International Governance in Post-Conflict Situations

Leiden Journal of International Law

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 495-529

  Korhonen, Outi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

international administrations; international governance; Kosovo; post conflict governance operations; United Nations

Indexed keywords

EID: 85015095729     PISSN: 09221565     EISSN: 14789698     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0922156501000267     Document Type: Article

References (129)

1. See, e.g., O. Ramsbotham, Reflections on UN Post-Settlement Peacebuilding, 7 Int'l Peacekeeping 169, at 169-170 (2000).
2. Id., at 182.
3. See, e.g., S. Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in the Lands of Conflict After the Cold War (1997), passim.
4. See, e.g., the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, esp. Art. 41 (good governance), OJ C 364/1 (18 December 2000).
5. M. Parlevliet, Truth Commissions in Africa: The Non-Case of Namibia and the Emerging Case of Sierra Leone, 2 Int'l L. Forum du droit international 98 (2000); see also J.-M. Sorel, Interventions humanitaires et maintien de la paix, CIV RGDIP 37, at 57, n. 57 (2000).
6. The inequalities of the concern put into the East Timor and the Kosovo cases is often debated; see, e.g., Sorel, id., at 56.
7. See, e.g., J. Traub, Inventing East Timor, 79 Foreign Affairs 74, at 81 (2000).
8. Dr Bernard Kouchner, a year and a half after the establishment of the UNMIK; UNMIK/PR/419/16 November 2000; see at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/press/; see also Ramsbotham, Inventing East Timor note 1, at 171; who refuses to call these missions ‘post-conflict’ because ’ “post-conflict” is precisely what it is not.’ He prefers the term ‘post-settlement.’
9. M. Pugh, Peacebuilding as Developmentalism: Concepts from Disaster Research, 16 Contemp. Sec. Pol'y 320, at 325 (1995).
10. Cf. Ramsbotham, Peacebuilding as Developmentalism: Concepts from Disaster Research note 1, at 176, 179.
11. See, e.g., Traub, Peacebuilding as Developmentalism: Concepts from Disaster Research note 1 note 7, at 82: praising the competence and functions of the principal legal counsel to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in East Timor, Hans Strohmeyer for his work in the ‘constitutionalisation’ of the UNTAET's rule.
12. Reg. No. 1999/1 on the Authority of the Transitional Administration in East Timor, Sec. 1.1, UNTAET/REG/1999/1, see http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/regs.
13. UN Security Council Res. 1244, UN Doc. S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999).
14. Reg. No. 1999/1 on the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/ 1999/1, see http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/regs.html.
15. The respective mandating UNSC resolutions for UNMIK (1244) and UNTAET (1272) authorise the administration to be equipped “with all necessary means” (Kosovo) and “to take all necessary measures” (East Timor) to fulfil their mandates; see UN Security Council Res. 1244, Reg. No. 1999/1 on the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo note 15, Sec. 7 and Res. 1272, UN Doc. S/RES/1272 (25 October 1999), Sec. 4.
16. See, e.g., Memorandum by the Government of Yugoslavia on the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), Yugoslav Daily Survey No. 2710 (5 November 1999).
17. Such tones can be detected in some speeches to the locals and sometimes also to the international press. See, e.g., the inaugural press conference by Vieira de Mello, available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/DB/br19199.htm (Daily Briefing, 19 November 1999); see also the critique by Petrit Krasniqi of the international community and George Robertson who, according to the author, should understand that the Kosovars do not need the support of the internationals but the internationals need the support of the Kosovars to achieve their goals in Kosovo; see IWPR Balkan crisis report, no. 157, available at http:// www.iwpr.net (18 July 2000).
18. The point has been raised in many discussions on the subject, e.g., by Juhani Väänänen from European Union Administration, Mostar (‘EUAM’) (Interview, 27 October 2000).
19. Pugh, The point has been raised in many discussions on the subject note 10, at 338-339.
20. Noting the scarcity and link of both financial and human resources in both Kosovo and East Timor, T. Garcia, La mission d'administration intérimaire des Nations Unies au Kosovo, CIV RGDIP 61, at 69-70 (2000).
21. November 2000/press Release SC/6961, at www.un.org/news/press/docs/2000/20001128. sc6961.doc.html.
22. See International Commission of Jurists, Tragedy in East Timor, Report on the Trials in Dili and Jakarta (1992).
