Between metaphysical and liberal pluralism: A reappraisal of rabbi a. i. kook's espousal of toleration

AJS Review

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 61-110

  Ross, Tamar ^a  

^a BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

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EID: 85012502226     PISSN: 03640094     EISSN: 14754541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0364009400007625     Document Type: Article

References (114)

1. Binyamin ‘Ish-Shalom, “Tolerance and Its Theoretical Basis in the Teaching of Rabbi Kook” (Hebrew), Daat 20 (Winter 1988): 151-168; Binyamin Efrati, Sanegoriya (Seeing the Good Side) in the Teaching of R. Kook (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1959); Zvi Yaron, The Philosophy of R. Kook (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Jewish Agency Torah Dept., 1974), chap. 12: “Toleration,” pp. 323-373; Eliezer Schweid, Judaism and the Solitary Jew (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), chap. 3: “Secularism from a Religious Perspective-R. Kook's Teaching,” pp. 178-192.
2. As has been done by Jay Newman, “The Idea of Religious Tolerance,” American Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 3 (July 1978): 187, and by P. F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment (London: Methuen, 1974), chap. 4: “The Limits of Toleration,” p. 43.
3. See Newman, “Idea of Religious Tolerance,” p. 194.
4. For a more elaborate explication of these two models of toleration and the respective philosophical and political difficulties they engender when forming the basis for practical policy, see Herbert Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance,” in A Critique of Pure Tolerance, ed. R. P. Wolff, B. Moore Jr., and H. Marcuse (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 81-123; W. Kendall, “The ‘Open Society” and Its Fallacies,” American Political Science Review 54 (1960): 972-979; David Lewis, “Mill and Milquetoast,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1989): 152-171; Karl Popper, “Toleration and Intellectual Responsibility,” in On Toleration, ed. S. Mendus and D. Edwards (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 17-34; David Hed, “Two Concepts of Liberalism,” in In the Labyrinth of Democracy, ed. Yuval Lurie and Hayim Maranz (Ben-Gurion University, 1990), pp. 169-184. The two versions of maximalism and minimalism have alternatively been described as thick or thin, rightist or leftist, individualistic or pluralistic, when applied not only to toleration as such, but also to the broader concept of liberalism as a form of government.
5. Although these motives are separate and distinct justifications for toleration, they are not always mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they may reinforce each other. See Susan Mendus's introduction to Mendus and Edwards, On Toleration, pp. 3-4. Mendus terms the three motives “prudence,” “rationality,” and “morality.”
6. It is worth noting in this connection, however, that the distinction between holding and expressing an opinion is easily eroded if a person is not prepared to lie in response to direct questioning or to perform acts that are inconsistent with his private convictions. See Strawson, “Limits of Toleration,” p. 46.
7. Contrary to what is usually assumed, it is this version of intellectual skepticism that supports J. S. Mill's liberalism. Mill opposes the idea of public truth not because society must have freedom of speech, but for the same reason that it must have freedom of speech, i.e., an assault on one definitive truth. For Mill, skepticism and tolerance are integrally connected. He thinks our choice is either never to silence or to declare ourselves infallible. See Kendall, “Open Society,” pp. 975-976; Strawson, “Limits of Toleration,” p. 50.
