Re-Imagining International Human Rights Education in Our Time: Beyond Three Constitutive Orthodoxies

Leiden Journal of International Law

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 563-590

  Okafor, Obiora Chinedu ^a   Agbakwa, Shedrack C ^a  

^a YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

constitutive orthodoxies; international human rights education; Third World; transformation; Western societies

Indexed keywords

EID: 85012146783     PISSN: 09221565     EISSN: 14789698     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0922156501000280     Document Type: Article

References (99)

1. See U. Baxi, Random Reflections on the [Im]possibility of Human Rights Education, online at http://www.pdhre.org/dialogue/reflections.html.
2. See M. Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 Harv. Int'l L.J. 201, at 204 (2001).
3. See P. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, at 27 (New York: Continuum, 1997). We wish to point out that by citing this passage from Paulo Freire's famous work, we do not mean to subscribe to over-generalized “oppression” and “liberation.” We do not view Freire's own work as an example of this pitfall. Nevertheless, we do believe that to “generalize” is not always a pitfall. A certain measure of generalization is imperative in the very use of language. What is important, as always, is a self-reflexiveness regarding its possible negative implications. Again, we do also intend to minimize Freire's self-admitted (though contextual) lack of engagement, in the cited book, with the historical specificities of oppression, especially as it relates to the experiences of subaltern and non-subaltern women. For an important discussion concerning these two questions, see P. Freire & D. Macedo, A Dialogue with Paulo Freire, in P. McLaren & P. Leonard (Eds.), Paulo Freire: A Critical Encounter 169-176 (London: Routledge, 1993).
4. See UN General Assembly Res. 49/184 (1994), proclaiming 1995-2005 as the UN Decade of HRE.
5. See P. Kirpal, Human Rights: The Contemporary Situation-New Orientations in Education-Looking Ahead, in UNESCO, Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights 279 (Paris: UNESCO, 1986). See also J. Shand Watson, Theory & Reality in the International Protection of Human Rights (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1999). For a critique of Watson's arguments, that is sympathetic on this point, see M. Mutua, Book Review and Note: Theory and Reality in the International Protection of Human Rights, 95 AJIL 255 (2001).
6. See K. Pritchard, Political Science and the Teaching of Human Rights, 11 Human Rights Quarterly 459 (1989).
7. See D. Misgeld, Human Rights and Education: Conclusions from Some Latin American Experiences, 23 Journal of Moral Education 239 (1994). For a more extended definition, see L. Frost, Human Rights Education for Indigenous Peoples: Teaching Whose Human Rights?, 7 St. Thomas Law Review 699, at 702-703 (1995).
8. See Frost, id., at 710-714.
9. We use this expression much in the same sense as that expression has been used by Balakrishnan Rajagopal as a set of “counter-hegemonic discursive sites,” and by Karin Mickelson, as “a chorus of voices.” See B. Rajagopal, Locating the Third World in Cultural Geography, (1998-1999) Third World Legal Studies 1; and K. Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse, 16 Wis. Int'l. L.J. 353 (1998).
10. For example, see Rhoda Howard's now famous position that because they authorize brutish and cruel actions, no non-Western system of social justice can guarantee human dignity. See R. Howard, Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community, 15 Human Rights Quarterly 24 (1993). For critiques of this position, see P. Fitzpatrick & E. Darian-Smith, Laws of the Postcolonial: An Insistent Introduction, in P. Fitzpatrick & E. Darian-Smith (Eds.), Laws of the Postcolonial (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); and M. Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 Virginia Journal of International Law 338 (1995).
11. See J. Smith & R. Pagnucco, Globalizing Human Rights: The Work of Transnational Human Rights NGOs in the 1990s, 20 Human Rights Quarterly 379, at 386 (1998).
