Rethinking the Nineteenth-Century Employment Contract, Again

Law and History Review

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 627-657

  Witt, John Fabian ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85012538134     PISSN: 07382480     EISSN: 19399022     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/744072     Document Type: Article

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