8. Newman, “Idea of Religious Tolerance,” pp. 190-191.
9. Strawson, “Limits of Toleration,” p. 47.
10. For those who accept the Kantian criterion of universalizability, with the implied universality and absoluteness of moral principles, the impossibility of tolerance would apply here too. It has, however, been argued that one cannot draw a distinction between the moral and the nonmoral by contending that one is based on reason and the other on feeling. Morality itself is based on strong feelings, and the concept of morality would wither away and become lost in the concept of expediency if strong feelings or sentiment were not involved in the judgment that something is morally right or wrong. The conclusion is therefore drawn that no sharp line can be drawn between what I dislike and what I disapprove of. See Baroness Warnock's article, “The Limits of Toleration,” chap. 7 in On Toleration, p. 126. However, Wamock also argues that there is no necessity to identify relativism (the belief that nothing is ultimately better or worse than anything else) with the belief that morality is based as much on feeling as reason, for some feelings may be better or more important (culturally, historically) than others. 12. According to R. M. Hare in Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 177, “what distinguishes the liberal is that he respects the ideals of others as he does his own. This does not mean he agrees with them-that would be logically impossible if they are different from his.” But if his and others’ conflict, “he will-in arbitrating between people's interests and ideals, give as much weight to each person's as to any other's; he will not give his own ideals and interests preference because they are his own. It is only when somebody else's pursuit interferes with others’ that this arbitration becomes necessary.” But Hare then continues: “He does not claim finality for his own ideal, though he may be sure that it is the best that he has discovered so far… He may even think that a diversity of ideals is in itself a good thing, not only because people are different and what they are likely to achieve is different… but also, because it takes all sorts to make a world” (p. 180).
11. Thus, as Newman points out (“Idea of Religious Tolerance,” p. 188), when toleration is applied to moral positions or to rational argument, the concept need not necessarily represent a normative ideal. A person may criticize himself or others for merely tolerating what calls for stronger approval or respect, or for even tolerating something that calls for stronger measures of disapproval and denunciation.
12. Newman, Thus, as Newman points out; Strawson, “Limits of Toleration,” pp. 43-55.
13. Strawson, “Limits of Toleration,” p. 47.
14. “Limits of Toleration,”., p. 49.
15. “Limits of Toleration,”., p. 47.
16. See ‘Avot 3:18. For further amplification of this theme, see Aaron Lichtenstein, “The Dignity of Created Beings” (Hebrew), Mahanayim 5 (May 1993): 8-16; Menahem ‘Elon, “Freedom of Expression and the Control of Minority Rights in Jewish Law,” “Limits of Toleration,”…, pp. 28-30, pars. 5-6. See also TB Kritot 6b: “Every fast-day in which the sinners of Israel do not participate is not a true fast-day, as we see from the case of the helbena (galbanum), which has a bad smell but is included by Scripture (Exodus 30:34) among the ingredients to be included in the incense to be offered in the service of the sanctuary”; the theme is elaborated upon in Derashot Ha-ran (Nissim b. Reuven of Gerondi), edited by L. A. Feldman (Jerusalem, 1973), first derasha, pp. 3ff.
17. For further amplification and sources, see ‘Elon, “Freedom of Expression,” pp. 25-26. A spirit of pluralism based on such sources surely animates the toleration of diversity in the realm of halakhic practice exemplified in such contemporary rulings as R. Moshe Feinstein's permitting the sale, during the year of shmita (the sabbatical year), of ‘etrogim (citrons) produced in the framework of belief in heter mekhirah (the possibility of “selling” the land of Israel in order to obviate its lying fallow) even to those who do not accept this heter, since there is no violation of “placing a stumbling block before the blind” regarding anything that is done in accordance with the decision of a sage until a Sanhedrin actually rules against it (Igrot Moshe, Orah Hayim, vol. 1, sec. 186). That is, it is recognized here that the fragmentation of religious authority allows for many opinions. Compare the Responsa Mishnat Yosef, pt. 1, sec. 100. Another leading contemporary decisor, R. Eliezer Waldenberg, in his Responsa Tzitz Eliezer 12, pt. 16, sec. 3, forbids practicing a humra (stringent measure) which will shame someone else who does not keep the same stringency. He wrote this in response to a query regarding the practice of the saintly Hafetz Hayim, who behaved in this manner regarding the eating of matzah sheruyah (moistened unleavened bread) on Passover; the questioner asked whether he was obligated to perform a hatarat nedarim (remission of vows) in this connection.