12. See E. Dorsey, Charter Making and Participatory Research, in G.J. Andreopoulos & R.P. Claude (Eds.), Human Rights Education for the Twenty-First Century, at 140 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997).
13. See D. Gierycz, Education on the Human Rights of Women as a Vehicle for Change, in Andreopoulos & Claude, id., at 112.
14. See, for instance, T.M. Franck, Is Personal Freedom a Western Value?, 91 AJIL 593 (1997), denying the Western quality of the human rights regime constructed after World War II.
15. T.M. Franck, Are Human Rights Universal?, 80 Foreign Affairs 191, at 198 (2001); see also at 202 where he asserted that human rights do not “represent Western cultural imperialism; instead they are consequence of modernizing forces that are not culturally specific.”
16. Id. While urging vigorous international action against the exceptionalism of the supposed human rights hells, Prof. Thomas Franck did not see such a measure fit enough for the reversal of the deep-rooted US mainstream scepticism and rejection of the universality of global human rights norms. Apparently, he did not see any reason for ‘wasting’ international efforts on a supposed human rights heaven. See id., at 204.
17. See G. Ezejiofor, The Development of the Concept of Human Rights: Definition and Philosophical Foundations, in A.O. Obilade & C. Nwankwo (Eds.), Text for Human Rights Teaching in Schools 1, at 16-19 (Lagos: Constitutional Rights Project, 1999).
18. For critical reflections on these reservations as well as on the USA's initial report to the HRC, see U. Baxi, ‘A Work in Progress'?: The United States’ Report to the United Nations’ Human Rights Committee, 35 Indian Journal of International Law 34 (1995); and J. Paust, Avoiding Fraudulent Executive Policy: An Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DePaul Law Review 1257 (1993). See also Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Statements on US Ratification of the CCPR, 14 Human Rights Law Journal 125 (1993). For an attempt to justify the reservations, see D.P. Stewart, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, 14 Human Rights Law Journal 77 (1993). It is important to note that Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden have filed objections to the USA's reservations. See Baxi, The Development of the Concept of Human Rights: Definition and Philosophical Foundations, at 35. For the text of US Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, see 14 Human Rights Law Journal 123 (1993).
19. See Baxi, id., at 34.
20. See Initial Report of the USA to the Human Rights Committee CCPR/C/81/Add.4 (State Party Report) (24 August 1994).
21. See Baxi, Initial Report of the USA to the Human Rights Committee CCPR/C/81/Add.4 note 19, at 37-38.
22. Id. In its letter to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, rightly in our view, argued that the US's position amounted to outright refusal to “commit itself to do anything that would require change in the present U.S. law or practice.” See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Initial Report of the USA to the Human Rights Committee CCPR/C/81/Add.4 note 19 note 19, at 125.
23. See Paust, its letter to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, rightly in our view, argued that the US's position amounted to outright refusal to “commit itself to do anything that would require change in the present note 19, at 1283.
24. P. Hountondji, The Master's Voice-Remarks on the Problem of Human Rights in Africa, in UNESCO, Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights 319, at 320-332 (Paris: UNESCO, 1986).
25. On this and similar questions, see Kirpal, The Master's Voice-Remarks on the Problem of Human Rights in Africa note 5, at 279-300.
26. See Mutua, On this and similar questions note 2, at 217.
27. See N. Chomsky, The United States and the Challenge of Relativity, in T. Evans (Ed.), Human Rights Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal 24, at 25-26 (Manchester: University Press, 1998), noting the US treatment of “that hapless race of native Americans” which are being exterminated “with such merciless and perfidious cruelty.”
28. See Baxi, The United States and the Challenge of Relativity note 19, at 45.
