkowska, “The Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration: Landmark Progress in the Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty and Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation”, in International Boundary Research Unit, (2000) 8(1) Boundary and Security Bulletin 66.
5. Map included in Antunes, Boundary and Security Bulletin, at p.386.
6. Arbitration Agreement, Art.2(3).
7. Second Award, Chapter IV, paras 87–112.
8. First Award, para.527(vi); see also paras 525–526.
9. The solutions proposed by Eritrea for the delimitation issue were rather complex, incorporating a combination of “boundary-lines” and “joint resources boxes”. Second Award, paras 27–28, 89, 122.
10. Eritrea's Prayer for Relief, para.6, Chapter I in fine.
11. Second Award, paras 37, 90.
12. Second Award, para.95.
13. See this author's comments elsewhere as to the composition of the Tribunal; Antunes, Second Award, at p.385, n.100.
14. Ahmed El-Kosheri, “History of the Law of the Nations Regional Developments: Islam”, in Rudolf Bernhardt (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Volume 2 (1995), North-Holland, pp.809–818, at p.816.
15. Second Award, paras 94–95, emphasis added.
16. Guano extraction, and any other mineral extraction for that matter, was viewed as not being included in such entitlements (as had been suggested by Eritrea; Prayer for Relief, Second Awward, Chapter I, in fine).
17. Second Award, paras 103–108.
18. Second Award, para.109.
19. Second Award, para.37.
20. UNCLOS, Art.56(1)(a).
21. Second Award, paras 656–69, 108.
22. See UNCLOS, Art.56(1)(b)(iii), which establishes the jurisdiction of States in the EEZ as regards “the protection and the preservation of the marine environment”.
23. Distefano, UNCLOS, at pp.883–886.
24. First Award, paras 337–340
25. Second Award, para.107 in fine. Importantly, this exercise of “private justice” reinforces the idea of existence of restrictions to State sovereignty motivated by the need to accommodate the traditional fishing regime.
26. Second Award, paras 109–110.
27. Second Award, para.37.
28. Headquarters Agreement Advisory Opinion, 26 April 1988, I.C.J. Rep. 1988, 4, at p.34.
29. Charter of the United Nations, Art.13(1)(a).
30. Since the 19th century, a group of Latin American States has attempted, and to some extent has succeeded, to shape the contents of international law by reference to their socio-political realities. See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Alvarez in the Asylum case (Colombia/Peru), I.C.J. Rep. 1950, 266, at pp.293–294.
31. Malcom N. Shaw, International Law (1997), Cambridge, p.37.
32. A question of a procedural nature regards the mandate given to the Tribunal under the arbitral compromis, which requested “an award on territorial sovereignty”, on the basis of “principles, rules and practices of international law” and, “in particular, of historic title” (Arbitration Agreement, Art.2(2).). Elsewhere, one argued that, because the traditional fishing regime emerged as a restriction to sovereignty, the decision could not be seen as rendered in excès de pouvoir (Antunes, International Law, at pp.383–384.). But in view of what the Tribunal asserted in this Second Award, perhaps the answer to this question becomes more delicate. By conceptualising the traditional fishing regime as not conditioning sovereignty, as being a regime in fact not related to sovereignty, the Tribunal may have reignited this debate. For it had only been empowered to decide the dispute on sovereignty, on the basis of international law.
33. Decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the matter of the Maritime Boundary between Norway and Sweden, Award of 23 Oct. 1909, (1910) 4 A.J.I.L. 226, at p.233, emphasis added. In this case, the two States agreed that tracing the boundary across important bars or fishing banks would be highly unsuitable, due to the fact that fishing activities were a primary concern in the area; and they asked the Tribunal to take this fact into account when rendering the decision.
34. The Tribunal made explicit reference to “a sort of ‘servitude international falling short of territorial sovereignty” (First Award, para.126).
35. Para.2.2.b) First Award.
36. Second Award, paras 109–110.
37. Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander (Eds.), International Maritime Boundaries (1993), Martinus Nijhoff, p.929.
38. International Maritime Boundaries., at pp.946–947, Arts.10(3) and 12 of the Treaty, emphasis added.
39. Charney and Alexander (Eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, at pp.1238–1241.
40. Article 11(2), in Charney and Alexander (Eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, at p.946.
41. The limits of the “Protected Zone” are delimited in Annex 9, International Maritime Boundaries., pp.974–975.
42. Second Award, para.109. It is worth noting that Eritrea had argued for “joint zones” delimiting the area of the fishing regime, which bears a certain similitude with the idea of “Protected Zone” followed in this example of State practice.
43. Victor Prescott, in Charney and Alexander (Eds.), Second Award, at pp.1233- 1234. Second Award, para.106.
44. Bernard Oxman, “Political, Strategic and Historical Considerations”, in Charney and Alexander (eds.), Second Award, at pp.38–39.
