Corporate control in commercial banks

Journal of Financial Research

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 509-527

  Prowse, Stephen ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85015609228     PISSN: 02702592     EISSN: 14756803     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6803.1997.tb00263.x     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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