18. E.g., see R. Moshe Feinstein's ruling in his Igrot Moshe, Orah Hayim, vol. 1, sec. 46, that although the Israeli flag is a symbol of the state of the wicked heretics who deny Jewish tradition, there is no ban on it, for there is nothing against placing a secular object in the synagogue. Therefore, it is not worth creating a dispute over something which is not actually forbidden. In this case, the imprudence of divisiveness overrides the distaste for the dissident. One source that might be construed as extending the toleration principle even further is TB Menahot 27a, which compares the obligation to bind together the ‘arba’ minim (four species of plants blessed on Sukkot) to the obligation to bind together all types of Jews, which includes even the wicked among them. But the intent is most likely directed to tolerance of their persons, not of their wickedness per se.
19. E.g., see Maimonides’ opinion in his Guide of the Perplexed, III, chap. 51, regarding the second class of people surrounding the palace in search of the king. Since they hold wrong opinions, sometimes they must be slain and all memory of their opinions destroyed, so that they will not mislead others.
20. Rambam, Hilkhot Gerushin 2:2. See also Yaron, Philosophy of R. Kook, p. 327, and especially n. 13.
21. TB Pesahim 113b; Shulhan ‘Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 272:11.
22. Tanya’, pt. 1, chap. 32. For discussion of further references which mitigate the level of hatred one is obligated to harbor for the transgressor, see Yehudah ‘Amital, “Regarding the Status of the Secular Jew in Our Days” (Hebrew), ‘Alon Shvut le-Bogrei Yeshivat Har Etzyon, no. 6 (Elul 1988), pp. 11-12; Mordecai Gafni, “The Halakhic Approach Toward Secularists” (Hebrew), Mahanayim, pp. 189-190, May, 1993.
23. Rambam, Hilkhot Rotzeah, end of chap. 4.
24. This disparity between halakhic legislation and its execution has been likened to the difference in style of fatherly and motherly upbringing. See ‘Amital, “Regarding the Status of the Secular Jew,” pp. 9-10, and Gafni, “Halakhic Approach Towards Secularists,” pp. 200-201.
25. This separatism was expressed in prescribing the avoidance of social contact with such dissident Jews, not mourning or eulogizing them, banning them as kosher witnesses, and forbidding intermarriage with them. See the collected writings of Maharatz Hayot, vol. 2, Iggeret Kannaut, p. 908 and on.
26. R. David Zvi Hoffman (in Responsa Melamed Leho'il 1, 29) establishes that the transgressors cannot even qualify as public Sabbath desecrators. The definition of farhesiya (“public”) has changed, since it is now the majority that do not observe Shabbat. On the basis of this observation, he permits including them in a minyan, even though it is preferable to pray in another congregation if this can be done with creating offense.
27. A ruling by Maimonides that although it is a mitzvah to kill epiqorsim and mumarim who deny the divinity of the Torah, the children of such dissenters are to be regarded as tinoqot shenishbu who had no choice, serves as the basis for posqim in recent generations to regard current secularists leniently. The lack of choice stems from a recognition of the possibility of intellectual seduction. E.g., see R. Meir Simha Ha-cohen of Dvinsk (1843-1928) in Meshekh Hokhma, Shemot 3, 19, or R. Tzadoq Ha-cohen in Tzidqat ha-Tzaddiq, sec. 43. An even more ingenious and radical rationale for relating to modern heretics be-‘avotot ahavah (“lovingly”) rather than with tokhehah (“chastisement”), and not applying the law of kofrim to them, is suggested by the Hazon ‘Ish (Yoreh De'ah, Hilkhot Shehitah 2, end of n. 16): i.e., the fact that Divine Providence is not evident in our day.
28. Hazon ‘Ish's commentary on Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot De'ot 6:3.
29. ‘Orot (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook,), pp. 73-74. [au. year of pub.?]
30. igrotR'ayah I (Jerusalem, 1962), pp. 58, 160-161.
31. For several examples of such criticism, see Aviezer Ravitzky, Messianism, Zionism and Jewish Religious Radicalism (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, Tel Aviv, 1993), p. 160.
32. See Yosef Ahitov, “The Attitude Towards Secularists” (Hebrew), in Be-Hevlei Massoret u-Temura (Rehovot, 1990), pp. 35-50.