29. Id., at 42.
30. Id., at 39. For a detailed consideration of this phenomenon, see Interim Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions (prepared by Bacre Waly Ndiaye), A/51/457 (7 October 1996).
31. Baxi, For a detailed consideration of this phenomenon note 19, at 41.
32. Id., at 48.
33. Mutua, Id. note 2, at 217.
34. See Baxi, Id. note 2 note 19, at 46.
35. For instance, see Mutua, Id. note 2 note 19 note 2, at 217; M. Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights.
36. Virginia Journal of International Law 589 (1996); A. Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law, 5 Social and Legal Studies 321 (1996); and Hountondji, For instance note 27.
37. See Howard, Virginia Journal of International Law 589 note 10, at 315.
38. See Baxi, Virginia Journal of International Law 589 note 10 note 1, at 7.
39. For an explanation of the reasons for the difficulty that the human rights project has experienced in its attempt to gain mass legitimacy in the Third World see C.A. Odinkalu, Why More Africans Don't Use Human Rights Language, 2(1) Human Rights Dialogue 3, at 3-4 (2000).
40. See Mutua, For an explanation of the reasons for the difficulty that the human rights project has experienced in its attempt to gain mass legitimacy in the Third World note 2, at 211. See also E.K. Quashigah & O.C. Okafor, Toward the Enhancement of the Relevance and Effectiveness of the Movement for the Securement of Legitimate Governance in Africa, in E.K. Quashigah & O.C. Okafor, Legitimate Governance in Africa: International and Domestic Legal Perspectives 539, at 553 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999).
41. For instance, see B. de Sousa Santos, Toward A New Common Sense, at 337-352 (New York: Routledge, 1995).
42. See Freire, For instance note 3, at 53.
43. See Howard, For instance note 3 note 10, at 336-337.
44. See Smith & Pagnucco, For instance note 3 note 10 note 11, at 386.
45. See Mutua, For instance note 3 note 10 note 11 note 2, at 216.
46. Id., at 217.
47. See H. Lewis & I.R. Gunning, Cleaning Our Own House: ‘Exotic’ and Familial Human Rights Violations, 4 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 123 (1998) (emphasis supplied).
48. For instance, see Mutua, Cleaning Our Own House: ‘Exotic’ and Familial Human Rights Violations note 10; K. Wiredu, An Akan Perspective on Human Rights, in A.A. An-Na'im & F. Deng (Eds.), Human Rights in Africa: Cross Cultural Perspectives 243-260 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990); and E.K. Quashigah, Legitimate Governance: The Pre-Colonial African Perspective, in Quashigah & Okafor, Cleaning Our Own House: ‘Exotic’ and Familial Human Rights Violations note 44, at 43.
49. See M. Seck, A Plea for Human Rights Education in Africa, 11 Human Rights Law Journal 283, at 294 (1990).
50. See Baxi, A Plea for Human Rights Education in Africa note 19, at 34.
51. See R. Higgins, Opinion: Ten Years on the UN Human Rights Committee: Some Thoughts Upon Parting, 6 European Human Rights Law Review 570, at 581 (1996).
52. See Baxi, Opinion: Ten Years on the UN Human Rights Committee: Some Thoughts Upon Parting note 19, at 39-48.
53. Id., at 51.
54. See N.H. Kaufman & D. Whiteman, Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in the United States: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10 Human Rights Quarterly 309 (1988).
55. Cited in Baxi, Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in the United States: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment note 19, at 52.
56. See E.L. O'Brien, Community Education for Law, Democracy and Human Rights, in Andreopoulos & Claude, Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in the United States: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment note 19 note 13, at 419-420. See also D.G. Thomas, Advancing Rights Protection in the United States: An Internationalized Strategy, 9 Harvard Human Rights Journal 15 (1996).
57. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, at 369 (1989).
58. See Freire, Stanford v. Kentucky note 3, at 30.
59. See R.P. Claude, Human Rights Education: The Case of the Philippines, 13 Human Rights Quarterly 453, at 512 (1991).
