Seduction by disclosure: Comments on seduction by contract

Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 72-86

  Becher, Shmuel I ^a   Zarsky, Tal Z ^b  

^a Striks School of Law ^*

^b UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85015553712     PISSN: 22197117     EISSN: 22197125     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jrls/jlt026     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT (2012).
2. For a recent discussion of this important topic, see Symposium, The Disclosure Crisis, WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
3. See also Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 PENN. L. REV. 647 (2011).
4. For a thorough analysis, see Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 303 (2008).
5. In this context we rely on and employ the ideas first outlined in Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, Open Doors, Trap Doors and the Law, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 101 (2011).
6. For a discussion of the asymmetric information problem in consumer contracts see eg Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That Is Yet to be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L. J. 723 (2008).
7. See also Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206, 1220 (2003).
8. For a few recent illustrations in the cell phone market, see http://forums.penny-arcade.com/discussion/143868/cell-phone-contract-remorse (contract cancellation/withdraw) (last accessed July 1, 2013)
9. http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=618554 ("no contract" agreements) (last accessed July 1, 2013)
10. http://www.howardforums.com/forumdisplay.php/249-General-Prepaid-discussion (last accessed July 1, 2013) (debate regarding pre-paid cell phone programs on a discussion board)
11. http://forums.moneysavingexpert.com/forumdisplay.php?f=14 (last accessed July 1, 2013) (discussing a variety of market attributes and contractual aspects).
12. For examples in the context of credit cards, see http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=405585 (last accessed July 1, 2013) (discussing unilateral change of contract terms)
13. http://creditcardforum.com/general-credit-card-talk/ (last accessed July 1, 2013).
14. The effect need not pertain to the entire population of consumers. A small, informed minority will suffice. The general argument that an informed minority can discipline sellers in competitive markets was presented decades ago; see eg Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interest, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983).
15. This model, however, was criticized on various grounds, among others, given the fact that consumers could be subjected to discrimination both ex post and ex ante; see eg R. Ted Cruz & Jeffery J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 635, 638 (1996).
16. Consumers have various motivations to share their experiences - from revenge and spite to altruism, as well as striving to contribute to a community. See eg Becher & Zarsky, supra note 3; YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006).
17. Lior J. Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. C HI. L. REV. 359 (2003).
18. Lior J. Strahilevitz, "How's My Driving" For Everyone (and Everything?), 81 NYU L. REV. 1699, 1733-34 (2006).
19. For more on this issue, see eg Nishanth V. Chari, Disciplining Standard Form Contract Terms Through Online Information Flows: An Empirical Study, 85 NYU L. Rev. 1618 (2010).
20. However, we do not claim that potential consumers are interested in learning about their form contracts per se. Rather, we assert that consumers find abundant information which indirectly reflects the nature of the contract used by vendors. See Becher & Zarsky, supra note 3 at 341. See also John Horrigan, The Internet and Consumer Choice Summary of Findings, PEWINTERNET (May 18, 2008), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2008/The-Internet-and-Consumer-Choice/1-Summary-of-Findings.aspx (last accessed July 1, 2013).
21. Jim Jansen, Online Product Research, PewInternet (September 29, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Online-Product-Research.aspx (last accessed July 1, 2013).
22. MCCAN ERICSON, WAVE 3, http://he.scribd.com/doc/3836535/Universal-Mccann-on-Social-Media (last accessed July 1, 2013).
23. Edward Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913 (2007).
24. Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben Shachar, No Contract (NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 13-06, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2220271, p. 2 (last accessed July 1, 2013).
25. See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006) 201-4.
26. See also BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004).
27. For connecting the notions of privacy and those of consumer protection in the context of the cell phone market, see also Richard H. Thaler, Show Us the Data (It's Ours, After All.), THE NEW YORK TIMES (April 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/24/business/24view.html?_r=0 (last accessed July 1, 2013).
28. See Peter P. Swire and Yianni Lagos, Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces Consumer Welfare: Antitrust and Privacy Critique, 72 MD. L. REV. 335 (2013).
29. For further discussion, see Evaluation Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), COM (2011) 225 final (April 18, 2011), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0225:FIN:en:PDF (last accessed July 1, 2013).