Personal and sub‐personal: A difference without a distinction

Philosophical Explorations

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 63-82

  Bermúdez, José Luis ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING   (United Kingdom)

^b Routledge International Library of Philosophy   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85015107923     PISSN: 13869795     EISSN: 17415918     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13869790008520981     Document Type: Article

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