23. See, e.g., R. Beck, Die Internationalisierung von Territorien, Darstellung und rechtliche Analyse, Vorwort (1962).
24. See M. Ydit, Internationalised Territories: From the “Free City of Cracow” to the “Free City of Berlin”, A Study in the Historical Development of a Modern Notion in International Law and International Relations (1815-1960), at 24, 27, 127, 154 (1960).
25. Id., at 29-32.
26. Id., at 28-29, 109-126.
27. See Beck, Internationalised Territories: From the “Free City of Cracow” to the “Free City of Berlin” note 26, at 12.
28. Ydit, Internationalised Territories: From the “Free City of Cracow” to the “Free City of Berlin” note 26 note 27, at 179.
29. Id., at 180-182.
30. See, e.g., Ratner, Internationalised Territories: From the “Free City of Cracow” to the “Free City of Berlin” note 26 note 27 note 3, at 91.
31. Ydit, Internationalised Territories: From the “Free City of Cracow” to the “Free City of Berlin” note 26 note 27 note 3 note 27, at 44; see also Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 1919, Arts. 45-50.
32. See Ratner, Internationalised Territories: From the “Free City of Cracow” to the “Free City of Berlin” note 26 note 27 note 3 note 27 note 3, at 92.
33. Secretariat of the League of Nations, The Aims, Methods and Activity of the League of Nations 122 (1935).
34. Id., at 125.
35. P. de Azcárate, League of Nations and National Minorities 15 (1945).
36. Id., at vii.
37. See also G. Ostrower & G. Lankevich (Eds.), The League of Nations: From 1919 to 1929 (Partners for Peace) (1996).
38. Arts. 100-102.
39. Secretariat of the League of Nations, Arts. note 36, at 125.
40. Id., at 127.
41. Ydit, Secretariat of the League of Nations note 27, at 227; similarly, Secretariat of the League of Nations, Secretariat of the League of Nations note 36, at 128.
42. Secretariat of the League of Nations, id., at 127.
43. H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights 378 (1990); also quoted in Ratner, Secretariat of the League of Nations note 3, at 95.
44. See Beck, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights 378 note 26, at 23, advocating the two former; and Ydit, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights 378 note 27, at 224, advocating a three-way split.
45. See, e.g., R. Redslob, Le statut international de Danzig, LIII Revue de Droit International et de Législation comparée 155 (1926); see commentary by Ydit, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights 378 note 26 note 27, at 226-227.
46. See Ydit, id., passim; see also Ratner, Le statut international de Danzig note 3, at 98-101.
47. See Beck, id. note 26, at 44-45.
48. General Act of the Congo Conference (26 February 1885), for full text, see G.F. de Martens, Nouveau Recueil Général, Series II, Vol. X, 414-427 (1843-1875); the quote is by Colonial Minister Baernaerts of Belgium, see K. Strupp, Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts, Vol. I, 659 (1924-1929); see also Ydit, id. note 26 note 27, at 24-27.
49. See Ydit, id., at 27.
50. United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping 175 (3rd ed., 1996) (hereinafter ‘The Blue Helmets’).
51. Id., at 175-176.
52. Id., at 176-177, 186, 190; First UN Security Council Res. 143, UN Doc. S/4387 (14 July 1960), http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1960/s60rl43e.pdf.
53. The Blue Helmets, Id. note 53, at 179, 182.
54. Memorandum by the Secretary-General on the Organisation of the UN Civilian Operation in the Republic of the Congo (11 August 1960), UN Doc. S/4417/Add.5 (11 August 1960); UN Security Council Res. 143, The Blue Helmets note 55.
55. Statement on UN Operations in the Congo before the General Assembly by the Secretary-General (17 October 1960), UN Doc. A/PV.906, at 741; quoted in Ratner, Memorandum by the Secretary-General on the Organisation of the UN Civilian Operation in the Republic of the Congo note 3, at 107.
56. The Blue Helmets, Statement on UN Operations in the Congo before the General Assembly by the Secretary-General note 53, at 196-197; Question considered by the Security Council at its 906th Meeting on 16 September 1960, UN General Assembly Res. 1474 (ES-IV), UN Doc. 1474 (ES-IV) (20 September 1960).
57. UN Secretary-General Report to the Security Council S/5240 (4 February 1963); id. S/5428 (17 September 1963); id. S/5784 (29 June 1964).
58. See, generally, Ratner, UN Secretary-General Report to the Security Council S/5240 note 3, at 105-109.
59. The Blue Helmets, UN Secretary-General Report to the Security Council S/5240 note 3 note 53, at 199; UN Secretary-General Report S/5784, UN Secretary-General Report to the Security Council S/5240 note 3 note 60.
60. See Ratner, Id. note 3, at 111.