33. Igrot R ‘ayah I, pp. 20-21. Further development of this idea appears in R. Kook's letter to the Ridbaz (Igrot R'ayah II, pp. 184-198). In this letter R. Kook also employs another metaphysical concept to justify his refusal to distance himself from the secular Zionists, i.e., the midrashic understanding of the ‘erev rav (“mixed multitude”) as those who were destined to produce superior offspring in the generations that follow. The use of this notion relates to a kabbalistic dispute about whether the final redemption will be the result of a separation of the holy and the profane, or the sanctification of the profane and its elevation.
34. J grot R'ayah II, 170-171.
35. J grot R'ayah II. I, pp. 170-171, 368-370; ‘“Al Bamoteinu Halalim,” Ma'amarei R'ayah I (Jerusalem, 1980), pp. 90-91.
36. Igrot R'ayah I, pp. 100-101.
37. Igrot R'ayah I., pp. 170-171, 100-101.
38. Igrot R'ayah I., p. 305.
39. For an expression of this view, see the letter R. Kook wrote to his parents in Igrot R ‘ayah I, pp. 352-353, regarding the policy of those who opposed his approach to the secularists. (In this letter he displays great nobility and personal tolerance regarding his adversaries on this issue.)
40. ‘“Al Bamoteinu Halalim,” pp. 89-93.
41. Yoreh De'ah 340:5.
42. IgrotR'ayahl,p. 18.
43. IgrotR'ayahl., p. 19.
44. IgrotR'ayahl., pp. 19-21.
45. This is in contradiction to the view of some that R. Kook's tolerance never goes beyond the status of post-factum (bedi'avad). E.g., see Yosef Ahitov, “Reflections Regarding the Future of Relations with the Secularists” (Hebrew), in Be-Hevlei Massoret u-Temura, ed. Menahem Kahanah (Rehovot: Kivvunim, 1990), pp. 37-38.
46. ‘Orotha-'Emunah (Jerusalem, 1985), pp. 66-67.
47. “Talelei ‘Orot,” Ma'amarei R'ayah I, p. 26, sec. 8.
48. ‘Orot ha-Qodesh I (Jerusalem, 1963), pp. 176-177; ‘Orot ha-'Emunah, pp. 67-68; ‘Arpelei Tohar (Jerusalem, 1983), p. 62.
49. ‘Eder ha-Yaqar (Jerusalem, 1963), p. 14
50. ‘Eder ha-Yaqar., pp. 14-15. See also “Ma'amar Meyuhad,” in Ma'amarei R'ayah I, p. 105; Igrot R'ayah, pp. 192-193.
51. ‘Orot ha-Qodesh I, 22; ‘Orot ha-Emunah, pp. 67-68.
52. ‘Orot ha-Qodesh III (Jerusalem, 1964), introduction, p. 26.
53. ‘Orot ha-Emunah, p. 21; ‘Orot ha-Qodesh HI, introduction, p. 44.
54. ‘Orot, pp. 73-74.
55. Igrot R'ayah, pp. 171-172.
56. ‘Orot ha-Emunah, pp. 67-68.
57. E.g., see Ginzei R'ayah 6 (Jerusalem, 1990), p. 151, where love of the rasha’ is perceived as problematic because it could lead to a blurring of the distinction between the bearer of the wickedness and the wickedness itself.
58. Igrvt R'ayah I, 19-20.
59. ‘Orot ha-Qodesh III, 282.
60. ‘Arpelei Tohai; p. 18.
61. ‘Arpelei Tohai;., p. 27.
62. Maimonides, for example, often differentiates ‘emunot davar bilvad (theoretical opinions) and emunot ha-mevi'ot liyedei ma'aseh (opinions that lead to action). E.g., see Ma'amar Tehiyat ha-Metim, sec. 4; Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Sotah, chap. 3.
63. Igrot R'ayah II, pp. 184-198.
64. Maimonides, for example, often differentiates ‘emunot davar bilvad (theoretical opinions) and emunot ha-mevi'ot liyedei ma'aseh (opinions that lead to action)., p. 188.