45. See also H. Burmester, “The Torres Strait Treaty: Ocean Boundary Delimitation by Agreement”, (1982) 76 A.J.I.L. 321, at pp.329- 332
46. Donald M. Schug, “International Maritime Boundaries and Indigenous People”, (1996) 20 Marine Policy 209.
47. Nothing in this text should be read as recognising any of the claims advanced in several parts of the world by groups of individuals, as indigenous peoples, vis-à-vis the States whose territory they inhabit. All the considerations made below should be seen in the light of this caveat. On the rights of indigenous peoples, S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (1996), Oxford, (in particular pp.39–45, 104–107)
48. Paul Havemann (Ed.), Indigenous Peoples” Rights in Australia, Canada and New Zealand (1999), Oxford
49. R. L. Barsh, “Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of International Law?, (1994) 7 Harvard Human Rights Journal 33.
50. Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, 16 Oct. 1975, I.C.J. Rep. 1975, 4.
51. The conclusion of the Court as to the existence of “legal ties of allegiance” between the Sultan of Morocco and the nomad tribes in Western Sahara, and the “rights relating to the land” which also existed between the Mauritanian entity and the territory of Western Sahara, illustrates this point. See I.C.J. Rep.1975, 4, at pp.40–64, 68.
52. UNCLOS, Arts.2(1), 49, 51.
53. Anaya, UNCLOS, at p.3.
54. Any reference in this text to the term “miles” should be understood as referring to the International Nautical Mile, which is equivalent to 1852 metres.
55. This is the unit of length that has been used in the Law of the Sea, as Stated in the Official Records, Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly-Eighth Session, 1956, para.32, at p.4. If any symbol is to be used to refer to “nautical miles”, it should be “M”, which is the symbol adopted by the Système International d'Unités (International System of Units).
56. United Nations, The Law of the Sea-National Legislation on the Territorial Sea, the Right of Innocent Passage and the Contiguous Zone (1995), pp.419–422.
57. the Right of Innocent Passage and the Contiguous Zone., pp.122–123.
58. Second Award, Chapter V, paras 113–168. See the map attached to this article.
59. For the “Submissions of Yemen” and the “Eritrea's Prayer for Relief”, Second Award, Chapter I, in fine.
60. Second Award, paras 75–82, 132.
61. Second Award, paras 129–135.
62. Second Award, para. 138.
63. Second Award, paras 114–120.
64. Second Award, paras 138–146.
65. Second Award, paras 147–153.
66. Second Award, paras 124–125, 154–159.
67. Second Award, paras 160–162. This approach seems to explain why, previously, the Tribunal stressed the distinction between the terms “boundary” and “limit”.
68. Second Award, paras 127–128, 163.
69. Second Award, paras 44–46, 136, 164. On 12 June 2000
70. Yemen and Saudi Arabia signed the Treaty on their land and maritime boundaries-(2000) 8(2) IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 63. The end point of the maritime boundary described in Annex 3, lies some 34 miles northwards of the end point of the boundary determined in this Award.
71. Leonard Legault and Blair Hankey, “Method, Oppositeness and Adjacency, and Proportionality in Maritime Boundary Delimitation”, in Charney and Alexander (Eds.), IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, p.203, at p.206.
72. Prosper Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation-Reflections (1989), Grotius, p.285.
73. This term was used when referring to “the law of continental shelf boundaries”; Robert Y. Jennings, “What Is International Law and How Do We Tell It When We See It?”, (1981) XXXVII Annuaire Suisse de Droit International 59, at p.68.
74. Resorting also to this terminology, Weil, Annuaire Suisse de Droit International, pp.6–8
75. Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (1991), Martinus Nijhoff, p.58
76. Juan J. Quintana, “The International Court of Justice and the Formulation of General International Law: The Law of Maritime Delimitation as an Example”, in A. S. Muller et al. (eds.) The International Court of Justice: Its Future Role After Fifty Years (1997), Martinus Nijhoff, p.367, at p.373
77. Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs (1998), Martinus Nijhoff, p.28.
78. Michael Akehurst, “Equity and General Principles of Law”, (1976) 47 B.Y.I.L. 801, at p.809.
79. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment of 19 Dec. 1978, I.C.J. Rep. 1978, 4, at p.36, para.84.
80. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment of 3 June 1985, I.C.J. Rep. 1985, 13, at p.30, para.27.
81. Case Concerning the Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment of 14 June 1993, I.C.J. Rep. 1993, 38, at p.47, paras 18–19.
82. Second Award, paras 83, 119, 124–128, 154–163.
83. Charney and Alexander (eds.), Second Award, at pp.1611–1625, 1627–1637.
84. Second Award., pp.1549–1555.
85. Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration, Award of 19 Oct. 1981, (1993) 91 I.L.R. 543, at p.674.
86. Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, Award of 30 June 1977, 18 R.I.A.A. 3, at pp.89–90, para.187.
87. Jonathan I. Charney, “Rocks that Cannot Sustain Human Habitation”, (1999) 93 A.J.I.L. 863
88. A. G. Oude Elferink, “Is it either Necessary or Possible to Clarify the Provision on Rocks of Article 121(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention?”, (1999) 92 The Hydrographic Journal 9
89. Syméon Karagiannis, “Les Rochers qui ne se Prêtent pas à l'Habitation Humaine ou à une Vie Économic Propre et le Droit de la Mer”, (1996) 29 Revue Belge de Droit International 559
90. Robert Kolb, “L'Interprétation de lArticle 121, Paragraphe 3, de la Convention de Montego Bay sur le Droit de la Mer […]”, (1994) XL Annuaire Français de Droit International 876
91. Barbara Kwiatkowska and Alfred H. A. Soons, “Entitlement to Maritime Areas of Rocks which Cannot Sustain Human Habitation and Economic Life of Their Own”, (1990) XXI Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 131
92. J.M. Van Dyke and R.A. Brooks, “Uninhabited Rocks: Their Impact on the Ownership of the Oceans” Resources” (1983) 12 O.D.I.L. 265.
93. Oude Elferink, O.D.I.L., at p.12.
94. Weil, O.D.I.L., at pp.8–9.
95. J. G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (1998), Cambridge, at p.295.
96. Second Award, para.147.
97. Second Award, paras 119, 125, 155, 160, 162.
98. Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. United States of America), Judgment of 12 Oct. 1984, I.C.J. Rep. 1984, 246, at p.327, paras 194–195.
99. I.C.J. Rep. 1984, 246, at pp.362–377, paras 5–26.
100. Paul Peters and Gerard J. Tanja, Lateral Delimitation of Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (A Report of the Netherlands Branch of the International Law Association, prepared for the ILA International Committee on the EEZ), 1984.
101. I.C.J. Rep. 1993, 38, at pp.56–81, paras 41–93.
102. I.C.J. Rep. 1993, 38, at p.201.
103. Separate Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 1993, 38, at pp.109–110, paras 70–74.
104. Second Award, para.132.
105. Second Award, para.116.
106. Second Award, para.130.
107. International Court of Justice (ICJ), Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, Public Sitting of 9 March 1998, Verbatim Record CR/98/05, seventh preliminary objection; document available on the website of the ICJ (http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnframe.htm).
108. Myron H. Nordquist (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982-A Commentary, Volume II (1993), Martinus Nijhoff, at p.510, emphasis added.
109. Second Award, para.131.
110. Report of the Committee of Experts, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1953(II), p.79 (text in French).
111. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, at pp.112–117, paras 241–251.
112. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, at pp.670–677.
113. Myres S. McDougal and William T. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans (1987), New Haven, p.725.
114. Delimitation of the Maritime Areas between Canada and France (St. Pierre and Miquelon), Award of 10 June 1992, (1992) 31 I.L.M. 1145, Dissenting Opinion, at p.1209, para.30.
115. Second Award, paras 136, 164.
116. David Colson, “The Legal Regime of Maritime Boundary Agreements”, in Charney and Alexander (eds.), Second Award, p.41, at pp.61–63.
117. ICJ, Judgment of 11 June 1998, para.115, website of the ICJ, Second Award.
118. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment of 20 Feb. 1969, I.C.J. Rep. 1969, 4, at p.55, para.101.(D)(3).
119. Second Award, paras 39–43; 165–168.
120. International Hydrographic Organisation, A Manual on Technical Aspects of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea-1982 (1993), Special Publication No.51, I.H.B., p.111.
121. Weil, A Manual on Technical Aspects of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea-1982, at pp.75–81.
122. A Manual on Technical Aspects of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea-1982, at pp.1204–1207, paras 20–25, emphasis added.
123. Second Award, paras 47–74.
124. Second Award, paras 75–86.
125. The relevance of navigational interests in territorial sea areas had already been endorsed in the Beagle Channel arbitration. Considerations of “convenience, navigability and the desirability of enabling each party so far as possible to navigate in its own waters” were taken into account to delimit the boundary; Beagle Channel Arbitration (Argentina v. Chile), Award of 18 Feb. 1977, (1979) 52 I.L.R. 97, at p.185, para.110.
126. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary (Guinea v. Guinea-Bissau), Award of 14 Feb. 1985, (1986) 25 I.L.M. 251, at p.292, para.96.
127. I.C.J. Rep. 1993, 38, at pp.58–61, paras 46–51