61. See The Blue Helmets, Id. note 3 note 53, at 648; citing the UN Secretary-General Report regarding the act of self-determination in West Irian (6 November 1969), UN Doc. A/7723, Ann. I; for a critical discussion, see Ratner, Id. note 3 note 3, at 111; referring to, e.g., T. Franck, Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the UN Dream and What the U.S. Can Do About It, esp. at 79 (1985).
62. See UN General Assembly Res. 2504 (XXIV) (19 November 1969).
63. Cf. I.I. Dore, Self-determination of Namibia and the United Nations: Paradigm of a Paradox.
64. Harv. Int'l L.J. 181-182 (1986).
65. UN Charter, Art. 76.
66. UN Chronicle (June 1990), at 6.
67. Ratner, UN Chronicle note 3, at 133.
68. W.A. Lindeke, Democratization in Namibia: Soft State, Hard Choices, 30 Stud. Comp. Int'l Dev. 3, at 4 (1995).
69. Id., at 4.
70. See also M. Parlevliet, Truth Commissions in Africa: The Non-Case of Namibia and the Emerging Case of Sierra Leone, 2 Int'l L. Forum du droit international 98, at 99-100 (2000).
71. UN Secretary-General Report submitted pursuant to para. 2 of Security Council Resolution 431 (1978) concerning the situation in Namibia, S/12827.
72. A group of Western States negotiating the underlying treaty and organisation of the UNTAG administration. For detail, see section on UNTAG in O. Korhonen & J. Gras, International Governance in Post-Conflict Situations (2001).
73. Officially, the apartheid legislation was established in Namibia since 1964. However, the racial segregation had in practice started some 80 years earlier. See UN Chronicle, at 48 (March 1989).
74. For the blatant human rights violations committed by South Africa in Namibia during the 1980s, see G.J. McDougall, International Law, Human Rights and Namibian Independence, 8 Human Rights Quarterly 458-470 (1986).
75. Signature of the Statute in Rome (1998).
76. See D. Roberts, Sympathy with the Devil? The Khmer Rouge and the Politics of Consent in the Cambodian Peacekeeping Operation, 16 Contemporary Security Policy 7 (1995); Roberts points out that the activities of the PDK were inspired by the thoughts, speeches and writings of Pol Pot who was, in fact, a driving force of the party.
77. The only reference to the genocide was included in Art. 15 of the Paris Peace Agreements. It required Cambodia “[T]o take effective measures to ensure that the policies and practices of the past shall never be allowed to return.” The use of the term “genocide” in the Peace Agreements had been raised in the first Paris Conference on Cambodia in 1989 but could not have been agreed upon. See M. Hong, The Paris Agreements on Cambodia, 2 Retrospect, International Peacekeeping 94 (1995).
78. See also R. Mani, Conflict Resolution, Justice and the Law: Rebuilding the Rule of Law in the Aftermath of Complex Political Emergencies, 5 Int'l Peacekeeping 6 (1998).
79. Cf. the chief of the Military Component, Lieutenant-General John M. Sanderson who has noted that “[T]here is a tendency to look at UNTAC in terms of Cambodia's tragic past. However, I would like to make the point that UNTAC was about the future of Cambodia, not the past.” J.M. Sanderson, UNTAC: The Military Component View, in The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC): Debriefing and Lessons, Report of the 1994 Singapore Conference 126 (1995) (hereinafter ‘UNTAC: Debriefing and Lessons’).
80. Amnesty International has recently noted that impunity remains at the heart of Cambodia's current human rights problems. See Amnesty International Report 2000, available online at http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/ar2000web.nsf/.
81. See above, e.g., Parlevliet, Amnesty International has recently noted that impunity remains at the heart of Cambodia's current human rights problems. note 76.
82. Y. Akashi, The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia, 1(2) Int'l Peacekeeping 213 (1994).
83. Ratner, The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Cambodia note 3, at 198.
84. John Mackinlay and Randoplh Kent pay attention to better knowledge of the local area by the civil organisations. See J. Mackinlay & R. Kent, A New Approach to Complex Emergencies, 4(4) Int'l Peacekeeping 38 (1997).
85. T. Findlay, Cambodia, The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, SIPRI Research Report No. 9, 114-116 (1995).
86. K.S. Kamarotos, Building Peace, Democracy and Human Rights: International Civilian Missions at the End of the Millennium, 2(4) Int'l Peacekeeping 503 (1995).
87. H. Koschnick & J. Schneider, Brucke uber die Neretva 232-233 (1995).
88. UNTAC: Debriefing and Lessons, Brucke uber die Neretva note 85, at 6.
89. Ramsbotham, UNTAC: Debriefing and Lessons note 1, at 175.
90. For the PDK's position, see Roberts, UNTAC: Debriefing and Lessons note 1 note 82, at 5-10.