60. See R.P. Claude, Human Rights Have Wings: A Note for Teachers, http://www.pdhre.org/ dialogue/wings.html.
61. See M. Abdallah-Pretceille, Human Rights in the Nursery School, in H. Starkey (Ed.), The Challenge of Human Rights Education 61 (London: Cassell, 1991).
62. See M. Bittner, Human Rights Education, A Unifying Force in the Secondary School Curriculum, 19 American Secondary Education 18 (1991). See also J. Symonides, The Duty to Promote Human Rights Education, in S. Spiliopoulou Akermark (Ed.), Human Rights Education: Achievements and Challenges 11 (Turku/Abo: Institute for Human Rights, Abo Akademy University, 1998).
63. See C.P. Henry, Educating for Human Rights, 13 Human Rights Quarterly 420 (1991); J.P. Martin, Human Rights-Education for What?, 9 Human Rights Quarterly 414 (1987); R. Pettman, Taking Human Rights Education Seriously, 7 Peace Review 211 (1995); and P.C. Aka, Education, Human Rights, and the Post-Cold War Era, 15 New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 421 (1999).
64. See R.P. Claude, The Methodologies for Human Rights Education, available online at http://www.pdhre.org/materials/methodologies.html, at 27 (of printed pages).
65. See E.F. Short, The Role of the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice in Ghana, 9 ASICL Proc. 185, at 192 (1997).
66. See B. Ibhawoh, Human Rights Organizations in Nigeria, unpublished report submitted to the Danish Centre for Human Rights, January 2001, at 21-22 (on file with the authors).
67. On this “urban-rural” rift, and resultant urban bias, see D. Olatunbosun, Nigeria's Neglected Rural Majority (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1975).
68. See Baxi, On this “urban-rural” rift, and resultant urban bias note 1, at 2.
69. This is a term that Makau Mutua has used in order to underscore the fact that such dialogue will not always lead to a consensus that retains one cultural form or the other in its “pure” form as the basis for a cosmopolitan human rights ethos. See Mutua, On this “urban-rural” rift, and resultant urban bias note 1 note 2, at 205.
70. See Frost, This is a term that Makau Mutua has used in order to underscore the fact that such dialogue will not always lead to a consensus that retains one cultural form or the other in its “pure” form as the basis for a cosmopolitan human rights ethos. note 7, at 718. See also T. Holland, Human Rights Education for Street and Working Children: Principles and Practice, 20 Human Rights Quarterly 173, at 175-178 (1998).
71. See Baxi, This is a term that Makau Mutua has used in order to underscore the fact that such dialogue will not always lead to a consensus that retains one cultural form or the other in its “pure” form as the basis for a cosmopolitan human rights ethos. note 7 note 1, at 2.
72. See Seck, This is a term that Makau Mutua has used in order to underscore the fact that such dialogue will not always lead to a consensus that retains one cultural form or the other in its “pure” form as the basis for a cosmopolitan human rights ethos. note 7 note 1 note 54, at 298; and R. Akankwasa, Human Rights Education and the Quest for Development: The Case of Ugandan Schools, 5 East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 105 (1999).
73. Plan of Action for the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education, Appendix to UN Doc. A51/506/Add.1 (12 December 1996).
74. See U. Baxi, Human Rights Education: The Promise of the Third Millennium, online at http://www.pdhre.org/dialogue/third_millenium.html, at 3. This paper is re-published in Andreopoulos & Claude, Plan of Action for the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education note 13, at 142. On a related point, see, generally, C. Filice, On the Obligation to Keep Informed About Distant Atrocities, 12 Human Rights Quarterly 397 (1990).
75. See Baxi, Human Rights Education: The Promise of the Third Millennium note 1, at 6-7 (emphasis supplied).
76. See M. Mutua, The Politics of Human Rights: Beyond the Abolitionist Paradigm in Africa, 17 Michigan Journal of International Law 591 (1996).