65. Strawson, “Limits of Toleration,” p. 53.
66. Strawson, “Social Morality and Individual Ideal,” p. 44.
67. ‘Ish-Shalom,-“Tolerance and Its Theoretical Basis,” p. 153.
68. See particularly his Appearance and Reality, 2nd ed. (London, 1897) and Essays on Truth and Reality (Oxford, 1914).
69. ‘Orot ha-Emunah, pp. 23-24 (a parallel passage appears in ‘Arpelei Tohar, p. 45).
70. ‘Orot ha-Emunah., pp. 153-154.
71. The danger is intensified by the fact that R. Kook himself (Igrot R'ayah I, p. 47) describes the Jewish understanding of all human perceptions as “subjective and relative,” without adding any further distinctions.
72. ‘Orot ha-Qodesh II, p. 403; The danger is intensified by the fact that R. Kook himself. Ill, p. 327.
73. “Ne'edar ba-Qodesh,” Ma'amarei R'ayah II, p. 400.
74. Igrot R'ayah 1, p. 164.
75. See Schweid, Judaism and the Solitary Jew, pp. 180-181, for a similar account.
76. ‘Orot ha-Qodesh I, pp. 17-18.
77. ‘Ederha-Yaqar, p. 14.
78. ‘Orot ha-Qodesh III, p. 327; see also ‘Orot ha-Qodesh II, p. 484.
79. ‘Orot, pp. 130-131.
80. Igrot R'ayah I, pp. 19-21.
81. ‘Ikvei ha-Tzon, pp. 147-148.
82. ‘Orot, pp. 42-44, ‘Orot ha-'Emunah, p. 105.
83. E.g., see R. Kook's remarks on the status of the Jewish woman. The fact that Jewish society is composed of households and families, rather than individuals, as the basic unit guarantees the Jewish woman her unique position within her home, and spares her the need to resort to the indignities of political hustling (Igrot R'ayah III, pp. 50-51).
84. ‘Orot, pp. 130-131.
85. Igrot R'ayah I, pp. 19-20.
86. ‘Orot, p. 152, sec. 2. This theme was also stressed by Mazzini, in delineating the nature of modem nationalism.
87. ‘Orot. 64, sec. 10; “Talelei ‘Orot,” Ma'amarei R'ayah I, p. 21; “Le-mahalah ha-'Ideiot be-Yisrael,” ‘Orot, p. 120.
88. ‘Orot, pp. 129-130, 138; ‘Olat R'ayah I, pp. 376-377. R. Kook's view of knesset yisrael as the concentrate of all humanity is rooted in the special status that this concept has in qabbalistic symbolism, where knesset yisrael is equated with malhut, the lowest sefira, which serves as a final receptacle for the bounty of all the higher sefirot that flow into it. This sefira is characterized by the fact that it has no special character of its own. Its lack of a distinguishing quality is just what allows it to best serve as a sponge for collecting all the others, for its own character poses no barrier.
89. ‘Arpelei Tohai; pp. 3, 105-106; ‘Orot ha-Teshuvah, chap. 5, sec. 2; ‘Orot ha-Qodesh III, pp. 65-66; ‘Orot, p. 138, sec. 3.
90. ‘Olat R'ayah I, pp. 386-387.
91. ‘Arpelei Tohar, pp. 56-57, 64; ‘Orot, p. 138.
92. ‘Ikveiha-Tzon (Jerusalem, 1963), pp. 124-125; ‘Orot, pp. 63-64, sec. 9; IggerotR'ayah n,pp. 186-187.
93. ‘Ilcvei ha-Tzon, pp. 147-148; Orot ha-Qodesh III, pp. 117-118; ‘Olat R'ayah II, pp. 43-44; ‘Orot ha-Qodesh II, pp. 561-562.
94. ‘Igrot Rayah II, pp. 65-66; ‘Orot, p. 144, sec. 3.
95. ‘Ilcvei ha-Tzon.