91. Findlay, For the PDK's position note 91, at 137.
92. UN Secretary-General Report on Cambodia containing his proposed implementation plan for UNTAC, including administrative and financial aspects, S/23613 (19 February 1992).
93. See S.S. Gibson, The Misplaced Reliance on Free and Fair Elections in Nation Building: The Role of Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of Law, 21 Houston JIL 1, at 45 (1998).
94. Ramsbotham, The Misplaced Reliance on Free and Fair Elections in Nation Building: The Role of Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of Law note 1, at 183.
95. See, the World Bank and Cambodia, available at http://bln0018.worldbank.org/eap/ eap.nsf/c236c318fc341033852567c9006baf9a/a327463333316f90852567d700792a4c?Open Document.
96. Special Report No. 2/96 concerning the accounts of the Administrator and the European Union Administration, Mostar (EUAM) accompanied by the replies of the Commission and the Administrator of Mostar (Special Report), OJ C 287 (30 September 1996) (hereinafter ‘EU Special Report No. 2/96’); between 1993 and 1994 the EU had been involved in the situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by providing humanitarian assistance.
97. Bull. EU 4-1994, at 64.
98. See Report by the Secretary-General on the establishment of UNTAES and UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (Croatia) (1992-) (‘UNMOP’), S/1995/1028 (13 December 1995); see also The Blue Helmets, Bull. note 53, at 554-556.
99. EU Special No. Report 2/96, See Report by the Secretary-General on the establishment of UNTAES and UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka note 102, at para. 46.
100. F. Pagani, L'Administration de Mostar par l'Union européenne, XLII AFDI 245 (1996).
101. MOU, Art. 7.
102. Press Conference of the High Representative of the International Community, Mr Carl Bildt and Sir Martin Garrod, Mostar, available at http://www.ohr.int/press/p970115a.htm (15 January 1997), para. 46.
103. Pagani, Press Conference of the High Representative of the International Community note 106, at 249.
104. International Crisis Group (19 April 2000); According to the International Crisis Group, Mr Koschnick had expressed his frustration at the lack of the political support of the European governments, at http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/balkans/bosnia/reports/ A400020_19042000.pdf (19 April 2000).
105. See Interview Väänänen, International Crisis Group (19 April 2000); According to the International Crisis Group note 20.
106. EU Special No. Report 2/96, See Interview Väänänen note 102, at para. 90.
107. July 1996.
108. Off. High Rep., press conference (15 January 1997).
109. Document 95/021 (17 January 1995).
110. See Interview Väänänen, Document 95/021 note 20.
111. Report of the Court of Auditors; EU Special Report No. 2/96, See Interview Väänänen note 102, at para. 7.
112. Basic Agreement (12 November 1995), signed between the Croatian Government and the local Serb Authorities.
113. The establishment of UNTAES was affected by UN Security Council Res. 1037, UN Docs. S/RES/1037 (15 January 1996).
114. UN Secretary-General Report S/1998/59 (22 January 1998).
115. See Ramsbotham, UN Secretary-General Report S/1998/59 note 1, at 174-175.
116. P. Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Institutionalism, 22 Int'l Security 54, at 56 (1997); see also Ramsbotham, UN Secretary-General Report S/1998/59 note 1 note 1, at 176.
117. Cf. Ramsbotham, id., at 175, 179.
118. Pugh, id. note 10, at 327.
119. Traub, id. note 10 note 7, at 75, 89.
120. Pugh, id. note 10 note 7 note 10, at 338.
121. Id., at 327.
122. Id., at 341, warning that peace-building operations become regarded as a ‘poisoned chalice’ without the acknowledgement and discussion of their risks.
123. Pugh, warning that peace-building operations become regarded as a ‘poisoned chalice’ without the acknowledgement and discussion of their risks. note 10, at 337.
124. Sorel, warning that peace-building operations become regarded as a ‘poisoned chalice’ without the acknowledgement and discussion of their risks. note 10 note 5, at 56-57.
125. For the African options, see, e.g., G. Cahin, Les Nations Unies et la construction de la paix en Afrique: entre désengagement et expérimentation, CIV RGDIP 73 (2000).
126. See above, the chapters on the Congo and Tangier (Section 3.1).
127. See H. Gregorian, The UN's Role in Bringing about Peace in Cambodia (An Observer's View), in UNTAC: Debriefing and Lessons, See above, the chapters on the Congo and Tangier note 85, at 93.
128. S. Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions 57-58 (2000).
129. Pugh, The Riddle of All Constitutions note 10, at 339.