Moral Responsibility and Political Freedom

Cambridge Law Journal

Volumn 56, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 96-102

  Williams, Bernard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85012531798     PISSN: 00081973     EISSN: 14692139     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0008197300017761     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley 1993), chapter 3.
2. Moore, Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and its implications for Criminal Law (Oxford 1993), pp. 253 seq.
3. For a discussion of this and related views of Moore's see the symposium in 142 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1994), pp. 1443–1840.
4. The voluntaristic version. Retribution is not necessarily confined to the voluntary: see below, p. 100.
5. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford 1968), esp. ch. 2.
6. “Turn him round with regard to values” is Robert Nozick's phrase in Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Harvard 1984), at pp. 363 seq.
7. For further comment on the present lines, see “Nietzsche's minimalist moral psychology”, European Journal of Philosophy 1.1 (1993)
8. reprinted in Williams, Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge 1995).
9. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books 1974), p. 225.