Seeking the Historical Mao

China Quarterly

Volumn 145, Issue , 1996, Pages 176-188

  Teiwes, Frederick C ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 85012520485     PISSN: 03057410     EISSN: 14682648     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0305741000044180     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Perhaps the most extreme example, particularly on the latter point, is Jonathan Mirsky, “Unmasking the monster,” The New York Review of Books, 17 November 1994.
2. In contrast, Marilyn B. Young's measured review in The New York Times Book Review, 27 November 1994, p. 12, observes, inter alia, that sexual excesses in Mao's Zhongnanhai were “perhaps no steamier than, say, the White House during John F. Kennedy's Presidency,” and avoids sweeping condemnation of the Chairman's political morality.
3. On interviews, see Frederick C. Teiwes, “Interviews on Party history,” CCP Research Newsletter, Nos. 10 and 11 (1992), especially pp. 13–14.
4. Li Rui, Lushan huiyi shilu (True Record of the Lushan Conference) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1989).
5. See Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the State) Vol. 3 (January-December 1952) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1989), p. 563, Vol. 6 (January 1956-December 1957) (1992), pp. 165–69,187–88, 192–94, 199–200, 210–12
6. Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu (Reflections on Certain Major Decisions and Events), Vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), p. 556.
7. For detailed analyses of the issues involved, see Frederick C. Teiwes, “Mao texts and uie Mao of the 1950s,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 33 (1995), pp. 137ff
8. Teiwes with Warren Sun, “The politics of an ‘un-Maoist’ interlude: the case of opposing rash advance, 1956–57,” in Timothy Cheek and Tony Saich (eds.), New Perspectives on State Socialism in China (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, forthcoming).
9. Wang Dongxing, “Yi jiujie erzhong quanhui” (“Recollecting the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee”), Dangdai Zhongguoshi yanjiu (Research on Contemporary Chinese History), No. 3 (1994).
10. On Zhou in May 1971, see Quan Yanchi, Zouxia shengtande Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai Down to Earth) (Taipei: Xinrui chubanshe, 1994), pp. 365, 370.
11. On the general pattern of Zhou-Lin relations, see Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger during the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1971 (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1996), pp. 46–49.
12. See Chen Yi zhuan (Biography of Chen Yi) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1991), pp. 617–18.
13. The full case for this interpretation is provided in Teiwes and Sun, The Tragedy of Lin Biao.
14. A major case in point not dealt with by Li concerns the election of the Politburo at the time of the Ninth Congress. Despite Mao's explicit statement that she should not be selected, the responsible personnel group led by Zhou Enlai placed her on the list on the apparent assumption that Mao really wanted her despite his words. See Zhang Yunsheng, Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu (True Account of Maojiawan: Reminiscences of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988), pp. 247–255
15. Teiwes and Sun, The Tragedy of Lin Biao, p. 13.
16. According to senior Party historian Liao Gailong (Liao Kai-lung), “Historical experiences and our road of development,” Part II, Issues & Studies, November 1981, p. 90, Mao completely ceased attending Politburo meetings in 1958, thus graphically demonstrating his position above the Party.
17. In various instances Li depicts political conflict between Mao in the provinces gathering his resources against opponents at the Centre (e.g. pp. 156–57,419). For an analysis challenging this view with regard to one of the classic examples (albeit one only tangentially noted by Li (p. 111)), the 1955 acceleration of agricultural co-operati vization, see the Editors' Introduction to Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun (eds.), The Politics of Agricultural Cooperativization in China: Mao, Deng Zihui, and the “High Tide” of 1955 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), especially p. 20. This is not to deny that in specific instances, most notably summer 1971 concerning Lin Biao, Mao sought to mobilize support against an erring colleague, i.e. a perceived opponent. Cf. the discussion below.
18. See particularly Li's observations concerning Mao's journeys during the Great Leap Forward (chs. 30–38), and Tian Jiaying's complaint that “When the master lets his preference be known, the servants pursue it with a vengeance” (p. 276). Cf. Mao's spring 1959 comment that even “[Liu] Shaoqi doesn't dare to speak to me frankly”; Dangde wenxian (The Party's Documents), No. 1 (1989), p. 96. Another indication of Mao's concern with his inability to obtain a realistic view from official sources was his use of household personnel to carry out investigations, but even this measure could not guarantee that he would hear the truth (see pp. 275, 308–309).
19. Li also claims that Peng, whom he classifies as “the only top leader who consistently dared to confront Mao,” attacked Mao's personal life style excesses at Politburo meetings, asserting that the Chairman behaved like an emperor with a harem of 3,000 concubines (pp. 94,132). Such unsourced assertions must be regarded as unsubstantiated rumour. While Peng was clearly an irascible personality with a history of personal tension with Mao from revolutionary days, the best evidence suggests he did not go out of his way to antagonize the Chairman after 1949. Even the complex developments at Lushan, while involving an element of provocation on Peng's part, were by no means a political challenge. See Frederick C. Teiwes, “Peng Dehuai and Mao Zedong,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 16 (1986), especially pp. 89–91.
20. This by no means denies that other leaders sometimes had different ideas from Mao, or that in pre-Cultural Revolution days in particular tried to convince him of their views, only that even the most dedicated follower of the Chairman was vulnerable to his shifting moods. For an extended analysis of Mao's ambiguity and its political implications, see the introduction to the second edition of Frederick C. Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms 1950–1965 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993).
21. For a discussion of this distinction for the crucial 1960–65 period, see Teiwes, Politics and Purges, pp. xxxvi-xliv.
22. The issue was the rehabilitation of Great Leap critics which, in his discussion, Li claims had been undertaken by Liu Shaoqi without reference to Mao, an erroneous assertion in that Mao sanctioned the process in his speech to the 7,000 cadres conference in January 1962. On the general question of Mao's frequent complaints about receiving inadequate information, see Bo Yibo's observation concerning Mao's 1958 claim of insufficient briefing on economic issues that all major policies were reported but it was impossible to submit everything to him; Huigu, Vol. 2(1993), p. 651.
23. See the analysis in Teiwes, Politics and Purges, pp. xxxix-xliv.
24. For further discussion of Liu's character and its implications for his relations with Mao, See Frederick C. Teiwes, “Mao and his lieutenants,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 19–20 (1988), pp. 56–63
25. Teiwes with the assistance of Warren Sun, The Formation of the Maoist Leadership: From the Return of Wang Ming to the Seventh Party Congress (London: Contemporary China Institute Research Notes and Studies, 1994), pp. 34–40; and n. 32, above.
26. E.g. a finding of Teiwes and Sun, The Tragedy of Lin Biao, is that during the Cultural Revolution when radical statements or personal attacks were required, Zhou outperformed Lin Biao.
27. See the resolution in Beijing Review, No. 27 (1981), especially pp. 19–26.
28. A case in point concerns the preoccupation with coups d'état which can be traced to late 1965 and clearly originated with Mao himself, not Lin Biao as commonly believed. See Teiwes and Sun, The Tragedy of Lin Biao, pp. 61–62, 213.