77. See C. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries, 41 Harv. Int'l L.J. 381, at 391-395 (2000). For other allusions to, or discussions of, this paradigm, see T. Nhlapo, Cultural Diversity, Human Rights, and the Family in Contemporary Africa: Lessons from the South African Constitutional Debate, 9 International Journal of Law and Family 208 (1995); and H. Lewis, Between Irua and ‘Female Genital Mutilation': Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1 (1995).
78. For a particularly strong version of scholarly abolitionism (as identified by Nyamu, id.), see S.M. Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in J. Cohen et al. (Eds.), Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). Another scholarly version of abolitionism (in the IHRE discourse) can be found in G. Andreopoulos, Human Rights Education in the Post Cold War Context, in Andreopoulos & Claude, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries note 13, at 16. For an account of abolitionism in the work of both domestic and international human rights NGOs, see Mutua, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries note 82, at 604-613.
79. This is the main thrust of Rhoda Howard's arguments on “cultural absolutism.” See Howard, For a particularly strong version of scholarly abolitionism note 10.
80. See Nyamu, This is the main thrust of Rhoda Howard's arguments on “cultural absolutism.” note 83, at 393.
81. For an extended analysis of this “sense of opposition between culture and rights”, see K. Engle, Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context, 32 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 291 (2000).
82. See Mutua, For an extended analysis of this “sense of opposition between culture and rights” note 82, at 608.
83. See Nyamu, For an extended analysis of this “sense of opposition between culture and rights” note 82 note 83, at 394-395.
84. See Mutua, For an extended analysis of this “sense of opposition between culture and rights” note 82 note 83 note 82, at 608.
85. Id., at 609.
86. See Freire, Id. note 3, at 30 (emphasis supplied).
87. This declaration was made recently by Catholic Archbishop Peter Sarpong of Kumasi, Ghana. See Newsweek, 16 April 2001, at 51.
88. See Kirpal, This declaration was made recently by Catholic Archbishop Peter Sarpong of Kumasi note 5, at 288.
89. We agree with Richard Devlin that the human rights discourse must remain “open-ended and revisable.” See R. Devlin, Solidarity or Solipsistic Tunnel Vision? Reminiscences of a Renegade Rapporteur, in P. Mahoney & K. Mahoney (Eds.), Human Rights for the Twenty-First Century: A Global Challenge 992, at 992-993 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993).
90. See the Osaka Declaration of the international Conference on Human Rights Education in the Asia-Pacific Region, http://www.pdhre.org/dialogue/osaka.html, at 2.
91. See Freire, the Osaka Declaration of the international Conference on Human Rights Education in the Asia-Pacific Region note 3, at 30.
92. See R. Robinson, Introduction: A Visitor Yet a Part of Everybody-The Tasks and Goals of Human Rights Education, in Starkey, the Osaka Declaration of the international Conference on Human Rights Education in the Asia-Pacific Region note 3 note 67, at 3.
93. See Towards a Pedagogy of Human Rights Education, http://www.pdhre.org/dialogue/ costarica.html, at 2 (emphasis supplied).
94. See Baxi, Towards a Pedagogy of Human Rights Education note 19, at 53.
95. See Claude, Towards a Pedagogy of Human Rights Education note 19 note 70, at 28.
96. For instance, see A. An-Na'im, Human Rights in the Muslim World, 3 Harvard Human Rights Journal 13 (1990); D. Bell, The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights: Reflections on an East-West Dialogue, 18 Human Rights Quarterly 641 (1996); Nyamu, Towards a Pedagogy of Human Rights Education note 19 note 70 note 83; Mutua, Towards a Pedagogy of Human Rights Education note 19 note 70 note 82; Quashigah & Okafor, Towards a Pedagogy of Human Rights Education note 19 note 70 note 44; and Odinkalu, Towards a Pedagogy of Human Rights Education note 19 note 70 note 43, at 3.
97. See Mutua, Human Rights in the Muslim World note 2.
98. See Freire, Human Rights in the Muslim World note note 3, at 30 (emphasis supplied).
99. See Baxi, Human Rights in the Muslim World note note 3 note 1, at 3.