96. This paradox parallels the paradox commonly attributed to liberalism: the liberal must be intolerant of the anti-liberal in the name of liberalism.
97. ‘Arpelei Tohar, pp. 56-57; ‘Orot ha-Qodesh III, pp. 349-350; “Ikvei ha-Tzon, p. 123.
98. According to R. Kook, the Jewish people's unique comprehensive quality of concentrating all powers and meshing them into one coherent whole gives rise to concomitant other qualities, just as one is not surprised that the brain and heart of the individual organism exhibit manifestations of life that are not found in the rest of the body (‘Orot, p. 138, sec. 2). Because they contain all tendencies, the Jewish people are more prone to inner conflict. For the same reason, they are more self-sufficient, (‘Arpelei Tohar., p. 169). Another difference is the creative power of the history and culture of the Jewish people. The national cultures of other nations merely rearrange what already exists in various forms and constellations; they describe and preserve. But Jewish creativity is ex nihilo, true innovation (‘Orot ha-Qodesh III, pp. 67-69). This is similar to the view of R. Yehudah Halevi, who also held that Israel's uniqueness did consist in its comprising an organism separate from the rest Of humanity, but rather in its serving as the heart of the general universal organism. There is no room for questions of equality within an organism, because all parts of the hierarchy work together for the common good. It is only when the various elements are viewed in partial, individual terms that there is room for talk of inequity.
99. ‘Orot, p. 156, sec. 11.
100. ‘Igrot R'ayah I, pp. 100-101.
101. ‘Orot, pp. 73-74; ‘Iggerot R'ayah I, pp. 48*9.
102. For a modified version of the more usual suggestion of a modus vivendi between the religious and secular camps, which works in reverse (appealing to the religious on prudential grounds, in the interest of social cohesion, and to the secularists in terms of their ideological commitment to pluralism), see Hed, “Two Concepts of Liberalism,” pp. 183-184.
103. ‘Igrot R'ayah I, p. 311.
104. For a discussion of this exchange, see Rivka Shatz, “R. Kook's Stand Regarding the Question of Religious Legislation in 1920” (Hebrew), Kivvunim 33 (1986): 101-104.
105. If the son's behavior is any measure of the father's policy, it is worth noting that R. Zvi Yehudah objected to nonobservant visitors donning a head covering merely out of deference to him when such practice was unaccompanied by inner conviction. He was also a card-carrying member of the League Against Religious Coercion until he became convinced that his unlikely colleagues had no comparable objection to the coercion of secular practices. See Yaron, Philosophy of R. Kook, p. 337, n. 40.
106. For one of the earliest systematic presentations of this argument, see Locke's Epistola de Tolerantia, published in 1688. This most likely served as the subsequent basis for viewing autonomous decision as a necessary prerequisite of morality in Kantian ethics.
107. For sources, see Sagie, “Jewish Religion.”
108. As proposed by Yesh'ayahu Leibowitz in his writings. See also Joseph Agassi, Religion and Nationality: Toward an Israeli National Identity (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1984).
109. Seen. 22.
110. Naphtali Berlin makes the same conjecture regarding R. Zvi Yehudah's position in “Why Did R. Zvi Yehudah Join the League Against Religious Coercion?” (Hebrew), Mahshevet ha-Dor, no. 1 (Jerusalem: Hamahon le-Limmud ve-'Iyyun be-Mishnat ha-R'ayah Kook Zatzal, 1991), pp. 21-23.
111. For a more extensive account of communitarianism and its critique of liberalism, see Charles Taylor, “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate.” in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); Allen E. Buchanan, “Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,” Ethics 99 (July 1989): 852-882.
112. Eliezer Goldman, “The Structuring of Rabbi Kook's Thought (1906-1909)” (Hebrew), Bar Ilan Annual 22-23 (1987): 115-116.
113. David D. Duquette, “Liberal Purposes and Community” (Paper presented at the Ninth Annual Social Philosophy Conference, Davidson College, North Carolina, August 1992).
114. See Sagie, “Jewish Religion.”